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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

A STUDY OF CORRUPTION, FOREIGN AID, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Foreign aid donors increasingly demand that aid is used efficiently and effectively. This
study examines the effect of corruption levels, measured by the Corruption Perceptions Index,
within a recipient country on the levels of economic growth. A growing literature outlines the
mechanisms through which corruption impedes economic growth and is summarized within.
Additionally, as longevity gains may result from foreign aid but are not captured in economic
growth, this study computes a variable called the Life Quality Indicator (Life Quality) that
combines such gains with economic growth and examines corruption’s effect on Life Quality
growth.
As any windfall, foreign aid has been argued to exacerbate problems within corrupt
countries—causing economic decline. This study develops an interaction of corruption levels and
the ratio of aid receipts to GDP to examine the effects of this interaction on economic growth and
Life Quality growth. Conducting a regression analysis shows the relationships between the
interaction term and economic growth and the interaction term and Life Quality growth are
negative, leading to policy recommendations that corrupt countries not receive foreign aid.
Using game theory, this study predicts the outcomes of interactions between aid recipients
and donors during the Cold War, post-Cold War, and in the present. The present predicted
outcomes suggest that recipients will be the winners because they are able to choose between
receiving aid from emerging donors and from the Development Assistant Committee (DAC).
Policy guidance to the aid community includes understanding that emerging donors may exert
influence on aid recipients and programs to monitor this influence ensuring that it does not
become exploitation may be necessary.
Finally, a case study of Russia is presented, highlighting corruption and foreign aid receipts
in the post-Soviet timeframe. A separate analysis is conducted on the countries that were in the
Eastern Bloc to determine whether Russia’s corruption and aid receipts are associated with lower
levels of economic and Life Quality growth than that experienced by other Eastern Bloc
countries. While results do not show this, the negative relationship between the interaction term
and economic and Life Quality growth is also found in this subset.
KEYWORDS: Economic Development, Longevity, Corruption, Foreign Aid, Russia
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Chapter One: Introduction

In 1996, the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed the following
decade as “the decade of poverty eradication” (United Nations, p.1). Subsequently,
worldwide summits were held to formulate international agreements for development
goals that, if met, would result in such eradication. However, despite such efforts by
international, national, and subnational organizations, we are currently midway through
the second decade to eradicate poverty. To quantify poverty at present, the World Bank
uses an estimate of $1.25 per day ($456.25 per year in current U.S. dollars) as the line for
poverty in developing countries. (The original estimate of $1 per day was a result of data
available in 1990. The poverty line has been increased due to improved data availability
on price levels.)
According to data from the World Bank (2009), using current U.S. dollars as
measurement, the poorest countries on the planet were Burundi, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, and Liberia—with all three having per-capita GDPs of less than $250 (well
below the poverty line). However, in contrast, the same year, there were three countries
with per-capita GDPs 280 times greater than this $250. Luxembourg, Norway, and Qatar
all experienced wealth levels of $70,000 or greater. In fact, Luxembourg’s per-capita
GDP was over 600 times greater than that of Burundi. While such inequality is stunning,
it is far from unheard of. In fact, using data available for each year since 1960, the
country with the highest per-capita GDP is, on average, almost 600 times wealthier than
the country with the lowest per-capita GDP. While the goal of development economists
is not to decrease inequality by making the rich poorer but to do so by making the poor
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013
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richer by a relatively greater amount than the rich, data indicate that economic growth for
the poorest countries is still elusive (World Bank, 2009).
Increasing economic growth in these poor countries is the subject of a vast
amount of literature. And, as discussed in the following chapters, economic theory poses
as a guide for realizing economic growth. For example, a country with good institutions
and a competitive market should realize allocative efficiency, leading to economic
growth. Additionally, theory suggests that foreign aid receipts by countries with weak
institutions and a lack of a working market will do more harm than good in promoting
economic growth.

Purpose of Dissertation
In this dissertation, I aim to examine the relationships between weak institutions
within a country (i.e., corruption), foreign aid, and economic growth. In the following
chapters, I will detail the definition of corruption and explain the mechanisms through
which corruption, foreign aid, and their interaction affect economic growth. To add to
the social infrastructure literature concerning institutions and policies that encourage
investment and production as opposed to consumption and diversion, I use a corruption
index to that includes many more years and countries than indices previously used in this
literature. Much discussion will be given to the Corruption Perceptions Index in later
chapters, but by using this index, my analysis and findings will be more encompassing
than previous studies using corruption findings. Also, I attempt to quantify the influence
that the combination of corruption and foreign aid has on economic growth in a manner
that has not been examined in the literature.
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013
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Finally, I add to the small but increasing field of literature that asserts that quality
of life gains (typically measured through per-capita GDP growth) are not the only gains
that should be measured but that increased life expectancy (longevity) is a resultant of
improved living conditions. Following literature in this field, I compute an index that
accounts for both per-capita GDP growth and increased longevity. The aim of this
dissertation is to provide policy-relevant recommendations concerning corruption,
foreign aid and their relationship with economic growth and longevity that are datadriven and theoretically-sound.
The next chapter presents an introduction to theories concerning economic
development; the following chapter details the measurement of economic growth,
longevity, and basic variables that have been shown to influence the two, including an
introduction to foreign aid concepts. Chapter Four provides a game-theoretic model of
interactions between foreign aid donors and receipts in the past, the present, and the
future. Chapter Five discusses institutional variables that have been shown to affect
economic growth, while Chapter Six develops a research design and tests data for
relationships between corruption, foreign aid, and economic and longevity growth.
Chapter Seven provides a case study of corruption and foreign aid in post-Soviet Russia
and includes a data analysis similar to that in Chapter Six but that is limited to Former
Soviet Union countries. The final chapter discusses the policy implications of this
dissertation and presents future avenues of research.
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3

Chapter Two: A Brief Introduction to Economic Growth through Time

Introduction
This chapter provides an introduction to theories concerning economic growth.
Lewis (1955) and Solow (1956) developed seminal theories concerning economic
development that have been further developed and tested in the last sixty years. The
more recent theories described in this chapter provide a background for the reader
concerning stages of economic development within a country and why it is relevant to
examine how corruption, foreign aid, and their interaction affect economic growth.

Urbanization
In a 1988 report by the National Commission on Urbanization, it is noted that the
number of urban-dwellers in India has increased from 50 million to 200 million since
1947 (Harris, 1990). Many developed countries saw statistics like this during the 19th
century, while most developing countries just began to see large increases in urbanization
in the latter half of the 20th century. In the United States, at the beginning of the
nineteenth century, six of seven workers were employed in the agricultural sector, and by
1850, only half of the workers were employed in this sector. Table 1 illustrates this
urbanization trend from 1950 to 2030 estimates for the world overall, more developed
regions such as Europe, North America, Australia/New Zealand/Japan, and less
developed regions such as Africa, Asia (excepting Japan), Latin America and the
Caribbean, and including Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia.
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Table 2.1: Urban Population Size and Distribution by Major Geographic Area (in
millions), 1950-2030 1

Region
Total population
World
More Developed Regions
Less Developed Regions
Rural Population
World
More Developed Regions
Less Developed Regions
Urban Population
World
More Developed Regions
Less Developed Regions
Percentage of Population
Living in Urban Areas
World
More Developed Regions
Less Developed Regions
Distribution of World’s
Urban Population
World
More Developed Regions
Less Developed Regions

1950

1975

2000

2030

2519
813
280

4068
1047
3021

6071
1194
4877

8130
1242
6888

1786
386
1400

2552
344
2208

3214
311
2902

3185
228
2958

733
427
306

1516
703
813

2857
882
1974

4945
1015
3903

29.1
52.5
17.9

37.3
67.2
26.9

47.1
73.9
40.5

60.8
81.7
57.1

100
58.3
41.7

100
46.4
53.6

100
30.9
69.1

100
20.5
79.5

The urbanization process begins as advances in agriculture are introduced into a
society; food production is no longer on a subsistence basis. During the nineteenth
century, these advances included the seed drill, the horse hoe, and improved methods of
crop rotation and animal husbandry. Food surpluses are created, and there is more food
available for consumption at lower prices. Families have discretionary income to spend
1

Source: Cohen, B. 2006. “Urbanization in Developing Countries: Current Trends, Future Projections,
and Key Challenges for Sustainability.” Technology in Society, 28: 63-80.
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on non-food items, and with more food available, families can feed more children. As
many families increase their size, this society begins to experience a population increase.
The labor market drives this increased population to cities, as a nation’s output transitions
from low-productivity to high-productivity sectors (e.g., from agriculture to
manufacturing).
As discussed by Lewis (1955), increased development in poor countries occurs
when there is a shift in labor into manufacturing, and capitalists can use their profits to
increase the saving (or investing) portion of the economy, resulting in economic growth.
Using this explanation, Lewis explained the phenomenon of high growth in middleincome countries and lower growth in low- and high- income countries. He posited that
very poor countries experience low economic growth because there is a nonexistent
manufacturing sector, middle-income countries have high levels of growth due to growth
in the manufacturing sector that is taking the underemployed from the low-productivity
sector of agriculture, and, finally, high-income countries that already have a large
manufacturing sector have slower growth because all workers that can be removed from
the agricultural sector have. Combined with infrastructure (i.e., capital), urbanization
results in a concentration of workers that increases productivity and is an initial phase in
developing the economy of a nation (Harris, 1990). However, as discussed in the next
section, Lewis’s explanation did not include productivity gains from innovation and
technology.
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The Solow Residual
Prior to the work of Solow, explaining growth and output due to this urbanization
was thought to be a function of labor and capital coming together and creating output for
a nation, as shown below:
Output = f (Capital, Labor)

And, with more capital or more labor, a nation would realize more economic output.
However, as discussed in the seminal articles, “Technical Change and the Aggregate
Production Function,” and “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth” (1957
and 1956), Solow finds that half of economic growth cannot be accounted for through
changes in labor and capital. This unaccounted portion of economic growth is commonly
referred to as the Solow residual and is the effectiveness of labor, commonly referred to
as A. A higher effectiveness of labor allows a higher output with lower levels of capital
and/or labor. A takes various forms and is a catch-all for specifics, e.g., the education of
the labor force, technology, innovation, property rights of a nation, and cultural attitudes
toward entrepreneurship (Romer, 2001). A includes a society’s institutions, or the rules
of the game within a populace. North explains institutions as the limitations to behavior
imposed on the individual by society (1990). Including this factor, the equation becomes:

Output = f (Capital, Labor, A)

And, with this equation, increases in capital, labor, or A will result in increased output.
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Income Inequality
In a developing economy, as urbanization is occurring, so is a natural cycle of
economic inequality known as the Kuznets’ curve (Kuznets, 1955). Kuznets observed
that at low levels of income per-capita, inequality within a society is low. As per-capita
income increases, so does inequality. This is explained by the following: during the
early expansion of an economy, members of the society that have money are bombarded
with investment opportunities to increase their wealth, while the wages of workers within
cities are depressed due to the continual influx of cheap labor emigrating from the
agricultural sector, and the workers still in agriculture begin losing income as food
becomes cheaper. Income inequality reaches its apex, and once a certain level of average
income is reached, by-products of industrialization such as democratization or the rise of
the welfare state cause trickle-down benefits from growth and increase per-capita income.
As per-capita income continues to increase, inequality decreases.
To quantify income inequality of citizens in a given set, the Gini coefficient was
developed and is now a well-known measure. If one person in a country has all of the
money, the Gini coefficient is 100. However, if everyone in the country has one dollar,
the Gini coefficient is zero. The Gini coefficient is currently forty in the United States
and is thirty in continental Europe (Peltzman, p.177). In developed countries, the Gini
coefficient (inequality) was declining following the industrial revolution until recently,
when inequality within the developed world has increased. Alderson and Nielson (2002)
show that this is due to globalization, specifically through the mechanism of immigration
from developing countries, capital outflows to developing countries, and increased trade
between developed and developing countries. The authors contend that as the world
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013
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becomes more interconnected, global inequality will decrease, with inequality in the
developed world leveling off.

Human Capital and Institutions
Since Solow’s findings, dozens of studies have been conducted to parse out how
much a specific aspect within the residual affects growth. For example, in “Why Do
Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?” Hall and
Jones (1999) seek to discover why the average worker in the United States in 1988
produces as much in ten days as the average worker in Niger produces in an entire year.
In this article, the authors specifically analyze how years of schooling affect economic
growth. They find that roughly a quarter of the gap between the growth of the richest and
poorest countries is attributable to the years of schooling the workforce has received. As
an economy expands and a society moves toward urbanization, human capital (education)
becomes important in many ways. The type of education discussed here is irrelevant
(i.e., primary or secondary versus skills-related), as this is simply an overview of the
learning by individuals. First, increased schooling leads to increased skills, greater
worker productivity, and greater output in the economy. Also, education increases
innovation within a society, and new ideas create greater output. Finally, the ideas of an
educated populace diffuse within the population and increase the realization of new
processes and technologies (Hanushek and Wössmann, 2007). Different types of human
capital, the methods of measuring them, and how they affect economic growth will be
discussed at length in following chapters. In this subfield of growth accounting, the
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general findings have been that human capital differences account for about one-third of
growth (Romer, 2001).
Following seminal examinations of human capital’s influence on economic
growth, economists began exploring other causes of cross-country income differences.
Hall and Jones (1999) referred to the social infrastructure of a society when discussing
institutions and policies that foster economic growth. The first distinction between a
society that lacked this social infrastructure and one that did not was that a society that
fostered economic growth encourages investment over consumption. This investment
can be realized through physical capital or human capital that would increase future
output as opposed to creating goods and services for current consumption. The second
distinction between these two societies is that the society fostering growth has policies
and institutions that encourage production instead of diversion, with production being
activities increasing output and diversion being activities such as rent-seeking, that
reallocate output that has already been created.
In a ground-breaking study concerning social infrastructure, Olson (1996)
examines countries that have been divided, with one-half of the country under a marketoriented regime and the other under a Communist regime. The findings of this study
show that differences in social infrastructure within these countries results in much higher
output per worker in the market-oriented part of the country. For example, following the
reunification of Germany, a West Germany’s worker’s output was 2.5 times that of a
worker in East Germany. Since the conception of the social infrastructure idea,
prominent economists such as Burnside and Dollar (2000), Mauro (1995), Sachs and
Warner (2005), and many more have derived measures of social infrastructure to examine
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013
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how these measures are related to the level of economic growth within a society. These
measures, studies, and results are discussed at length in following chapters.

Theories Concerning Foreign Aid and Economic Growth
Another factor that has been posited to affect economic growth is the receipt of
foreign aid. When looking at the motivations for foreign aid from the 1960s to present,
encouraging economic growth through aid was not the sole impetus, but a large one for
donor countries and organizations to provide funds (Hjertholm and White, 1998).
However, with ever-increasing amounts of aid provided, citizens and government
officials from the donor countries demanded to know the results of the aid. Because of
calls for accountability, techniques to measure growth and determine if such aid was
effective would need to be developed. One theory behind foreign aid begins with the
discussion that a well-functioning economy is one dominated by market prices, property
rights, and good information from both buyers and sellers that can be used to make
decisions concerning goods and services that are worthy to purchase and provide.
Conversely, central-planning can lead to a poorly-functioning economy, as
interference with the market distorts decision-making processes, and central planners lack
information about local conditions necessary to make efficient decisions. Following this
reasoning, a lack of economic growth despite the general form of foreign aid as an overall
transfer of money is discussed by Skarbek and Leeson (2009), who explain that foreign
aid can be viewed as a method of central-planning that distorts choices and information in
the recipient economy, with the institutions that provide aid viewed as the central
planners that, from afar, provide directions to recipient countries about how to use the aid
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013
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or improve their economies. Following this vein, foreign aid may even discourage
economic growth and encourage inefficiency through market distortions. However, these
authors continue their examination of foreign aid to show that by not using aid as a form
of central planning or a general transfer but as a tool used for a specific purpose, aid can
be effective. By using aid to increase a specific output by providing more inputs, certain
outcomes may be achievable but will not immediately lead to overall economic growth.
For example, aid associated with the goal of ending malaria can create incentives and
payments that actually lead to the eradication of the disease—leading to a larger,
healthier workforce and the downstream consequence of economic growth for the
eradicated area. Foreign aid will be discussed at length in following chapters.
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Chapter Three: Literature Review of Basic Variables of Economic Growth

Introduction
There is a far-reaching literature that discusses economic growth, the effects of
corruption on economic growth, and the efficacy of foreign aid in encouraging economic
growth. The works examined in this dissertation are limited to published books, articles
from academic journals or presented at academic conferences, and documents publiclyavailable from varying organizations (e.g., the United Nations). Specifically, the purpose
of this review is to: (1) identify and assimilate the literature concerning variables that
affect economic growth, (2) summarize the findings concerning the relationship between
these variables and economic growth, and (3) identify limits in the current literature that
are conducive for future research. The following section discusses seminal publications
that empirically or theoretically discuss explanatory variables of economic growth. As
noted in “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth Regressions” (Levine and
Renelt, 1992), “over fifty variables have been found to be significantly correlated with
growth in at least one regression,” (p. 942).

Defining Economic Growth
Economic growth is an expansion in the long-term productive potential of an
economy (World Bank, 2000). The main idea behind the quest for economic growth is to
reduce scarcity in an economy and, therefore, increase standards of living. In the shortterm, economic growth is usually quantified by the Gross Domestic Product (the entire
production of goods and services) or the per-capita GDP (GDP divided by the
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013
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population). Using a measure like per-capita GDP is a simple method for researchers to
compare wealth across nations and over time. Despite the usefulness of this
measurement, scholars have recently developed other measures that aim to include the
quality and of life that are also comparable across countries.
In “The Quantity and Quality of Life and the Evolution of World Inequality,”
Becker, et al. (2005) posit that while per-capita GDP is a useful measure of quality of
life, it is necessary also to measure the quantity of life (longevity) to reach conclusions
about overall welfare. The authors discuss that while income inequality has not changed
much in recent history (p. 278), health inequality (with health measured as life
expectancy at birth) has dramatically decreased. By developing the “hypothetical lifecycle individual” (HLCI), the authors use a counterfactual measure of the mortality rate
that would be observed in the 1990s if all individuals retained their mortality rates from
the 1960s. This counterfactual allows the researches to quantify welfare increases
attributable to decreased mortality. The majority of welfare gains realized through
decreased mortality are found in the reduction of early death (before the age of twenty)
due to infectious, respiratory, and digestive diseases in developing countries. Using the
HLCI, cross-country inequality found through solely examining income is reversed when
per-capita GDP is replaced with the full income of an individual. Also, the authors find
statistically significant evidence of convergence—that the poorest countries realized
larger gains than the richest countries.
Following this vein, in “Mortality Inequality,” Peltzman (2009) develops a Gini
coefficient for mortality. The author uses mortality rates to develop a Gini coefficient
measuring years of life. A score of 100 would indicate that one person had all years of
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life, while a score of zero would indicate that everyone lived the exact same amount of
time. Worldwide, in 1852, the mortality Gini coefficient was 47.6, and in 2002, it was
10.8—indicating a much more equal distribution of life-years in 2002 than in 1852. The
closing of this gap is due to a decreased risk of premature death; there are more people
living longer. This article adds to the literature by using a well-known measure of
economic well-being (the Gini coefficient) to show that despite stagnant economic
inequality changes, welfare realized through increased life-years has dramatically
increased throughout the world in the last one hundred years.
Along this vein, Pandey, et al. (2006) develop a measure that reflects revealed
preferences for the ratio and productivity of work and leisure time. The authors
developed the Life Quality Index to discover a value of life calibrated by implied values
garnered from the societal willingness to pay for additional years of life. Their findings
suggest that, while societies differ in the ratio of work and leisure time, the formula used
in computation of the Life Quality causes these differences to only slightly affect the
score. The computation of the Life Quality is discussed in following chapters, and this
measure will be used as a dependent variable in a set of analyses found in this
dissertation.

Measuring Economic Growth
To examine the effects of foreign aid and corruption in economic growth and
changes in longevity, it is necessary to control for other factors that affect growth. In the
literature, economic growth is generally measured by calculating the changes in real percapita GDP from year to year (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Levine and Renelt, 1992).
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While this is a measure provided in many datasets across time and for various levels of
geopolitical boundaries, as each country has differing attributes that affect their economic
growth, it is necessary to account for variations in economic growth across countries and
time. When examining specific relationships between growth and other factors, it is
imperative to include explanatory variables, as not accounting for them can alter the
findings of the relationship of interest. In seminal pieces, such as “Aid, Policies, and
Growth” (2000), the authors examine relationships between economic policies, foreign
aid, and the growth of per-capita GDP, while using many variables to explain differences
in per-capita GDP growth. The explanatory variables used in these articles are usually of
a standard variety based on previous seminal publications, and the control variables used
in this study are presented below.

Basic Variables in Economic Growth
One such control variable is the initial per-capita GDP and can be the level of
GDP from any base year chosen by the researcher. The specified base year should be a
stable year with respect to economic activities and reliable data should be available for
the selected year (Agarwal, 2006). As discussed in Levine and Renelt (1992), the
theoretical argument for including this measure in a growth regression is that, following
the theory of convergence, countries with a lower level of initial GDP should experience
faster growth compared to countries that have already reached high levels of growth. As
discussed in Solow (1956), the idea of convergence comes from an exogenous growth
model based on neo-classical assumptions. The theory follows that, in countries with
similar institutions and factors like savings rates and population growth, poor countries
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should experience higher levels of per-capita GDP growth. This higher growth is
attributable to both lower diminishing returns to capital in capital-poor developing
countries and the replication of technology already available in developed countries.
However, as found in Barro’s seminal article, “Economic Growth in a Cross
Section of Countries” (1991), Levine and Renelt (1992) also found evidence supporting
only conditional convergence—indicating that poor countries grow faster than rich
countries, only if a human capital measurement is controlled for (in this study, secondaryschool enrollment) in the explanation of per-capita GDP growth.
This conditional convergence theory suggests that human capital affects growth
through two mechanisms: domestically-produced technological innovation and the speed
of adoption of technology from abroad. In different studies, human capital is measured in
various ways. These measures include literacy rates (Islam, 2004), initial secondaryschool or primary-school enrollment at a point in time (Barro, 1991), or the percentage of
females attending secondary-school and are all theoretically positively-correlated with
economic growth because a more educated populace should create more investment
opportunities and wealth within the country.
As discussed in “Economic Growth and Human Development,” Ranis, Stewart,
and Ramirez (2000) examine the idea that human capital and economic growth are
intertwined and exhibit endogeneity. The authors examine data concerning health and
educational development and economic growth to determine if countries become mired in
virtuous (or vicious) cycles wherein health and educational development support (detract
from) economic growth, which, in turn, supports (detracts from) health and educational
development. The authors find empirical evidence for the existence of such cycles, and
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the data suggest that a country can only move from a vicious cycle to a virtuous cycle by
increasing levels of health and educational development.
Using literacy rates poses many issues such as differences in measurements across
countries, the higher likelihood of sampling in urban areas where literacy is higher, and
that literacy rates in most developed countries are one hundred percent (Benhabib and
Spiegel, 1994). Using school enrollment measures shows the level of investment and
assumes that attending schools actually educates students. If the argument that the
students do not learn useful skills despite school attendance follows, the literacy rate may
prove more useful. Additionally, there are some arguments that developing countries
may experience a “brain drain” of their educated citizens. This argument postulates that
the level of school enrollment does not accurately capture the human capital in a country
because educated citizens flee the country for better opportunities elsewhere—which
would actually decrease levels of economic growth (Beine, Docquier, Rapoport, 2008).
In Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference
to Education, Becker (1994) argues that human capital is a stock variable that provides
low returns when the stock is low and, up to a certain point, the returns increase as the
stock increases 2. This implies that the return on education is higher in developed
countries (that already have high human capital stocks) than in less-developed countries 3.
Building on this idea, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) also posit that the stock of human
capital is difficult to measure and previous measures such as school enrollment or literacy
2

A stock variable is a variable that is accumulated inter-generationally and, in this case, is illustrated by
the strong positive relationship between the human capital of parents and the learning of their child
(Becker, 1994).
3
Becker (1994) notes that after very high levels of human capital stock have been developed, it becomes
increasingly difficult to absorb more knowledge.

Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013

18

rates at a specific point in time may not accurately reflect the stock variable. In this
piece, the authors cite an often-used method of estimating human capital stock that was
constructed by Kyriacou (1991), and estimate the relationship between educational
attainment and past values of enrollment in all levels of school. This index is available
for forty-two countries for the 1970s and can be extrapolated for other time periods based
on enrollment ratios. Using this estimate, the authors are able to account for the growth
in income from 1965-1985 through the growth in labor, physical capital, and human
capital.
In the same vein as Kyriacou, Barro and Lee (1993) developed a cross-country
distribution of human capital from 1960-1990, for the adult population over twenty-five,
based on average years of schooling. While the authors were able to assemble a large
and accurate dataset, there are two problems with these data as discussed in the literature.
First, as noted by the authors, measuring educational attainment of only the adult
population leaves out a sizable portion of the population, and the under-25 demographic
in developing countries is often larger than in developed nations. Additionally, as
discussed by Mulligan and Sala-I-Martin, using educational attainment as a measure of
human capital includes many assumptions that may not be correct: that workers from
each category of education are perfect substitutes for workers from other categories, that
the differences in productivity in workers with varying levels of education are
proportional to their educational attainment, and that a year of schooling is comparable
across countries and schools (p. 216).
In “Democracy and Growth,” Barro (1996) examines the influence of different
measures of human capital on economic growth. In this study, the author examines the
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average years of enrollment in secondary schools by the adult population as a whole,
parsed out by gender, and how these measures affect economic growth and the
development of democratic institutions. The findings show that in the development of
democratic institutions, of the variables GDP, life expectancy, educational attainment of
males, and educational attainment of females, the most significant and the largest effect is
found through the educational attainment of females. The importance of female
education to economic growth and longevity improvements is thought to be realized
mostly through the mechanism of lowering fertility rates. Increased levels of secondary
school attendance by females reduce their fertility levels in almost all countries (Ranis,
Stewart, and Ramirez, 2000), resulting in lower levels of population growth and higher
levels of economic growth. However, this measure can suffer from a lack of data
availability as, until recently, it was not a measure that was gathered by all countries.
Despite the problems found in using educational attainment as a measure of
human capital, de la Fuente and Domenech (2006) suggest that many of the
inconsistencies of findings concerning human capital in empirical growth literature are
caused by poor data quality. In “Human Capital in Growth Regressions: How Much
Difference does Data Quality Make?” the authors compile meta-estimates of the
coefficients found for years of schooling in the growth equation. Their argument is that
educational attainment data quality suffers because of missing values and measurement
error. The authors hypothesize that studies in this literature often have conflicting
findings that can be attributed to differences in data quality. Using reliability ratios to
measure data quality, the authors find that as schooling data becomes more accurate, the
coefficient of human capital in the growth equation increases. The takeaway point of this
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piece for future researchers is to ensure that the data concerning human capital are
accurate.
In this dissertation, I use the percentage of females enrolled in secondary schools
over time across countries as a measurement of human capital. However, for some
countries, specifically in former Soviet Union countries following the dissolution of the
USSR, this data is not available. In these cases, I will use a variable that measures the
average number of years of total schooling the population over the age of fifteen has
completed. The drawbacks of both variables have been mentioned, however, I agree with
previous literature that these variables are more useful than literacy rates as a human
capital measurement, for the reasons discussed previously. To address problems with
data quality, the values I will use come from the World Bank Development Indicators, a
source that has been collecting human capital data for over five decades. I argue that by
lowering the age from the usual twenty-five to fifteen, human capital levels in developing
countries with large populations of young people will be more accurately represented.
An additional variable that warrants further discussion and often included in this
basic category of explanatory variables is the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF)
score. The ELF score represents the probability that two randomly selected individuals
from a specific country will not be in the same ethnolinguistic group—the higher the
score, the more fractionalized the country (Mauro 1995). A higher score indicates a
higher level of fractionalization within the country.
The theoretical argument is that higher ELF scores are correlated with lower
economic growth through various mechanisms. One mechanism is explained through the
fact that a country with a high ELF score contains heterogeneous groups of people—
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these groups may differ in their religion, their language, or their ethnic background.
Because of the high levels of heterogeneity, each group will have its own preferences
concerning service packages from the government.
As it is argued that individuals will be more loyal to their individual group than to
their country, the group that is currently in power in the country will impose laws to
benefit its group and to be congruent with their beliefs—not necessarily to promote
policies that benefit the entire country4. This type of group-wide rent-seeking
undermines institutional quality and allocative efficiency, as well as leads the other
groups to lose respect for the government. The other groups may challenge the
government through unlawful coup d’états or political uprisings. If the groups are of
comparative size, a different group may be in power next and change the laws set by the
previous government and engage in its own rent-seeking. A large ELF score has been
shown to decrease economic growth by discouraging investment through increased
political instability, assassinations, and black market premiums. Table 3.1 shows
examples of the ELF scores from 1985 of countries selected to show a range of ELF
Scores.
Table 3.1: ELF Scores of Selected Countries
Country
United Arab Emirates
Australia
Brazil
United Kingdom
China
United States
Russia

ELF Score
0.242
0.437
0.576
0.389
0.132
0.575
0.333

4

While this is the general idea behind the ELF score, the overall political institutions in place will
determine the extent to which the group in power can impose group-only benefits.
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Foreign Aid Receipts
In addition to the previously-discussed variables that influence economic growth,
recently, theories concerning determinants of growth have expanded to include aid
receipts (Levy, 1988 and Boone, 1995). Academics and practitioners have hypothesized
and looked toward theory for reasons as to why findings in this literature show that
foreign aid receipts have not increased overall growth rates. These findings are relevant
for the entire aid community: international financial institutions, developed countries that
fund such institutions, and developing countries that receive aid. It is imperative to
understand what has gone wrong in this process and under what conditions aid can be
used to encourage global economic growth.
Aid acts as a transfer from one institution to another. Following the two-gap
model from Chenery and Strout (1966), a recipient country is not experiencing economic
growth due to a gap between a necessary amount of investment for economic growth and
the domestic savings or a gap between a necessary level of imported goods needed as
inputs for production and earnings from foreign exchange. Based on this model, foreign
aid could “fill the gap” presented by either deficiency and result in economic growth.
This model became the basis for future research focusing on how the use of foreign aid
affects economic growth in the recipient country. Burnside and Dollar (2000) argue that
a lump-sum of aid increases investment in productive sectors of the recipient’s economy
(in countries with low levels of corruption), while Easterly (2002) posits that such aid
simply increases state consumption and payments to elites (in countries with higher levels
of corruption). As Burnside and Dollar (2000) discuss, the likelihood that aid will be
invested, as well as how productive the investment will be, depends on specific policies
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of the country. Weak institutions pose problems for investment. An efficient judicial
system is needed to enforce contracts, as property rights are necessary to encourage any
investment, and efficient bureaucracies are needed to ensure timely licensing (Mauro
1995). Bureaucratic inefficiency affects growth directly and indirectly--directly by
misallocating investment into unproductive sectors and indirectly through lowering the
overall investment rate. For example, a three-month-long wait for a restaurant permit
directly affects growth because the investment must be on hold for three months.
Indirectly, such a wait may discourage restaurateurs from even venturing into this
business area.
Institutions, such as property rights, have been developed by humans to shape our
interaction and reduce uncertainty. Change in institutions is usually incremental and
evolutionary but can occur rapidly during revolutionary periods. Neo-classical theory
suggests that efficient institutions will prevail; however, the continued existence of poor
institutions has led some to argue that neo-classical assumptions do not always hold. The
argument against these assumptions suggests that the information feedback process for
institutions does not operate efficiently but may require exogenous correction from
outside of the market. For example, in the third world, these imperfect institutions may
result in a large underground economy and rampant corruption as residents of these
countries may incur lower transaction costs within the black market than in the formal
sector. In fact, as discussed by North (1990), such poor institutions can incentivize
unproductive activity of their citizens. To change the incentives in this economy, the
government may intervene and create harsher laws concerning black market dealings.
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Such an exogenous correction can aid in improving such a country’s institutions and
pushing it toward economic growth.
However, corruption may be a byproduct of another underlying aspect of the
country. As discussed in “Foreign Aid and Rent-Seeking,” (Svensson, 2000),
disbursements of aid often cause a decrease of public goods in fractionalized countries.
For the reasons noted previously in this chapter, a fractionalized society’s competing
social groups participate in more rent-seeking activities than a homogeneous society.
Using game theory, the author finds that, given the expectation of foreign aid, competing
groups are better off in the long-term to cooperate and allocate the aid effectively.
However, the larger the windfall is, the larger the short-term impetus for the groups to not
cooperate but to extract rents from the payoff. Using the ELF score, a corruption index,
and foreign aid data, the author finds that in a fractionalized country, there is a positive
correlation between foreign aid and corruption. This piece introduces the idea that a
fractionalized country that receives with a windfall from foreign aid is likely to
experience corruption.

Foreign Aid for Geopolitical Reasons
As discussed in the seminal article, “Dimensions of Conflict in the General
Assembly” (Alker, 1964), during the Cold War and prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall,
vote-buying schemes were used by both the Americans and the Soviets. In this article,
Alker studies voting in the 1961-1962 United Nations General Assembly to observe the
effect of the Cold War on voting patterns. With data that includes seventy roll-call votes
(which can result in yes, no, or abstention) by United Nation members, the author uses a
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factor analysis and notes that sixty-four percent of the votes can be explained through the
East-West rift. Data concerning economic aid from the United States and the Soviet
Union is included in a regression analysis to predict the voting patterns found. The
highest predictor of voting in Soviet alignment is found to be the recent receipt of Soviet
aid and trade with the Soviet Union. This effect is found to be larger than the recent
receipt of aid from the United States or trade with the United States. Additionally, it is
noted that $100 of per-capita Soviet aid explained voting patterns better than formal
group membership. While this piece of literature is quite dated, it indicates that the
relationship between foreign aid and voting cohesion is not novel.
In this same vein, Wittkopf’s “Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A
Comparative Study” (1973) begins with the news that several United States Senators had
publicly-expressed the belief that countries that have received aid had not shown their
appreciation through votes in the United Nations General Assembly and that, in light of a
recent vote, their foreign aid should be decreased. The author examines all roll-call votes
from 1963 and 1966 from the General Assembly. Data concerning aid receipts is divided
into bilateral aid from a donor within the Developmental Assistance Committee and
bilateral aid from a donor within the Soviet Bloc from 1962-1967. The author
hypothesizes that bilateral aid and voting agreement between the donor and the recipient
should be found. The results show strong correlations in both time periods between aid
and voting agreements when the United States was the donor, weaker correlation only
with the aid provided in 1964 when the Soviet Union was the donor, and no significant
correlation when other DAC or Soviet bloc countries are the donors.
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However, following the Soviet collapse, the aid game changed. As recipient
countries did not have another superpower donor to choose from, acceptance of aid
conditions was required. While not all conditions of aid were met or enforced, the
conditions of democratization and human rights were often tied to aid receipts. As
discussed in “Does U.S. Aid Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated
Analysis,” (Dreher, et al., 2008), not all geopolitical aspects of aid have disappeared. The
authors use panel data from 1973-2002 to analyze the effect of financial assistance from
the United States on the voting patterns of recipients in the United Nations General
Assembly, specifically in comparison to the other countries in the G-7 (France, United
States, United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Canada, and West Germany). The contribution of
this piece to this substantial literature comes in disaggregating aid. By classifying types
of aid, the authors hypothesize that different kinds of aid will result in different levels of
voting compliance within the General Assembly. For example, emergency aid given for
humanitarian reasons has been previously shown to be given altruistically (Abrams and
Lewis, 1993). However, program and project-related aid has been consistently shown to
be motivated by the self-interest of donors. Using a Two-Stage-Least-Squares analysis,
aid provided by the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden is shown to be a valid
instrumental variable for aid provided by the United States and the G-7 donors, as these
four countries have been shown to not grant aid for geopolitical reasons. The authors
find that receiving project and program aid significantly increases the likelihood of voting
compliance with the United States within the General Assembly. The same specification
using bilateral aid from the other countries in the G-7 did not show such a pattern.
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Additionally, in “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign
Aid and Bribery at the United Nations,” (2008), Kuziemko and Werker examined foreign
aid provided by the United States and voting within the Security Council. As explained
by the authors, the United Nations Security Council has five permanent members: China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Also on the council are ten
non-permanent seats that are reserved for countries serving two-year terms. Each year,
five non-permanent seats become open, and a country has to be nominated by its regional
caucus and voted in by two-thirds of the General Assembly. The five members that retire
each year are not available for immediate reelection. To pass a resolution, nine of the
fifteen members must vote in favor. However, each of the permanent members can veto a
resolution. As discussed in the article, some years have more pressing issues than others,
thus, giving the non-permanent members of that year more opportunities to vote on
global security issues. Using historical panel data, the authors examine the changes in
foreign assistance to non-permanent members from the United States and the United
Nations. The authors found that when a non-permanent country rotates on to the Security
Council, the amount of aid given solely by the United States increases by fifty-nine
percent, and the amount given by the United Nations increases by eight percent.
Additionally, the authors cite examples when aid was cut following a vote on the Security
Council. For example, following the 1991 vote concerning the resolution to use force in
Iraq, the assistance provided to a dissenting Yemen drastically decreased.
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Conditional Aid and Economic Growth
Because of the knowledge that weak institutions and corruption can affect a
country’s economic growth, much recent literature focusing on aid’s role in economic
growth draws on institutional efficiency and corruption levels to explain that differing
levels of the two can result in differing levels of aid effectiveness (Collier and Dehn,
2001; Burnside and Dollar, 2004; Rajan and Subramanium, 2005). Making consistent
results more difficult to find, some empirical studies have found diminishing returns and
nonlinearity when examining the relationship between aid and economic growth. In
“Aid, Policies, and Growth in Developing Countries: A New Look at the Empirics,” the
authors generate a score for countries depending on several institutional quality factors.
Using this score, data concerning official development assistance (ODA) and measures of
economic growth, the authors examine the relationship between ODA, institutional
policies, and economic growth (Alvi and Shukralla, 2008). Their findings indicate that
countries that receive high levels of aid (as measured by ODA as a percentage of GDP)
and have a low score in institutional quality show diminishing returns to aid. Other
literature has found that in countries with very low institutional quality scores, aid does
not help economic growth at all (Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp, 2004).
Following research that examines institutional quality and economic growth, the
current conclusion concerning development assistance indicates that aid can be best
utilized for economic growth by countries with low levels of corruption and high
institutional quality. Unfortunately, some developing countries with low levels of
economic growth still have weak institutions and high corruption. The apparent problem
with foreign aid in these countries, as previously noted, is that these countries do not
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experience economic growth from ODA. One way that foreign aid donors can
incentivize such countries to improve their institutional quality is by requiring disbursed
aid be contingent on such improvements. Restricting aid can mean that before, after, or
during the disbursal of aid, the receiving country must do something (e.g., experience
reductions in the number of black market transactions).
However, imposing conditions on aid or restricting its receipt is not a perfect way
to ensure economic growth in the receiving country. As discussed by Amegashie,
Ouattara, and Strobl (2007), public economics theory somewhat supports the idea of
restricted transfers. For a domestic example, food stamps are a type of restricted
transfers. The money given by the government to the grocer (indirectly, through the food
stamp beneficiary) is only able to be used for certain items. This somewhat alleviates
moral hazard issues that transfers, such as food stamps, could be used for purchasing
alcohol or drugs. However, as basic utility theory explains, an unrestricted transfer will
result in a (usually) higher level of utility than a restricted one. For example, if the food
stamp recipient is not hungry but needs to pay rent, an unrestricted transfer from the
government would raise their utility more than the food stamps. This example illustrates
the “deadweight losses” (p. 2) discussed in “Moral Hazard and the Composition of
Transfers: Theory with an Application to Foreign Aid” (and previously in Blackkorby
and Donaldson, 1988 and Gahvari and Enlinson, 2007) that occur when incomplete
information concerning the recipient’s preferences is held. In the context of foreign aid,
the World Bank (1998) takes note of this economic principal by advising that aid to
countries with sufficient institutions be that of the unrestricted kind.
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While the literature that discusses and analyzes the effects of applying restricted
transfers to foreign aid is quite small, Amegashie, Ouattara, and Strobl (2007) draw upon
theories from more traditional applications to develop a model to explain the interactions
between a recipient country and a donor agency and how the actors affect whether
restricted or unrestricted aid is given. The main proposition of their model is that a donor
that gives restricted aid to a recipient will reduce the proportion of restricted aid with an
improvement in the level of governance of the recipient. Using data from the OECD
concerning the type of aid provided and governance measures including indices of both
political liberties and civil liberties, the authors examine the relationship between the two
from 1993 to 2003. They conclude that as governance improves in one period, the
proportion of restricted aid does, in fact, decrease in the following periods.
Additionally, in “Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction”, Collier and Dollar
(2002) develop a theory to find an efficient poverty-reducing allocation of aid. As
discussed previously, the purpose of foreign aid throughout history has not necessarily
been to reduce poverty. However, with this noted, these authors find a method of aid
allocation truly meant to reduce poverty. Using ratings of twenty aspects of national
policy from the World Bank and the levels and distribution of a nation’s income, the
authors compare current aid allocations to a “poverty-efficient” allocation. Their findings
suggest that the current allocation of aid is not optimal in reducing poverty. Currently, as
a recipient country’s policies improve in these twenty aspects of national policy, their aid
is decreased. To efficiently reduce poverty, the authors suggest increasing levels of aid
as policies improve. The final suggestion from the authors is that aid should be directed
to countries with residents that live in poverty. This, seemingly simple policy
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recommendation is found by the authors to not currently be a prerequisite for aid
disbursal.

Conclusion
This discussion of basic economic variables such as initial per-capita GDP,
human capital, the ELF score, and foreign aid receipts and how these variables influence
economic growth will be used as a foundation for later chapters that examine how
institutional factors can influence economic growth, net of other factors. The following
chapter presents a game-theoretical model of foreign aid based on theories and findings
presented thus far.
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Chapter Four: Game Theory Analysis of Foreign Aid

Introduction
Foreign aid has been a hotly-contested issue among academics and practitioners
for centuries (Morgenthau, 1962). In the seminal article, “A Political Theory of Foreign
Aid,” Morgenthau discusses six types of foreign aid while noting that all have political
motivations behind their disbursal. In previous centuries, foreign aid with the intention
of out-and-out bribery was not condemned to be unethical. However, recently, this
practice has been somewhat replaced with foreign aid for humanitarian, subsistence,
military, prestige, or economic development uses. As donor countries are argued to not
simply give their money away, they may retain expectations for the use of their aid or
have not-fully-disclosed motivations for giving. For example, during the Cold War, the
Soviets and the Americans used aid and trade as a mechanism to influence newlyindependent countries. Both superpowers would try to trump the other’s packages to
less-developed countries. As discussed in The Giant’s Rival: the USSR and Latin
America, Blasier (1983) asserts that the not fully-disclosed motivation behind the U.S.
aid was to keep new countries from adopting Communist policies. In this period, there
were many recipient countries that wielded power over the donor countries; many leaders
of recipient countries would hold out from accepting aid packages or confirming trade
terms, in order to receive the best offer. Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, specifically,
held bargaining power over the Soviets, as these countries produced products that Soviet
consumers were in tremendous need of, such as clothing and food products (Blasier, p.
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167). However, Nicaragua and Cuba did not hold such bargaining power because they
were quite dependent on the Soviet Union for economic support.
However, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, members of the DAC (the Development Assistance Committee, comprised of the
World Bank, the IMF, and 24 Western country members) became practically the only
donors (with small amounts given by Arab countries) in the world. The CMEA (Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance) was composed of Soviet-bloc countries and provided
their largest amount of ODA (Official Development Assistance) in the time period 19841988. 5

Figure 4.1 Net ODA by Major Donor Group 1969-1997

As the only donors, the DAC gained power to impose conditions upon the receipt
of aid. This committee established standards concerning Official Development
5

Source: Manning, Richard. “Will “Emerging Donors” Change the Face of International Cooperation?”
OECD/DAC Meeting, 2006.
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Assistance (ODA) disbursal, and its aid provision adhered to these rules. Such standards
are important to DAC countries, and arguably recipient countries, because much aid is
given for the stated purpose of economic growth, and such conditions would ensure that
foreign aid was going toward this--and not being channeled through corrupt means that
would work cause the opposite. Additionally, these standards have evolved over the last
century to optimize the outcomes of the aid process as the DAC has gained experience
with aid disbursal.
However, in recent years, non-Western donors, such as China and India, have
greatly increased their aid provision. As a result, recipient countries are once again
gaining power by having two different sources to choose from. While these donors are
increasing the worldwide level of aid, they are not adhering to the standards and
conditions developed through the experience of the DAC. When receiving aid from nonDAC countries, recipients may not be subject to restrictions like privatizing national
companies or improving their human rights situation. However, while recipients may be
able to better negotiate aid packages, they should consider that even if their aid package
is not tied to policy changes, donor countries may have underlying motivations.
In this chapter, I will discuss the motivations of donors and recipients in recent
history and how these motivations determine their actions. As the period between the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new donors represents a monopoly
that Western countries had over the aid community, much discussion will be focused
here. As economic growth and eradicating the plague of third-world living standards
(World Bank 2010) has become the overarching goals of foreign aid during this time,
these economic concerns are seen as the motivations for much aid given throughout these
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years and will be discussed at length. Finally, I will use game theory to explain actions
taken by donors and recipients during the Cold War, the 1990s, and currently.

Recipients
While the donors of foreign aid have been in the recent past a somewhat Westernconcentrated group, aid recipients are much more diverse. In the past ten years, more
than three-quarters of the countries in the world have received some type of foreign aid.
These countries range from the most populated countries of China and India to some of
the least populated countries like Belize and Tonga (World Bank, 2010). The vast array
of recipient countries makes it somewhat difficult to discuss their preferences and
reactions to the aid process, however, a reasonable assumption is that recipient countries
want aid and would prefer aid without restrictions to the restricted kind.
As discussed by Oduor-Owinga (2007), former French and Portuguese colonial
territories often receive different forms of aid than other countries: they may receive
higher levels of overall and untied aid from their former colonial rulers, and it has been
shown that these countries receive lower levels of aid from multi-lateral organizations
and the United States. The general reasoning behind this is that the mother countries
have specialized interests in the former colonies, and, therefore, provide more aid. And,
as more aid is provided by the colonizing countries, less is provided by other
organizations and countries. Additionally, as discussed briefly by Poirine (1999) in “A
Theory of Aid as Trade with Special Reference to Small Islands,” small countries and
countries located in strategic geographical areas also receive aid differently than other
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countries. Using the example of Cuba, Poirine notes the large amounts of aid provided
by the Soviet union due to Cuba’s proximity to the United States.
Aside from these special cases of recipient countries (and perhaps including these
countries), assumptions about their preferences can be made. On the country-level,
higher levels of unrestricted aid are preferred. Aid that is not based on specific
conditions acts as an increase in income to the country—allowing their utility to be
increased in line with their preferences. Restricted aid may be preferable to no aid at all
but can create problems within the recipient country. As noted by the World Bank
(2010), in countries without adequate administrative capacity, positions may need to be
created to monitor aid and report findings to the donor—creating unintended costs.
Furthermore, meeting specific conditions can be both politically and monetarily costly to
the government of recipient countries.
During the Cold War, aid-receiving countries could usually choose between aid
offered from the West or the East. As discussed by Blasier in The Giant's Rival: The
USSR and Latin America, (1983), from the 1950s until the Soviet collapse, both large
donors, the United States and the Soviet Union, offered competing aid packages to many
developing countries. These usually-unrestricted offerings were geopolitical in nature
with the attempt to try to influence the government of many newly-independent
countries. Specifically in Latin America, the over-arching theme behind Soviet aid was
to destabilize the region and carry Latin American countries onto the non-aligned (with
the United States) route (Blasier, 1983). While the two competitive donors put together
aid packages, the recipients were pitting them against each other for their own benefit.
As revolutions throughout Latin America were taking place, most developing countries
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had no direct intent of immediately adopting a U.S.-inspired form of democracy or
Soviet-style communism but could emphasize such choices to extract larger amounts of
unrestricted aid from the donors.
Following the Soviet collapse, recipients were faced with a united front of
multilateral agencies and Western countries that looked to use foreign aid efficiently and
effectively. The days of unrestricted aid were replaced with talk of institutional quality
that would best utilize the aid provided and measurements of factors that would cause aid
to be discontinued if not met. Without a viable alternative, many recipient countries were
forced to either meet these conditions or, at least, pretend that they did by falsifying
documents or fabricating statistics. Such conditions include but are not limited to the
privatization of government-controlled industries, inflationary precautions, improvement
of human rights, or the restructuring of the tax code (Kenan, 1994). While it is argued
that such changes provided a catalyst for the economic growth realized in the late 1990s,
much research has focused on the corrupt practices and rent-seeking that redirected
millions of dollars of aid into private pockets during this period (World Bank, 1992).
As the hegemony enjoyed by western countries in the world of aid is once again
being threatened, recipients have begun to realize that large amounts of aid are available
from areas other than the Western world. This major recognition has far-reaching
implications across the aid community. For example, specific projects funded with aid
from China and India are not held to the same environmental and safety standards as
projects funded by the World Bank. Additionally, such aid from China is often
accompanied by lowered trade barriers and foreign direct investment in the receiving
country—flagged by some as a possible exploitation of low-income African countries
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that can export commodities to China and import their goods made with cheap labor 6.
While recipients may be glad to see unrestricted aid, it is imperative that they take into
consideration the larger implications of their acceptance.

Donors
On the other end of the aid relationship, donors can also be classified in various
ways. As an example, the donor decision could be made by Congress or by the leader of
a private organization or, at an aggregated level by an international organization such as
the World Bank or the United Nations. Depending on the position of the decision-maker,
different games and motivations will ensue. Additionally, as political actors or
circumstances change, it can be expected that the motivations of actors will change, thus,
altering the foreign aid game.
Two of the largest and most well-known international financial institutions are the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). As discussed in The
Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers, by Ngaire Woods (2006),
both institutions were created post-World War II, were conceived at the Bretton Woods
meeting of economic officials in 1944, and are headquartered in Washington D.C. The
original charters of both institutions direct them to stimulate employment and real
income, facilitate balanced growth of international trade, and develop the productive
resources of all members. These two institutions employ a combined 13,000 people, and
are home to the largest gathering of economics Ph.D.’s in the world. However, despite
6

It is argued that as China provides aid to African countries, trade between the donor and recipient is
increasing and becoming more open. As Chinese exports are inexpensive due to cheap domestic labor,
African countries, despite their extremely low-incomes, will be able to import Chinese products.
Additionally, Chinese demand for commodities has been increasing rapidly and improved trade with
African countries may augment exploitation of the continent’s natural resources (Manning, 2006).
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the fact that both of their memberships consist of over 180 countries, most of the
economic professionals in these institutions have been educated in the United States and
subscribe to the liberal economic theories that are embedded in U.S. thinking 7. These
factors contribute to the fact that the two institutions are de facto led by U.S. Treasury
officials and their decisions and policies have come to be known as the “Washington
consensus,” even though the U.S. only holds seventeen percent of the voting rights in
each.
In addition to these international financial institutions (IFIs), individual countries
and groups and individuals within countries also officially provide aid. While aid is
sometimes provided in an altruistic fashion, donors typically have their preferences about
who should receive the aid, how it should be used, and the issue of repayment. In
“Evidence on Changes in Aid Allocation Criteria,” (Claessens, Cassimon, and
Campenhout, 2009), the authors look at historic data concerning aid to examine reasons
for differences in bilateral aid. Their argument begins with a discussion of how
geopolitical interests have beset aid provision in the recent past.
Geopolitical interests that may provide an impetus for aid include colonial ties,
such as between the Francophone countries and their mother country or specific strategic
interests, such as U.S. aid to Egypt and Pakistan. However, in historical data concerning
bilateral aid, the most discussed and most significant strategic interest in giving aid is the
Cold War. Such motivations can be explained through various ways. First, what is
referred to as the small country bias, which means that small countries typically receive
more aid (in proportion to their GDP) than large countries, can be explained through two
7

Such examples of these theories include global market-liberalism, free-trade policies, and the overall
functioning of the free market.
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competing arguments. The selection bias argument to this notion is that larger countries
may have better access to borrowing funds on international markets due to more capital
and credit available—making small countries less able to borrow funds and more reliant
on aid receipts from larger countries. Additionally, as the spread of communism and
anti-communist sentiments acted as an impetus for aid, it was to the detriment of
restricted aid. Powerful donor countries did not have significant leverage on recipient
countries to demand conditions of aid be met—as the recipients could volley between the
Soviet Union and the United States, looking for the best aid deal.
The geopolitical argument explaining the small country bias is that small
countries’ populations are over-represented in international organizations like the United
Nations (and constitute many votes). Consequently, aid receipts may be cause for a small
country to vote in a specific fashion. So, bilateral aid can be viewed as a vote-buying
scheme for countries that lack votes but have money to give. Despite the opportunity to
pit aid packages from the Soviet Union and the United States against each other,
acceptance of such aid did come with some expectations from the donors. As discussed
previously, many studies have shown that bilateral aid from the United States and the
Soviet Union resulted in higher voting compliance than bilateral aid from other countries.
Despite the geopolitical strings that were delivered along with aid from the United
States, these studies have all shown that aid from the other DAC countries is not
associated with voting compliance within the United Nations. Bilateral aid from these
countries, coupled with aid provided by IFIs has focused on improving good governance,
transparency, and aid efficacy in recipient countries. Aid restrictions have required
countries to make improvements that improve economic development. Without the threat
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of stopping aid receipts, recipient countries lack motivation to change policies that are
stifling their economies. Tying aid to improved institutional efficiency and policies is
referred to by Claessens, Cassimon, and Campenhout (2009) as a “more optimal
allocation” of aid across countries (p. 206).

Emerging Donors
As the previous sections have detailed the restrictions placed on aid during the
post-Cold War period, this section discusses the emerging donors in the aid community
and how they are changing the landscape in of foreign aid. In “Whose aid? Whose
influence? China, emerging donors and the silent revolution in development assistance,”
Woods (2008) argues that despite the realized benefits of conditional aid, new donors
such as Brazil, China, Saudi Arabia, Korea, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and India
have been changing the aid game. Instead of encouraging the new funds, some in the aid
community are worried about a return to the Cold War-like competition model for
donors. And, as seen before the collapse of the Soviet Union, these competitive pressures
on donors can decrease aid restrictions and allow recipients to choose among different aid
packages. An example discussed by Woods is that China provides aid to Zimbabwe and
Sudan—despite the enormous human rights problems in both countries that have kept
Western aid out of the countries.
There is evidence that these emerging donors have, in fact, helped the economies
of such countries. The Chinese government argues that they provide aid while respecting
the recipient’s sovereignty, and as discussed by the OECD DAC Chair, Richard
Manning, these emerging donors are actually not entirely new to the aid game and have
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been working with recipient countries to actively improve economic growth. However,
the economic growth of these recipient countries is being realized through channels such
as better terms of trade with China and technical assistance from India. This, combined
with the Chinese statement citing “mutual benefit” (Manning, p. 6) as a motivation for
providing aid to developing countries flags that China may certainly have some less-thanwholly-altruistic reasons for being an emerging donor. While there is not currently a
Cold War between these new donors and the Western aid community, in following
sections, there will be more discussion concerning the implications of Chinese aid
donation and how it will affect the Western world.
From here, I will focus on the modern historical contexts of foreign aid to
demonstrate the strategies of donors and recipients using a game theoretical model. The
first time period analyzed will be the Cold War period, with the United States and the
Soviet Union as donors. The post-Cold War period analysis includes DAC (western)
countries as the foreign aid donor, and the current period includes both Western countries
and emerging donors. While it is arguable that recipient countries vary on their specific
preferences, a generic recipient country will be mostly used in the analysis for all time
periods. This assumption will be discussed in following sections.

Game Theory
Game theory was developed as a branch of applied mathematics and was studied
intensively in the late twentieth century. Typical applications of the theory are in the
fields of economics, politics, and evolutionary biology. A game theory model can be
useful when discussing the various relationships and decisions involved in the process of
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foreign aid disbursal. As discussed in Osborne’s An Introduction to Game Theory, while
game-theoretical models may not be perfectly accurate in predicting behavior between
actors, such models can improve our understanding of a process. These models contain
underlying neo-classical assumptions that are in line with rational choice theory. These
theories suggest that when faced with choices, a rational actor will choose the best action
based on her preferences and constraints. However, it has been argued that neo-classical
assumptions do not always hold.
The rationality behind these assumptions is evident when the actors consistently
make choices that result in the best outcome available and possible, and for the purpose
of the model, these assumptions are used with the acknowledgment of their shortcomings.
A further assumption underlying rational choice is that preferences are transitive: if a>b,
b>c, then a>c. Among equally attractive choices, the chosen action’s outcome will be at
least as good as the outcomes of the other choices. As in economic models, preferences
can be indicated by numbers, with higher numbers designating higher levels of utility. In
game theory models, these numbers are called payoff functions, and the higher values of
payoffs will signal preferred choices.
Depending on the rules of the game and the payoffs available to the actors,
various assumptions about decision-making can be made—with the final solution to the
game often predictable. A strategic game is one in which the actors each have
preferences and can take actions based on their preferences. Each player must make a
decision independent of the other players; however, the payoffs received may change
depending on the choices of the other players. The infamous Prisoner’s Dilemma is an
example of a strategic game that ignores temporal factors by simply having the actors
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choose an action and not allowing them to change their mind. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is
as follows: two suspects of a crime are separated and questioned about the crime. If
neither admits to its commission, the police do not have enough evidence to prosecute
either. However, if one does confess and one does not, the confessor will be better off
and the other will be worse off. If both confess, then they both receive lighter sentences
but are not as well off as if both had not confessed. An example of a payoff matrix of
this dilemma is shown below, where the numbers are indicative of utility:

Table 4.1: Prisoners’ Dilemma

Suspect 2

Suspect 2

NOT CONFESS

CONFESS

Suspect 1

NOT CONFESS

6, 6

-1, 5

Suspect 1

CONFESS

5, -1

0, 0

Based on these estimated payoffs, it is possible to determine the course of action
for each player. However, the action chosen by each player not only embodies elements
of rational choice, but the decision must also be made with consideration of the choices
of the other player. When players have experience with the game, they can develop
beliefs about the choices others will make. When each player makes the best decision
based on their preferences, after taking into consideration their beliefs about the choices
of the other players, what is called a Nash equilibrium has been reached. When such
equilibrium is reached, no player has incentive to deviate. To continue with the example
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013

45

of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both suspects will choose to confess because both have
potentially-higher payoffs upon confession than staying quiet. This outcome is parallel to
the tragedy of the commons often found when public goods are in use. Each player will
have an incentive to free ride or attempt to obtain a higher individual payoff than would
be achieved if all chose the socially optimal outcome. However, because every player
will make this same free-riding choice, they will all end up with lower payoffs.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is an example of a non-zero-sum game because they both
prefer the outcome of (NOT CONFESS, NOT CONFESS) to (CONFESS, CONFESS).
In a zero-sum game, also known as a strictly competitive game, the players’ interests are
opposing: to maximize one player’s payoff minimizes the opponents’ payoff. In such a
game, the players’ preferences run in opposite directions. An example of a strictly
competitive game is found below:

Table 4.2: Strictly Competitive Game 8

8

Player 2

Player 2

L

R

Player 1

T

2,1

0,5

Player 1

B

1,3

5,0

Source: Osborne, M. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
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As shown in the payoff matrix, the decision that brings the highest level of utility
to Player 1 brings the lowest utility to Player 2 and vice versa. The zero-sum property
indicates that there is a sole payoff that one player wishes to minimize, while the other
player wishes to maximize.
To complicate matters, some games have more than two players. In the following
applications, there are three players. As discussed in “The Core of an N Person Game,”
(Scarf, 1967), the highest utility in a three-person game is realized when all players
cooperate and form a grand coalition that will result in super-additive utility. This
requires that the utility realized from the grand coalition is higher than any other
combined utilities of the players. However, forming a grand coalition does not result in
the highest utility possible for each player, as coalitions between players and against
another player may result in increased utility for the players involved in the coalition, or
one player may begin with a unique advantage that results in higher utility than that of the
other players. However, for a coalition to form, the assumptions of collective and
individual rationality previously discussed must hold. If a grand coalition is formed, the
task of dividing the utility between the players often proves to be difficult. A final
condition in forming coalitions requires the convexity of preferences of the players 9.

Game Theory Application
In the first application, the historical context is that of pre-Soviet collapse, and
there are three players: the United States and the Soviet Union as potential donors and

Convexity of preferences is indicated by, when the notation, ≥, means at least as good as, and x, y, and z
denote three consumption bundles (combinations of various quantities of various goods), preferences for
the consumption set, X, are convex if for any x, y, z ∈ X, where y ≥x and z ≥x, it is the case that θy + (1θz) ≥ x for any θ∈[0,1] (Varian, 1999).
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developing countries as a recipient. Because of tremendous hostility between the United
States and the Soviet Union, a grand coalition is not formed. As discussed in “The
Communist Bloc and the Foreign Aid Game,” (Beim, 1964), each donor gains utility
when providing aid to a recipient because they are expanding their sphere of influence,
and the recipient gains utility upon receipt of aid, regardless of the donor. During the
Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union could both afford to pay for influence
in recipient countries, while recipient countries were willing to be influenced for aid.
While aid is quantifiable, influence is more difficult to value. For example, aid can result
in influence through four channels (Beim, 1964): through the promotion of goodwill, by
making a recipient dependent on the donor, by encouraging ideological similarities within
the recipient countries, and by obtaining military advantages. Upon reaching an
agreement concerning aid, the donor and the recipient would both profit from the
agreement, while the Donor 2’s utility is decreased because of Donor 1’s expanded
sphere of influence. However, the issue for both donor and recipient quickly becomes
how to maximize what they are getting while minimizing what they are giving. The
United States and the Soviet Union both wished to maximize the influence-to-aid ratio:
getting more bang for each buck, and the recipients wished to minimize that ratio, as
most developing nations did not want to be entirely dependent on a foreign power for its
economic livelihood.
The goal of each donor is to give aid to a recipient that will increase the
dependence of the recipient on that donor. This dependence would increase the influence
of the donor, while allowing the donor to decrease aid due to this dependence. While this
did occur, i.e., the Soviet Union and Cuba, many recipient countries found that their best
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strategy was to volley back and forth between the donors, promising to be influenced by
each, and waiting for each donor’s aid offers to exceed the others. Had the Soviet Union
and the United States been on friendlier terms, this probably would not have worked as a
recipient’s strategy.
As discussed in Blasier (1983), many recipient countries volleyed between each
donor, accepted aid from both, and were influenced by both donors. These countries
were able to receive payments without committing to either. By doing this, the recipient
was minimizing the influence-to-aid ratio—receiving money from both but not allowing
either to exert much influence. Given the hostility toward each other during this time
period, the United States and the Soviet Union would not be outdone by the other. As a
result, the best strategy for the recipient countries was to remain somewhat neutral and
accept aid from both factions. The theme of this application is to show that during the
Cold War, recipient countries did not need to worry about meeting good governance or
human rights conditions to receive foreign aid. The overarching hostility between the
two donors ensured that if one donor did not provide aid to a country, the other donor
would, in an attempt to expand its sphere of influence. In terms of maximizing their
preferred ratios, the recipients were in the winning position of this aid game until the
Soviet Union began to falter and decrease aid disbursements due to domestic austerity
measures.

A Cold War Example
In a specific example that demonstrates the occurrences of the Cold War aid
process, there are three players, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Uganda. As
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previously discussed, the United States and the Soviet Union were not communicating
with each other concerning foreign aid. As the recipient, Uganda would not approach
either superpower and demand aid, and will not make an official move until there is an
offer of aid. Separately, the United States and the Soviet Union both prepare aid offers
and present them to Ugandan officials. Following this, Uganda can publicly announce
which offer is preferable. Based on indications from Ugandan officials, the United States
and the Soviet Union can alter their offers to make each more enticing. Uganda can
continue to defer acceptance in hopes of a continual improvement of each offer but
receives no aid until it accepts an offer, so there is a cost to delay but a benefit in
improved terms.
However, if Ugandan officials play this game for too long, their payoff may end
up being suboptimal. If the United States and the Soviet Union have also offered an aid
package to Rwanda, and both hegemons view Rwanda and Uganda as substitutes (e.g., if
both had recently regained independence from colonial rule, were creating a new
government, and were viewed as a way to extend the reach of capitalism or communism),
the first recipient to accept may obtain significant benefit. These recipient countries
could be viewed as substitutable if alliance from both is unnecessary: the benefit to the
United States or the Soviet Union could be greatest from the first African ally and
diminishing upon increasing allies. Assuming that Uganda and Rwanda are not colluding
to extract better aid terms from the donors, it is easy to see that an uncooperative country
may lose aid or negotiation power. This example demonstrates that while the recipients
have some bargaining power, they also may have motivation to not act in a never-ending
cycle of pitting Soviet and American offers against each other.
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Post-Cold War
Following the end of the Cold War, foreign aid became exclusively donated by
DAC countries. The ratio of restricted aid to unrestricted aid dramatically increased from
the end of the Cold War to the present (OECD, 2012). A very different aid game
emerged. Not only could the recipients not volley between hostile donors, but they were
also being required to meet requirements to obtain foreign aid. There are two methods to
examine the aid game during this time. Under the first approach, the game becomes a
two-player game, and, I argue, also becomes a zero-sum game. A generic aid recipient is
one player, and the DAC becomes the other player. As previously discussed, the DAC is
somewhat controlled by the United States, however, for the purpose of this application,
the DAC, collectively, will be the other player.
The strategies of each player have changed: the recipient now desires aid without
restrictions, while the donor gains utility through having its restrictions met when
disbursing aid. As in the previous application concerning influence, now it is very
difficult to measure utility lost or gained from restrictions on aid disbursal. Despite the
difficulty in measurement, it is clear that the two players are involved in a strictly
competitive game: gaining utility for one player results in a loss of utility for the other
and is shown through various mechanisms. As discussed in “Tied Aid and the Paradoxes
of Donor-Enrichment and Recipient-Impoverishment,” (Kemp and Kojima, 1985), tied
aid can harm the recipient because the aid may be required to be spent in a manner
incongruent with local preferences, building capacity in the recipient country for
necessary bureaucratic requirements may be cumbersome and politically costly, and
corruption in the recipient country may be increased due to the aid receipt. However,
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recipient acquiescence to the terms of tied aid can be politically beneficial to the donor
country, especially if trade increases as a result (Lloyd, et al., 2000). Also, if restrictions
are not met, human rights abuses and corruption within the recipient country can be
politically costly to the government of the donor country.
In the following matrix, the game is simpler, as after the Cold War, almost all
foreign aid is provided by one donor. The recipient and donor are both aware that if the
terms of aid are not accepted, another recipient will accept these terms. The game below
illustrates the payoffs (in utility) based on decisions made by the donor and the recipient.
As illustrated, offering unrestricted aid to the recipient results in lower utility to the donor
through the mechanisms previously noted. Therefore, the donors will never offer
unrestricted aid. As shown, the best strategies for each player result in a strictly
competitive game. The recipient has two options: accept restricted aid or decline
restricted aid. If accepted, the recipient also accepts the restrictions that may be difficult
to impose. However, during this period, as there were no other options, recipients are
better off to accept tied aid than to have no aid at all. If a recipient declines the restricted
aid, the donor loses a small amount of utility due to failed negotiations. This application
shows that during this time period, the donor was able to impose restrictions on aid, and
the recipient would meet them (or pretend to meet them through falsifying documents or
fabricating statistics).
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Table 4.3: Post-Cold War Aid Payoffs

Recipient

Recipient

Declines

Accepts

Donor

Restricted Aid

4,1

5,3

Donor

Unrestricted Aid

3,1

3,5

There is another method of examining the post-Cold War situation. Here, instead
of all recipients being grouped into one, there are many recipients, but still only one
donor. The recipients are now competing with each other, the utility of each increasing
in levels of unrestricted aid but decreasing, based on their own preferences, with
restricted aid.

For aid receipt to be agreed upon, each side must gain something. Also,

the donor seeks benefits beyond altruism, to increase its utility. While the donor will not
provide excessive benefits to recipients, the competition between recipients may result in
more favorable terms for the donor than otherwise realized. For example, the United
States approaches Pakistan with an aid package (Move 1). Pakistan would gain utility
through the receipt of aid, and the United States could gain utility through having an ally
in this region of the world. However, (Move 2) if Pakistan will not meet the
requirements of aid receipts (e.g., allowance of a United States military base in the
country), the United States may look for another country that will. The United States
may approach Kazakhstan (assuming Kazakhstan and Pakistan are uncooperative) with
an aid package (Move 3). In this game, it seems that the recipients will undercut each
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other in the quest for foreign aid receipts, and the United States will end up winning the
game.

Current Aid Game
In the current aid situation, there are again two groups of donors. While the
western countries represent Donor 1, emerging donors (China, India, and Brazil) will
represent Donor 2. The similarities between the Cold War aid game and this current
situation are stark: both donors are looking for influence in the recipient countries, and
there is a bit of hostility between the donors. While the Sino-American relationship is
complicated, it has not reached the levels of the Russian-American hostilities of the Cold
War. A significant difference in this game is that now the aid provided by DAC
countries usually comes with some restrictions. Aside from disaster relief aid and aid to
very poor countries, aid from these donors, bilaterally or multi-laterally, has various
restrictions concerning human rights, corruption, and democracy. As previously
discussed, aid from emerging donors is usually without restriction of the policies within a
country.
This current aid game is a three-player game, indicating, as discussed previously,
that the highest total utility will be realized when a grand coalition is formed. In this
application, this could happen if both sets of donors and the recipients agreed on a course
of action. If both donors met and decided to only give restricted aid and to help
recipients comply with the terms, this super-additive utility could be realized. However,
in a grand coalition, despite the overall higher utility, the utility of an individual player
may be lower than otherwise possible. An example of this would be that, as it is not
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politically costly domestically for the governments of emerging donors to provide
unrestricted aid, as they may lose utility through influence in recipient countries if forced
by international organizations to provide restricted aid. As the emerging donors will not
receive additional payoffs to provide restricted aid, it will not be a likely outcome of the
game.
Another difference between this aid game and that of the Cold War is that of
global economic power. During the Cold War, the Americans had the dominant
economic position, with a declining national debt (as shown in Figure 4.2) and an
increasing GDP, and the Soviet Union was experiencing the opposite. In the current aid
game, it seems that the economic problems of the Western donors are similar to those of
the Soviet Union during the Cold War—with increasing debt and stagnating growth
(OECD, 2012).

Figure 4.2: United States Gross Public Debt as a percentage of GDP 10

10

Source: World Bank. 2012. World Development Indicators. Washington DC: World Bank.
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Also, the current economic strength, despite a worldwide recession, displayed by
the emerging donors is similar to that of the Western donors during the Cold War.
Therefore, if we look back to the aid game during the Cold War, it will provide many
insights into the current aid game. First, both donors wish to influence the recipients.
The restrictions necessary for the receipt of aid from the DAC often pushes countries
toward a pro-democracy, open-market design. Aid receipts from emerging donors often
come with improved trade conditions between them and the recipients (Woods, 2008).
These open avenues better allow culture, ideas, and goods to flow from the donors to the
recipients, resulting in overall influence.
The recipients of aid from the emerging donors are just beginning to realize their
best strategy in this new aid game. As discussed in “’Emerging Donors’ from a Recipient
Perspective: An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in Cambodia,” Sato, et al (2001)
discuss the aspect of donors competing to provide aid for a country. In this analysis,
Cambodia is able to choose aid that works best for its needs. Depending on the specific
project, Cambodia may have as many as ten different offers to consider—from traditional
and emerging donors. As more recipient countries move toward the institutional
efficiency required by DAC countries to receive aid, more will be able to choose the best
aid package from the emerging donors or the traditional donors.
I posit that this increasing competition, coupled with an increasingly complicated
relationship between the United States and China, will lead the aid game to look very
similar to that of the Cold War era. The first move in this new game will be for the
donors to offer aid to the recipients. Some recipients will only be offered aid by one of
the donors. For example, because of its human rights abuses, Sudan will only receive aid
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offers from emerging donors. For Sudan, the choice will be easy: take the aid. While
this aid may result in an increased influence of the donor in the country, Sudan’s utility
from aid receipts will presently outweigh the costs. Also, some countries may only
receive aid offers from the United States. These countries will have to weigh the benefit
of aid receipts and the costs of complying with the standards required by aid disbursal
from the United States. However, in countries like Cambodia, their strategy will be to
pick and choose the aid package that is best for them in that specific instance.
At the present time, the Sino-American relationship is complicated but not
comparable to U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War. So, while emerging donors
have surprised traditional donors with their increase in aid provision, the quest for
influence upon aid recipients has not yet reached the competitive level of that during the
Cold War. However, if this relationship deteriorates, the United States may once again
find itself in competition with another global hegemon looking to provide aid. If this
happens, I assert that a return to a Cold War-like aid game is very likely—with the
recipients in the winning position. If this relationship improves or holds constant, I
theorize that the emerging donors and the traditional donors will continue to provide aid
in their current respective fashions.

Conclusion
Foreign aid is a lifeline for many countries to lead them to better living standards.
While the aid game is continuously changing as political relationships, and even
country’s boundaries, shift, there has been continued need for disbursals of aid.
Academics and practitioners have made great strides in the past century in understanding
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how to use aid as a tool to better the lives of recipients and encourage economic
prosperity; however, there is much more work to be completed. Especially important to
the current situation is to examine the motivations and decisions of the emerging donors
compared to the DAC. As I have shown using ordinal payoff matrices, it is commonsensical that each party (recipient or donor) will make a decision based on their own
preferences and expected payoffs. Such examination can show when and how recipients
react to these donors’ offers and provide insight to the DAC about how they should
respond to this new state of affairs to best encourage economic growth. The following
chapter details institutional factors that affect economic growth and explains how these
factors can interact with foreign aid receipts to influence economic growth.
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Chapter Five: Literature Review of Institutional Variables

Introduction
While Chapter Three examined classical variables that have been shown to
influence economic growth, this chapter discusses institutional variables that have been
added to the literature since the 1990s. Forty years ago, Friedman (1962) argued that
political and economic freedoms were mutually reinforcing, as democratic institutions
keep a check on governmental power and the rent-seeking of rulers, and Lipset
hypothesized (1959) that increases in the standard of living lead to a rise in democracy.
However, the empirical analysis involving these concepts was scarce until the past two
decades, likely due to poor data collection and availability. However, with recent
increases in computing ability and information access via the Internet, the analysis of
such factors has quickly added to the economic growth literature. The factors discussed
in this chapter have transitioned from theoretical suppositions into testable hypotheses.

Measuring Political and Economic Freedom
A major form of diversion of resources from consumption and investment in an
economy is corruption. Corruption can hinder economic performance in many ways.
This might occur through the waste of resources, investment distortions, diverting capital
to unproductive sectors, decreasing funding for public education, and lowering the
returns to human capital. Rose-Ackerman (1999) discusses three broad types of corrupt
practices that involve public servants. First, there are bribes to expedite services to which
citizens are legally entitled, including services such as telephone line installation. While
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these payments are argued by some to be economically efficient, Rose-Ackerman argues
that these payments ingrain corruption into the culture and waste resources. Following
the economically efficient argument, if these payments do signal higher willingness-topay by some, these fees should be made legal and regulated if they are truly acting as
market-clearing mechanisms. Secondly, there are payoffs that are made to reduce costs
to citizens. However, the reduction in costs is usually limited to a specific group of
citizens while the costs are spread over the general populace. An example of this would
be a payoff given to a bureaucrat in an environmental agency to change or block a
regulation that will benefit a specific company or industry. While the profit benefits will
be concentrated, the costs of pollution will be widespread. However, if the country’s
regulations are excessive, payments to circumvent them can be argued to increase
efficiency. In this case, Rose-Ackerman argues that the industry should lobby to change
the regulation and the law and not allow efficiency arguments to justify corrupt practices.
Finally, the author discusses illegal businesses that pay officials to protect the business
from prosecution. These businesses may be drug cartels or polluting companies that pay
off police, prosecutors, or regulatory officials. The economic distortions created by these
businesses are highest when they dominate legal businesses by creating an environment
of violence and uncertainty. While each type of corrupt practice introduces specific and
differing distortions into a country’s economy, perhaps, the most damaging result of
corruption is the resulting perception of an overall illegitimate government.
The relationship between economic growth and democracy has proven to be more
complicated than growth’s relationship with corruption. In “Political Regimes and
Economic Growth,” Przeworski and Limongi (1993) discuss the arguments concerning
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that of regime type and economic growth. The authors then perform a meta-analysis of
eighteen studies that have examined the effects of regime type on economic growth (An
interesting alternative meta-analysis might examine the effects of economic growth on
regime type.) Recent literature posits that one mechanism through which democratic
regimes encourage economic growth is through securing property rights. The argument
for secure property rights being necessary for economic growth is simple to follow and
discussed at length in North (1990): if a sovereign can alter property rights for personal
benefit, the expected returns on investment will decrease, as will the likelihood of
investment. The logic follows that this is less likely to occur in a democracy because the
ruler will be voted out by an unhappy populace (Olson, 1991).
Another aspect of the democracy and economic growth relationship concerns how
democracy affects consumption. As discussed by Huntington and Dominguez (1975),
democracy causes immediate consumption to occur at the cost of investment, which
hinders future economic growth. The logic of this argument follows that a populace
values consumption today over consumption tomorrow, and with universal suffrage, the
poor will vote for redistribution mechanisms that will move money from investment to
consumption, leading to decreased economic growth. While consumption does have
immediate positive effects on economic growth, increased consumption levels translate to
decreased investment levels. And, without long-term investments in education and
infrastructure, the economic growth of a nation will suffer. On the other side of the
political regime for this argument, a dictator can force the poor to stay in poverty
(therefore, continuing investment by cutting current consumption) without fears of being
ousted from power. This investment may be beneficial for future generations that can
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reap the benefits of long-term investments, but is not advantageous for the current
poverty-stricken citizenry.
The final argument concerning the differences for how regime type affects
economic growth concerns the effects of dictatorships insulating their countries from
particularistic pressures. The regimes of the Asian Tigers and many Latin American
countries are illustrated by this incredible state autonomy. For example, the economic
growth of the Asian Tigers occurred due to the ability of the government to pursue their
economic policies without succumbing to pressures from market influences, unions, or
interest groups. However, the opposing argument is that some dictators use this state
autonomy for their own benefit and that only democracies are able to constrain predatory
rulers through the election process (North, 1990).
The meta-analysis (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993) includes eighteen studies
concerning regime type and economic growth and the twenty-one conclusions of these
studies indicated that democracy promoted economic growth more than authoritarianism
eight times, the opposite was found eight times, and five findings indicated no difference.
Przeworski and Limongi posit that many of these studies were rife with econometric
difficulties that rendered their conclusions invalid, and they urge more work to be done to
answer the question of how regime type affects economic growth.
Citing this seminal work by Przeworski and Limongi, Barro (1996) looks to
examine the relationship between democracy and economic growth by examining data
from one hundred countries from 1960 to 1990 with the growth rates of real per-capita
GDP over time periods as a dependent variable, and previously discussed variables like
human capital, initial GDP, black market premiums, longevity, and democracy as the
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explanatory variables. The democracy variable is measured on a scale developed by
Gastil (1987) and ranges from one to seven. The regression indicates that countries with
low economic development do not sustain democracy, and countries with moderate levels
of democracy experience the highest economic growth. While Barro concludes that
democracy’s overall effect on economic growth is weakly negative, many variables that
increase with democracy (human capital, property rights and free markets) increase
economic growth. The takeaway point of the study is that while democracy may not be
the absolute key to economic growth, exporting Western economic principles may
effectively promote democracy.
Barro’s thoughts that the causality between economic and political freedom may
run both ways leads to the piece “Democracy and Economic Growth: A Historical
Perspective” (Gerring, et. al., 2005). The authors begin by citing previous findings that
while democracy has been found to have a negative or null effect on economic growth,
democracy does have positive indirect effects. Additionally, their data show that while
most rich countries in the world are democratic, the direction of causality is unclear.
While many articles look at recent levels of democracy to explain economic growth,
Gerring, et. al. contend that democracy should be viewed as a stock variable (measured at
one point in time but developed over time)—as democracy and authoritarianism often
extend decades or centuries. This stock variable can be seen as political capital and can
increase economic growth through economic policies and efficient bureaucracies. The
authors continue to argue that through the institutionalization of democratic policies and
the learning that occurs during the democratic experience, long-lived democracies may
better generate political capital than new democracies and authoritarian regimes. Using a
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polity score, the authors are able to capture how institutionalized a country’s authority
patterns are, measured by checks on executive power, how an executive is selected, and
the form of political competition. To arrive at the stock measurement, the authors add
each country’s polity score from 1900 to present, with an annual one percent depreciation
rate. Using the level of democracy, the authors find no effect on economic growth.
However, when using the stock of democracy and other explanatory variables
(longevity, instability, investment, inflation, and economic policies) to explain economic
growth, the stock of democracy exerts a positive and significant effect on economic
growth. This measure of the stock of democracy seems to be an interesting way of
combing out effects of regime type that has not been extensively explored. In examining
differences between authoritarian regimes and democratic governments, authors began
noticing that countries with higher levels of natural resources seemed to experience lower
levels of economic growth than their counterparts without such resources.

Natural Resource Curse
The idea of an actual natural resource curse really took shape within economic
development literature as Latin American economies contracted following decreases in
commodity prices (Sachs and Warner, 2001). This theory received empirical support
throughout the 1990s, as researchers found that many countries endowed with natural
resources, such as oil or minerals, experience lower levels of economic growth than
countries without—even when controlling for other variables (Auty, 1990 and Sachs and
Warner, 1995). In fact, as discussed in Doppelhofer et al. (2000), of the countries with
high levels of exports of natural resources as a percent of their GDP in 1970, none had
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high levels of economic growth in the following twenty years. Recent research has
begun identifying the mechanisms of how an abundance of natural resources can
negatively affect economic growth.
Sachs and Warner (2001), found that high levels of natural resource exportation
increases a country’s price levels, which in turn make other industries less competitive
domestically. Therefore, aside from the natural resource exports, not much else is
exported, resulting in an export economy dependent on the natural resource Additionally,
as discussed in Gylfason (2000), high wages in the natural resource sector (implying
dangerous work conditions) could crowd out innovation and entrepreneurship in the
country as workers obtain high rewards from working in this sector. These high wages
also reduce the returns to schooling in these countries.
Finally, as discussed in Escaping the Resource Curse, (Humphreys, Sachs, and
Stiglitz, 2007), in countries exporting high levels of natural resources, the fiscal social
contract between government and citizens in which citizens pay for the government
through taxes, and therefore, the government has a responsibility to the citizenry’s
demands is breeched. Revenues from the natural resources allow officials to run the
government how they deem fit. The government receives their power from the
companies paying for their resources and is able to run a kelptocracy within the country.
Auty (2000) also discusses that in resource-abundant economies, it is easy for
government officials to engage in rent-seeking and corruption to siphon gains from
natural resource exports. As discussed in the previous section, corruption could be a
contributing culprit for causing lower economic growth.
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However, as discussed in recent works such as Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik
(2006) and Hodler (2006), the natural resource curse is able to be broken. In “Institutions
and the Resource Curse,” Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006) point out that some
countries with natural resource wealth have experienced economic growth, while some
have not. In countries with a weak rule of law, a disabled bureaucracy, or corruption,
resource wealth will divert productive resources into rent-seeking activities. Using
institutional quality measures, the authors find that the combination of weak institutions
and resource abundance cause low levels or even negative economic growth. Following
this vein, in “The Curse of Natural Resources in Fractionalized Countries,” Hodler
(2006), notes that Norway and Botswana have seen great economic growth despite
natural resource exportations. The author asserts that the homogeneity of the populace of
these countries has allowed this growth to be realized. Using a game-theoretic model, the
authors find that the more fractionalized (using the ELF score) a country, the more
fighting will occur over the real and potential natural resource profits. Such fighting
between ethnic groups results in weakened property rights, overall uncertainty, and
increased rent-seeking by government officials, all which negatively influence economic
growth. As noted in Svensson (2000), these effects can be found from the windfalls of
natural resource exports and foreign aid.

Institutional Variables in Economic Growth
Following from the general arguments of economic and political freedoms, there
are many country-specific factors that have been found to influence economic growth.
These factors have become explanatory variables in the growth equation including
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economic policy indicators and civil liberties and will be discussed in that order.
Inclusion of economic policy indicators followed from findings that countries closed off
to world trade have not experienced the levels of economic growth that open countries
realized. Specifically, Sachs and Warner (1995) developed a dummy variable to account
for the openness of a country, using data concerning industry protection, tariffs, and
quotas. Following the neo-classical model, the theoretical supposition to justify use of
the openness to trade variable is that economies with fewer distortions should have higher
economic growth. Trade restrictions may discourage economic growth through several
mechanisms such as by providing domestic firms with protection from outside
competition, resulting in an inefficient use of resources—if competition was allowed, the
country with the restriction would not necessarily be able to supply the good at a lower
cost than available through importation and would choose to allocate its resources in a
more market-efficient manner 11.
The following variables have been found to be significant in some studies and
were included in the policy index found in the seminal empirical piece, “Aid, Policies,
and Growth” (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), but their significance is dependent on model
specification. These variables are macroeconomic indicators that have been found to
correlate with growth and include the black market premium, inflation, and the share of
exports in GDP. The share of exports in GDP is correlated with economic growth, as an
increased amount of exports brings non-domestic money into the country—if this money
is not spent on imported goods. The theoretical argument for these macro-level variables
is straight-forward and intuitive: higher inflation and black market premiums are
11

However, countries do maintain certain industries for reasons other than efficiency. For example, some
industries that provide defense intelligence capabilities in the United States are given protection from
competition as a matter of national security.
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correlated with lower growth. These variables may affect economic growth through
increasing uncertainty in the macro-economy, which discourages future investment in
various ways. Extreme inflation discourages investment and encourages immediate
consumption because money will be worth less tomorrow than it is today. Black market
premiums indicate a large black market and may be the result of overly stringent trade or
currency restrictions or price controls often used by governments to ineffectively deal
with inflation. A large black market generally provides higher returns to investors than
regular markets—providing incentives to trade there.
Another subset of measures in this category of economic policy variables includes
variance in money supply, investment share of GDP, and population growth.

Increased

variance in the money supply in the short-term correlates with lower economic growth, as
it may indicate meddlesome governmental policies that can create distortions in the
money market. These distortions cause expectations of monetary policy within the
country to vary—making investors unsure and causing overall output to decrease.
Investment share of GDP is theoretically argued to be positively associated with percapita GDP growth, as a larger share toward investment is argued to increase capital and
promote future growth. And, in “A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-Country Growth
Regressions,” Levine and Renelt (1992) find empirically that a larger share of investment
in GDP is correlated with higher per-capita GDP growth. Also, the average annual
population growth is associated with two theoretical arguments that may cancel each
other out. First, a high population growth may lead to lower growth in real per-capita
GDP growth, as more people drain the economic resources of the country. However, a
higher population can support more production, thus, having a positive effect on perCopyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013
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capita GDP. The findings concerning the influence of population growth on per-capita
GDP, and vice versa, have been mixed (Becker, Murphy, and Tamura, 1990; Barro,
1991; Levine and Renelt, 1991).
Other measures in this such as social and political instability, probability of
opposition group takeover, instability of labor, bureaucracy and red tape, and corruption
are all theoretically argued to decrease economic growth. Also, as discussed earlier,
extreme regulations create distortions that encourage use of the black market. Social and
political instability may discourage this growth through the mechanism of creating unsure
expectations for investors. For example, a multinational corporation would be hesitant to
finance a long-term investment in a country that may experience political turmoil and
nationalize the corporation’s investment, quickly alter the tax structure, or change the
industry’s regulations, causing unpredictable changes in the project’s profitability.
Additionally, bureaucracy and red tape can act as deterrents to obtaining permits and
licenses necessary for new investments.
Further, fiscal policy indicators are measures such as the deficit as a percentage of
GDP, the percentage of government expenditures of GDP, the growth rate of government
expenditures, and their influence on economic growth is somewhat contested. On one
hand, high levels of these fiscal policy measures may indicate that governments are
mitigating the disparity between private and social costs by providing growth-inducing
services. For example, a large government sector that has a high percentage of
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP may be investing in expensive
infrastructure or new schools that will benefit the future economy. However, on the
other hand, a high percentage of government expenditures could indicate a corrupt
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government that is funneling tax revenue into private pockets or awarding over-priced
contracts for unneeded (or poorly constructed and short-lived) infrastructure to political
supporters.

Conclusion
The literature concerning institutional quality and economic growth has
dramatically increased in the past thirty years. In fact, there is such an expansive
literature in the realm of institutional quality and economic growth, a meta-analysis has
been conducted to discuss the differences in findings of varying works (Doucouliagos
and Paldam, 2005). Some authors prefer to develop an index of institutional or
governmental indicators by which to measure the efficiency, while some borrow others’
indices and add variables they assert to be relevant. Specifications and data may vary
across analyses, but the literature suggests comparable conclusions: regardless of aid
status or the presence of natural resources, countries with good governance and efficient
institutions have higher economic growth than countries without.
However measured, these factors are significant in the policy environment of
foreign aid. As previously discussed, in countries with very weak institutions and/or
ethnic fractionalizaion, foreign aid has been found to decrease economic growth.
Additionally, research suggests that tying aid to improvements in a recipient country’s
institutions or changing restricted aid to unrestricted aid based on improvements in
policies could increase economic growth. However, as also noted, the level of
fractionalization within a country has been shown to increase corruption when the
country receives windfalls from foreign aid or natural resource exports. As literature in
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this vein increases, perhaps policy-makers can look to this research to adjust the
composition of foreign aid as to encourage good institutions and economic growth or to
apply different levels of restrictions based on the fractionalization of the populace or the
strength of local institutions. The following chapter develops a specification to test the
relationships of corruption, foreign aid, and economic growth and reports results of the
analysis.
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Chapter Six: Estimating Effects of Corruption and Foreign Aid

Introduction
This chapter showcases the analyses examining the role that corruption levels and
foreign aid play in a country’s economic growth and growth in longevity. This
dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature by using a more encompassing
measurement of corruption to explain economic growth than previous studies in this area
have. Also, this dissertation adds to the literature that uses a combined quantity- and
quality- of-life measure to capture gains that are not realized solely through economic
growth but also through longevity increases. The following section summarizes existing
literature that analyzes the relationship between economic growth and corruption levels.
Following this discussion, the data and methodology of specification are discussed,
results are presented, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of findings and future
avenues for research.

Institutions and Economic Growth
In “Aid, Policies, and Growth,” Burnside and Dollar (2000) examine relationships
between economic policies, foreign aid, and the growth of per-capita GDP. The authors
begin by discussing previous findings that foreign aid has not increased growth rates
overall but that growth is conditional on the economic policies of the receiving country.
This is explained analytically in that foreign aid is an income transfer to a recipient and
has different effects based on how the transfer is used. Previous literature has shown that
when aid is consumed, rather than invested, it will not benefit development (Barro, 1991
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and Boone, 1995). However, as Burnside and Dollar discuss, the likelihood that aid will
be invested, as well as how productive the investment will be, depends on specific
policies of the country. From here, the authors hypothesize that economies with fewer
distortions will realize greater aid effectiveness.
Using data spanning fifty-six countries over six four-year time periods from 19701973 through 1990-1993 from the World Bank, the authors use the sum of grants and
concessional loans to a country as their measure of foreign aid in 1985 U.S. dollars. With
data concerning the budget surplus, inflation rate, and a dummy variable of trade
openness, an index of policies is developed. Following previous literature, the authors
include this index, initial per-capita GDP, aid receipts relative to GDP, a vector of
political and institutional variables (such as the ethnolinguistic fractionalization score and
frequency of assassinations), dummy regional variables and fixed-time effects to capture
the business cycles as explanatory variables to estimate a regression with per-capita real
GDP growth as the dependent variable. Upon running the regression, it is found that the
policy index has a significant and positive effect on per-capita real GDP growth. The
authors then estimate the same regression using only low-income countries—countries
with a real per-capita GDP below $1,900 and find similar results.
Additionally, the authors estimate an equation to explain the receipt of aid by a
specific country and find (consistent with previous literature) that donors direct aid to
low-income countries, small countries receive more aid, and donors give aid based on
their own strategic interests. However, controlling for this, the authors do not find that
having strong institutional policies results in more aid received. Additionally, an
equation for government consumption as a share of GDP is estimated; it is found that
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bilateral aid has a strong positive impact on consumption—suggesting that this aid is
fungible. Following aid theory, while this kind of aid increases government
expenditures, it has no effect on growth.
Following this vein of research that examines how the policies of aid-receiving
countries affect their growth, there has been much research as to which specific policies
have the greatest effect on recipients’ growth. In “Corruption and Growth,” Mauro
(1995) begins by discussing the problems weak government institutions pose for
investment, and that an efficient judicial system is needed to enforce contracts, property
rights are necessary to encourage any investment, and efficient bureaucracies are needed
to ensure timely licensing. In this paper, the author sets forth to measure how the
efficiency of government institutions affect economic growth.
Using data from Business International (BI) from 1980-1983, which rates
perceptions of corruption, red tape, and judicial system efficiency from seventy countries,
Mauro discusses how these institutional factors affect economic growth and the
magnitude of these effects. In this corruption index, the following measures are used to
form an overall score for each country: institutional political change, social political
instability, probability of opposition group takeover, instability of labor, relationships
with neighboring countries, terrorism, bureaucracy and red tape, and corruption.
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, all of these measures are positively-correlated.
Before estimating a regression, the author discusses the issue of endogeneity
between government institutions and economic variables; when rating a country, the BI
correspondents’ ratings of institutional efficiency may be influenced by the country’s
economic performance, or economic performance may affect institutional efficiency.
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Mauro argues that other measures such as lagged initial levels of corruption or political
instability would not be valid instruments, as these variables are highly auto-correlated.
In the quest for an appropriate instrument, a previous study by Canning and Fay (1993) in
which the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) measure is used as a proxy for political
stability is cited. The ELF score used here was constructed in 1960 and represents the
probability that two randomly selected individuals from a specific country will not be in
the same ethnolinguistic group—the higher the score, the more fractionalized the country.
Assuming that the ELF score of a country is exogenous and does not affect a country’s
economic performance except through its influence on institutional efficiency, Mauro
chooses it as an instrumental variable. Despite a formal specification test that fails to
reject the hypothesis that the ELF score is an appropriate instrumental variable, Mauro
cautions that there might be a lack of long-run exogeneity—there may be an
immeasurable factor that affected the ELF of a country and is affecting its economic
variables. However, with this note of caution, Mauro moves on to the estimation.
Using OLS, and controlling for initial GDP, education measures, and political
instabilities, Mauro finds a negative and significant relationship between corruption and
investment rate. The author then estimates the same regression using the growth rate of
per-capita GDP as the dependent variable. Following these estimates, the author explains
that bureaucratic inefficiency affects growth directly and indirectly; directly by
misallocating investment into undeserving sectors and indirectly through lowering the
investment rate. Additionally, corruption lowers the private marginal product of capital.
The paper is concluded with the real-world example that if Bangladesh would reduce its
corruption levels to that of Uruguay (a difference of one standard-deviation in the index),
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its annual per-capita GDP growth rate would increase by more than half a percentage
point.
While Mauro’s empirical findings follow theory very closely, I think that the
argument and findings would carry more weight if the corruption index encompassed
more than three years, rated more countries, and was from a more reputable reporting
agency. However, the use of a corruption score is novel in the literature of this area and
makes for much simpler data collection and analysis than that of other literature that
includes dozens of institutional indicators. Adding to the literature, in “Foreign Aid,
Political Corruption, and Economic Growth,” Xu (2009) develops a study that includes
data with more countries and more encompassing measures over a longer period of time
than Mauro.
In this article, Xu equates corruption with institutional quality and asks the
question, is foreign aid’s effectiveness contingent upon the recipients’ corruption level?
The theoretical debate behind this question follows from conflicting previous literature:
some literature argues that aid increases investment in productive sectors of the
recipient’s economy, while some argues that aid simply increases state consumption and
payments to elites (Easterly 2003). The argument that corruption can hinder economic
performance in numerous ways has been discussed at length in previous chapters.
To answer the research question, Xu estimates a regression using data from the
previously discussed Burnside and Dollar (2000) article, with an additional time period
that covers sixty-two countries over seven four-year periods ranging from 1970-1973 to
1994-1997. Average growth of per-capita GDP in each of the four-year periods is the
dependent variable. Explanatory variables in this model include the ratio of aid to GDP
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(all in real 1985 U.S. dollars as in Burnside and Dollar), the corruption index from the
International Country Risk Guide (somewhat like the Business International index used
by Mauro but includes more years and countries), and an interactive variable between aid
and GDP. Control variables used here are mostly the same as in previous studies: the
recipient’s macroeconomic policy index, level of M2 as a fraction of GDP, initial percapita GDP, political and institutional indices, the ethnolinguistic fractionalization score
(as constructed in 1960), and regional (for East Asia and Africa) and time dummies.
Xu finds that the economic policy index and initial GDP positively affect growth.
As a human capital measure was not included, it is not surprising that convergence was
not found. While corruption statistically significantly affects GDP growth negatively,
there is no evidence that corruption levels affect the receipt of foreign aid. However,
adding support to the argument that aid may augment corruption, the author finds that
receiving foreign aid negatively affects growth. Findings concerning the interaction of
aid and GDP are not significant. In the discussion, it is noted that decreasing corruption
within a country may lead to more efficient institutional and economic policies, which, in
turn, lead to a more efficient use of foreign aid and higher growth rates.

Dependent Variables
In the data analysis, I perform multiple analyses with two dependent variables. In
the original analysis, per-capita GDP growth as a percentage is the dependent variable.
In addition to this measure, I have also searched for a dependent variable that captures
improvements in longevity and economic growth. The Human Development Index
(HDI) seemed like a fair contender for the use as such a dependent variable. This index
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was developed by the United Nations and takes into account per-capita GDP, longevity,
and a measure that includes both the literacy rate and enrollment in schools in a nation at
a given time. 12 The gist of the inclusion of longevity is that improvements in global
well-being in the last fifty years have not solely been realized through economic growth.
An increased life expectancy for much of the world’s population has also been grasped.
As this index is only publicly-available for eleven years from 1980 to the present,
analysis would have been limited to those years. Additionally, as discussed in “The
Human Development Index: Yet Another Redundant Composite Development
Indicator?” McGillivray (1991) determines that the index is flawed as it is positively
correlated with each component variables. I heeded this warning, and continued the
search for a dependent variable that measures both economic growth (measured by percapita GDP) and longevity (life expectancy at birth) but leaves out the measure of
education that is included in the HDI. Following Pandey and Nathwani (1996), I choose
an indicator called the Life Quality Indicator that was discussed in Chapter Three and is
created from the expression:

Life Quality Indicator = (Per-Capita GDP) w * (Life Expectancy) 1-w

In which w is the time spent producing output, and 1-w is all other time. These
ratios follow findings from Lind et al. (1992), in which the authors strive to quantify the
accrual of benefits expected from ensuring health and safety for the public. In much
work from 1992-2006 by the authors that pioneered this index, Lind, Pandey, and
12

For future work using the HDI, note that after 2011, a different calculation will be used. The education
portion of the index will be calculated by estimating the number of years a five-year-old can expect to
spend in school.
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Nathwani, the ratios used were 1/6 and 5/6. However, in Pandey et al. (2006), this ratio
is found to differ across countries. In the United States, 1/5 and 4/5 are more accurate
ratios, while the original ratios were very accurate for Europe. However, the sensitivity
to changes in the ratios is mathematically insignificant, so I will use the original ratios for
all countries across all years. As discussed by Sen (2001), it is necessary to include both
economic growth and longevity growth in this measure because, in some countries, one
lags behind the other and the order depends on the country. Including both measures in
this variable will allow for a more inclusive analysis. Examples of Life Quality scores I
have computed of selected countries are shown below:

Table 6.1: Life Quality Scores of Selected Countries in 2000

Country
United Arab Emirates
Australia
Brazil
United Kingdom
China
United States
Russia

Life Quality Score
254.43
243.61
154.99
246.83
119.58
260.96
126.47

In Pandey and Nathwani (1996), the authors use this Life Quality Indicator to
examine the societal willingness to pay for increased longevity in Canada. Using the
same model, I develop an index to compare the quality and quantity of life by country
over time. Following longevity literature that gains are not realized solely through
economic growth, I hypothesize that Life Quality growth will be better explained by the
explanatory variables than per-capita GDP growth.
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Also, like Xu, I aim to look at effects of corruption on economic growth.
However, I use more recent data and a more objective report of corruption. Unlike the
measures used by Xu and Mauro that only take into account a few measures of corruption
within a country; in this dissertation, corruption is quantified using Transparency
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2011) that measures the perceived level of
public-sector corruption by averaging thirteen different expert and business surveys. As
discussed in Transparency International’s Our History (2013), Transparency International
was founded began as a small organization in 1993 and has expanded its offerings and
data collection every year.
I assert that this measure replaces the need of an index of institutional measures as
the questions in this survey concern many of the variables often included in an
institutional index. This encompassing dataset has been compiled since 1993, providing
more years of information than other corruption indices and is publicly available. The
Corruption Perceptions Index score ranges from one to ten: with one indicating
perceptions of a country with very high corruption and ten indicating the opposite.
However, in this dissertation, I have reversed the scoring, as it is very confusing that a
low level of corruption was indicated with a score of ten. Therefore, a score of one on
the Corruption Perceptions Index in this dissertation is a country with a low level of
corruption. Below are examples of Corruption Perceptions Index scores of selected
countries in 2000:

Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013

80

Table 6.2: Corruption Perceptions Index Score of Selected Countries in 2000

Country
India
Australia
Brazil
United Kingdom
China
United States
Russia

Corruption Perceptions Index Score
8.2
2.7
7.1
2.3
7.9
3.2
8.9

Following previous findings concerning other corruption indices, I expect to find
that high corruption scores negatively affect per-capita GDP and Life Quality growth.
Additionally, I look at much more recent time period than the previous studies. Data
from the World Bank (2007) shows that since 1993, foreign aid has dramatically
declined, so using more recent data could provide insight to the current aid situation.
1998 Per-capita GDP will be the initial level of GDP, as 1998 was a stable year
with respect to economic activities and reliable data is available—making it an
appropriate base year. As discussed in Levine and Renelt (1992), the theoretical
argument for including the initial level of GDP in a growth regression is that, following
the model of convergence, countries with a lower level of initial GDP should experience
faster growth compared to countries that have already reached high levels of growth 13.
However, as found in Barro’s seminal article, “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of
Countries” (1991), and discussed in Levine and Renelt (1992), evidence has only
supported conditional convergence—indicating that poor countries grow faster than rich
13

As discussed in Solow (1956), the idea of convergence comes from an exogenous growth model based on
neo-classical assumptions. The theory follows that, in countries with similar institutions and factors like
savings rates and population growth, poor countries should experience higher levels of per-capita GDP
growth. This higher growth is attributable to both lower diminishing returns to capital in capital-poor
developing countries and the replication of technology already available in developed countries.
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countries, only if a human capital measurement is controlled for in the explanation of
GDP growth. As I control for a human capital measure, I expect to find that a lower
initial per-capita GDP from 1998 will positively affect per-capita GDP and Life Quality
growth.
The initial 1998 per-capita GDP and net bilateral aid levels used in this
dissertation are from the World Bank Development Indicators dataset (2012) and are in
constant 2000 U.S. dollars. The measure of foreign aid used as an explanatory variable is
a ratio of net bilateral aid per year to GDP (in constant 2000 U.S. dollars). This measure
is useful because it scales aid levels within a country’s economy. In this dataset, percapita GDP growth, the aid ratio, and corruption levels from 1999-2010 for all countries
that data is available for is used. Corruption levels are available for all countries for at
least one year, with most countries having corruption scores for at least one year before
2006, and many countries having all years from 2008 to the present. Following previous
discussions concerning the appropriate measure of human capital to use in development
studies, I use the percentage of females enrolled in secondary school.
Upon conducting my own formal specification test to determine if the ELF score
is an appropriate instrumental, I find that it is not. As a result, unlike Mauro, I use the
ethnolinguistic frationalization (ELF) score not as an instrumental variable but as an
explanatory variable. Previous literature such as Schleifer and Vishney (1993) has found
that the more fractionalized a country, the less institutionally efficient it is—with the
argument being that more heterogeneity makes it difficult to agree on institutions, as well
as, increases the likelihood of corruption (bribes, special treatment, etc.). I utilize the
most recent ELF score based on countries’ populations in 1985. The ELF score ranges
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from zero to one: with zero indicating a homogeneous population and one being a
heterogeneous population. The expectation for this estimation is that a high ELF score
will negatively affect per-capita GDP and Life Quality growth.

Data
I have compiled a dataset that includes these proposed variables from the World
Development Indicators and Global Development Finance data released by the World
Bank on May 7, 2012. This data includes 248 countries, regions, and subcategories of
income levels. The dates of available data are dependent on the country. Data from
many countries are available for the post-1998 time period examined in this study. All
monetary data are inflation-adjusted and are in constant U.S. dollars. Countries that did
not receive aid in one year will be included in the analysis as having received zero
percent of their GDP as aid. Countries that are missing Corruption scores or aid statistics
will not be included in the analysis for the year that data is missing. Below a table listing
and describing the variables is presented.
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Table 6.3: Description of Variables

Variables
Per-capita GDP growth
Life Quality Growth
Corruption
Aid
ELF
Initial GDP
Interaction
Human Capital
Oil Country
Population

Description
The growth rate of Per-Capita GDP in a country from
year t to year t+1
The growth rate for the Life Quality Indicator in a
country from year t to t+1
The Corruption score given by Transparency
International
The ODA received by a country as a percentage of that
country’s GDP
The most recent ethnolingustic fractionalization score
The per-capita GDP in 1998
Aid * Corruption
On a scale of 100, the secondary schooling rates of
females
A dummy variable indicating the top-ten world oil
producers.
The natural log of the population of a country

For illustrative purposes, the summary statistics for these variables are found
below:
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Table 6.4: Summary Statistics 14

Variable
Per-Capita
GDP Growth
Life Quality
Growth
Corruption
Aid
Initial GDP
Interaction
Human Capital
Oil Country
Population

Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation
0.056

9044

0.020

8345

0.015

0.032

1726
9308
2912
3028
1570
12240
12125

6.754
0.038
6932.7
0.146
65.813
0.041
15.490

2.246
0.081
10728.11
0.470
26.896
0.199
2.765

Minimum

Maximum

-0.5029

0.925

-1

0.388

1
-0.029
105.910
-0.053
0.929
0
8.716

10.6
2.416
70151.55
8.858
100
1
22.654

Estimation and Results
The primary objective of this study is to examine the relationships between
corruption, foreign aid, and economic growth. Additionally, I would like to explore the
role that corruption plays, specifically in non-rich countries, as these are typically the
countries that receive ODA. Based on results from previous studies, I predict that,
controlling for other factors, countries with high corruption scores will have lower
economic growth than countries with lower corruption scores. In this same vein, I expect
that non-rich countries with lower levels of corruption should experience more economic
growth than countries with higher levels of corruption. A secondary objective of this
study is to examine the interaction between foreign aid, corruption, and economic
14

Many reviewers expressed curiosity concerning the country that received the maximum datapoint of Aid
at 240% of its GDP in foreign aid receipts. This occurred in Palau, a small Pacific island, in 1994, the year
that the United Nations trusteeship of the island ended, and the country States entered into the Compact of
Free Association with the United States, wherein, the U.S. would provide aid in return for Palau furnishing
military facilities (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008.)
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growth. I posit that countries with higher corruption levels and higher foreign aid
receipts (as a percentage of GDP) will experience less economic growth than countries
with comparable corruption levels and less foreign aid receipts or lower corruption levels
and comparable foreign aid receipts. To quantify this expectation, I have developed an
interaction variable that uses corruption levels and aid levels by year for each country.
Finally, I also expect similar results substituting Life Quality growth for economic
growth.
Initially, I estimated the following econometric model to test the relationship
between economic and Life Quality growth, corruption levels, and foreign aid:

Growth = Constant + b1ELF + b2Corruption + b3Initial GDP + b4Human Capital +
b5Aid +b6Aid*Corruption + b7Oil Country + b8Population,

wherein the average per-capita GDP growth and Life Quality growth of a country is a
function of the ELF score (ELF), the corruption level, the initial 1998 per-capita GDP,
human capital, aid receipts as a percentage of GDP, an interaction of aid and corruption,
the population of the country and whether or not this country is a top-ten global oil
producer. When the coefficient on the ELF score is negative, it follows theory that a
higher level of ethno-linguistic fractionalization decreases economic growth and growth
of the Life Quality score. When the coefficient on the corruption score is negative, it
follows that countries with low levels of corruption have increased economic growth and
growth of the Life Quality measure. A negative coefficient on the initial level of GDP
indicates the theory of conditional convergence is being supported, and a positive
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coefficient for aid indicates that aid increases economic growth and the growth of the
Life Quality score. A negative coefficient on the interaction variable indicates countries
with a higher combination of corruption scores and aid receipts experience lower
economic growth and Life Quality growth than countries with a lower combination.
And, a negative coefficient on the oil country variable indicates the presence of the
resource curse. The results of the analysis for all countries and years with data available
are shown below:

Table 6.5: Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the
Dependent Variable
Per-Capita
GDP Growth

Variables
Corruption

0.003
(0.002)
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.0000007*
(0.0000003)
-0.621
(0.497)
0.083
(0.063)
0.0004***
(0.0001)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.009
(0.007)
0.009
(0.024)

ELF
Initial GDP
Aid
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
818
R-squared
0.072
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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These results indicate that in explaining economic growth, the initial income and
human capital measurement of secondary school enrollment of females are the only two
significant findings. With a negative coefficient for initial income, convergence is seen,
and with a positive coefficient, this human capital measure is shown to increase economic
growth. Additionally, when the level of aid is -.005, the effect of the interaction term is
zero.
Next, I tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Aid variable and the
interaction term are both zero and the results are below:

Aid and interaction=0
chi2( 2) =

0.79

Prob > chi2 = 0.674

At the mean corruption level, testing that the coefficients on the Aid variable and
the interaction term are both zero shows:

Aid and interaction=0
chi2( 1) =

0.02

Prob > chi2 = 0.9
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To quantify the impact of aid at the mean level of corruption, I used the following
equation:

Impact of Aid = Coefficient of Aid + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean of Corruption),

to find that the impact of aid is -0.06. This means that for a given country, an increase in
one unit of aid will result in a decrease in Per-Capita GDP Growth of 0.06. For example,
an increase in aid in Algeria in 2003 from 0.331% of GDP to 100.331% of GDP would be
associated with a 0.06 decline of GDP from a 5.3% growth rate to a -5.9% growth rate.
I then tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Corruption variable
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:

Corruption and interaction=0
chi2( 2) =

1.96

Prob > chi2 = 0.376

And, at the mean level of aid, testing that the coefficients of the Corruption
variable and the interaction term are both zero shows:

Corruption and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) =

1.93

Prob > chi2 = 0.164
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Using the converse of the impact of aid equation of:

Impact of Corruption = Coefficient of Corruption + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean
of Aid),

I find that the impact of Corruption at the mean level of Aid is 0.006. The application of
this would indicate that, in Algeria, in 2003, an increase in the corruption score from 8.4
to 9.4 would be associated with an increase in the growth rate of Per-Capita GDP from
5.3% to 5.91%.
Next, I performed the same regression analysis for growth of the Life Quality
measure, with the results below:
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Table 6.6: Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the
Dependent Variable

Variables

Life Quality
Growth

Corruption

0.002***
(0.0008)
0.005
(0.004)
-0.00000007
(0.0000001)
-0.807***
(0.286)
0.100***
(0.035)
0.0002***
(0.00005)
-0.002***
(0.0005)
-0.0002
(0.002)
0.016*
(0.009)

ELF
Initial GDP
Aid
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
814
R-squared
0.055
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

These results show similar findings concerning human capital, however the
coefficients of the corruption score, aid, and population are also significant. Contrary to
my hypotheses, though, coefficients of Corruption and the interaction of Corruption and
aid are found to be positive. The coefficient of aid is found to be negative and is not very
surprising; however, the positive coefficients on the corruption score and interaction term

Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013

91

are puzzling. Additionally, when the level of aid is -.002, the effect of the interaction
term is zero.

Furthermore, I tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Aid variable
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:

Aid and interaction=0
F( 2, 666) = 5.07
Prob > F =

0.007

At the mean corruption level, testing that the coefficients on the Aid variable and
the interaction term are both zero shows:

Aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 666) = 10.06
Prob > F =

0.002

To quantify the impact of aid at the mean level of corruption, I, again, used the
following equation:

Impact of Aid = Coefficient of Aid + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean of Corruption),

to find that the impact of aid is -7.395. This means that for a given country, an increase
in one unit of aid will result in a decrease in Life Quality Growth of 7.395. For example,
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an increase in aid in Algeria in 2003 from 0.331% of GDP to 100.331% of GDP would be
associated with a 7.395 decline of Life Quality from a 3.65% growth rate to a -735.85%
growth rate.
I then tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Corruption variable
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:

Corruption and interaction=0
F( 2, 666) =

1.40

Prob > F = 0.247

And, at the mean level of aid, testing that the coefficients of the Corruption
variable and the interaction term are both zero shows:

Corruption and interaction = 0
F( 1, 666) = 0.44
Prob > F = 0.506

Using the converse equation of:

Impact of Corruption = Coefficient of Corruption + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean
of Aid),

I find that the impact of Corruption at the mean level of Aid is 0.006. The application of
this would indicate that, in Algeria, in 2003, an increase in the corruption score from 8.4
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to 9.4 would be associated with an increase in the growth rate of Life Quality from 3.65%
to 4.25%.
Upon further examination of the data, I found that most of the data on per-capita
GDP growth was between -.15 and .15 and most of the data concerning Life Quality
growth was between -.08 and .08. Results of joint test analyses, impact levels, and fixed
effects regression analyses of the remaining data subsets are found in the appendix. In
the following analysis, I isolated the dependent variables to within these two ranges,
getting rid of data points in the lowest and highest percentiles, to improve the fit of my
model and found:
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Table 6.7: Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data
Per-Capita
GDP Growth

Variables
Corruption

0.003*
(0.002)
0.0002
(0.008)
0.021
(0.046)
-0.0000006*
(0.0000003)
-0.155
(0.390)
0.0004***
(0.0001)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.01
(0.009)
0.015
(0.023)

ELF
Aid*Corruption
Initial GDP
Aid
Human Capital
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
813
R-squared
0.079
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

While the fit of my model did improve, the only variables found to be significant
were the corruption score (in the opposite direction than expected), human capital, and
initial income. Additionally, when the level of aid is -.019, the effect of the interaction
term is zero. Once again, convergence is found and the human capital coefficient is
positive. Examining data with Life Quality growth between -.08 and .08, I found:
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Table 6.8: Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data

Variables

Life Quality
Growth

Aid*Corruption

0.06**
(0.028)
0.002***
(0.0008)
0.004
(0.004)
-0.00000007
(0.0000001)
-0.465**
(0.233)
0.0002***
(0.00005)
-0.001***
(0.0005)
0.0001
(0.002)
0.012
(0.009)

Corruption
ELF
Initial GDP
Aid
Human Capital
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
805
R-squared
0.046
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The fit was not improved in this analysis, and the significant variables were
similar to the previous analysis of Life Quality growth. Again, the direction of the
coefficient of the Corruption score and the interaction term is unexpected; the
relationship with aid is negative and with human capital is positive. Additionally, when
the level of aid is -.019, the effect of the interaction term is zero.
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Following these results, I narrowed the data further by only examining countries
that had a level of 1998 per-capita GDP of $21,100 or less. This number is higher than
two standard deviations above the mean, so it excludes countries that were rich in 1998.
The findings are below:

Table 6.9: Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data with Initial GDP of $21,000 or Less

Per-Capita
GDP growth

Variables
Corruption

0.001
(0.002)
-0.004
(0.008)
-0.000002***
(0.0000005)
-0.275
(0.388)
0.037
(0.046)
0.0005***
(0.0001)
-0.0007
(0.001)
-0.012
(0.009)
0.01
(0.024)

ELF
Initial GDP
Aid
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
693
R-squared
0.084
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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These significant findings indicate convergence and show that human capital has
a positive coefficient. Additionally, when the level of aid is -.004, the effect of the
interaction term is zero.
With the same initial per-capita GDP cutoff and an Life Quality growth rate
between -.08 and .08, I ran the analysis again and found:

Table 6.10: Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data with Countries that had an Initial
GDP of $21,000 or Less

Variables

Life Quality
Growth

Corruption

0.002*
(0.001)
0.003
(0.004)
-0.0000003
(0.0000003)
-0.486**
(0.234)
0.063**
(0.028)
0.0002***
(0.00005)
-0.001*
(0.0006)
0.0006
(0.002)
0.012
(0.011)

ELF
Initial GDP
Aid
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
685
R-squared
0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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These findings indicate convergence, a positive effect of human capital, a
negative effect of aid receipts, and, again, positive coefficients on the Corruption score
and the interaction between the Corruption score and aid. Additionally, when the level of
aid is -.004, the effect of the interaction term is zero.
In the previous analyses, the negative relationship between aid receipts and Life
Quality growth is common-sensical and may reflect endogeneity, as aid is often directed
to low-income countries or to countries with public health issues that may cause a
decreased life expectancy. The puzzling positive coefficients for these variables could be
picking up on growth in the short-term resulting from corruption. This growth would be
seen by increased consumption caused by funneling tax revenue into private pockets or
awarding over-priced contracts for unneeded (or poorly constructed and short-lived)
infrastructure to political supporters. However, growth in this fashion would not be
expected to continue into the long-term, as this consumption would crowd out investment
in future infrastructure.
Upon closer examination of my data, it became apparent that the dependent
variable varies dramatically, while the Corruption score does not change as drastically. A
disparity in variances could explain the poor fit of the model to the data, as shown in the
following equation:
Variance(Y) * (1-r2)
Variance(B) = Variance(xj) * (1-rj2)
When the large variance in Y is divided by the small variance in x, the variance of
the coefficient increases—leading the model to not fit the data so well, and, perhaps,
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explaining the puzzling results of the positive coefficients on the corruption score and
interaction term variables.
To examine the relationship between corruption and growth further, using a
binary variable to indicate positive levels of growth or not, I performed a probit analysis
to examine the relationship between independent variables and whether a country
experienced positive growth in per-capita GDP and found:

Table 6.11: Results of Probit Analysis Examining Positive Per-Capita GDP Growth

Equation

Variables

Positive
GDP Growth

Corruption
ELF
Initial GDP
Aid
Human Capital
Aid*Corruption
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Positive
GDP Growth
0.024
(0.049)
-0.094
(0.246)
-0.000006
(0.00001)
17.65
(15.23)
0.003
(0.003)
-2.119
(1.835)
0.018
(0.037)
-0.403*
(0.215)
0.391
(0.726)

Observations
819
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The only significant findings here are that being a top oil country does not lead to
experiencing positive economic growth. This analysis does not explain the puzzling
directionality of the coefficients of the corruption score or the interaction term that
previous analyses found. The following shows a comparable probit analysis, with this
iteration concerned with a positive level of Life Quality growth:

Table 6.12: Results of Probit Analysis Examining Positive Life Quality Growth

Equation

Variables

Positive
Life Quality
Growth

ELF

Initial GDP
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Population
Oil Country
Corruption
Aid
Constant

Positive
Life Quality
Growth
-0.066
(0.242)
0.000005
(0.00001)
4.264**
(1.798)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.057
(0.038)
0.185
(0.237)
0.067
(0.049)
-33.86**
(14.54)
1.054
(0.716)

Observations
819
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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As shown, the significant finding here is that countries with high levels of aid are
not experiencing a positive Life Quality. Also, countries with higher levels of the
interaction term are experiencing positive Life Quality growth—again contrary to my
hypothesis.
As the findings concerning the corruption score and interaction term variables
were still puzzling, I began examining the data closer. While the Corruption score is
provided across a longer period of time and for more countries than many corruption
indices, prior to 2006, many countries have only one entry. Did having many corruption
score entries prior to 2006 indicate that a country had achieved a certain level of
development that could be skewing the findings toward higher levels of economic and
Life Quality growth? Countries with many scores before 2006 may indicate that they are
safer or more developed than countries without, leading to a positive coefficient for the
Corruption variable. To name a few countries at the beginning of the alphabet,
Afghanistan, Barbados, Benin, and Burkina Faso had scant data concerning the
corruption score before 2006. However, countries such as Argentina, Australia, and
Bolivia have corruption scores available for every year. Additionally, as discussed in
Our History (Transparency International, 2013), Transparency International began
partnerships with numerous non-governmental organizations and were able to expand the
scope of their data collection. With this in mind, I analyzed the data after 2006. Below
are the results of a regression analysis using all available data from 2008 forward:
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Table 6.13: Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2008 Forward

Per-Capita
GDP Growth

Variables
ELF

0.002
(0.015)
0.0000006
(0.0000006)
-0.223*
(0.116)
-0.0003
(0.0002)
0.008**
(0.003)
1.835*
(0.932)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.033***
(0.011)
-0.056
(0.045)

Initial GDP
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Corruption
Aid
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
195
R-squared
0.134
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

These findings show a significant and expected sign of the coefficient for the
interaction variable, despite positive coefficients on both the corruption score and aid.
Also significant in these findings is the negative coefficient on the variable of oil country.
The effects of aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.
Below are the findings concerning the Life Quality growth rate using all data from 2008
forward:
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Table 6.14: Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2008 Forward

Variables

Life Quality
Growth

ELF

0.018***
(0.006)
0.0000004
(0.0000003)
-0.12*
(0.066)
-0.0002**
(0.00008)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.936*
(0.522)
-0.0008
(0.001)
-0.005
(0.008)
0.005
(0.023)

Initial GDP
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Corruption
Aid
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
195
R-squared
0.121
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As in the prior table, despite having significant and positive coefficients for aid
and corruption score, the interaction term has a significantly negative coefficient.
However, the negative coefficient for human capital is a surprising find. The effects of
aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive. Exploring the truncated
samples show similar results:
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Table 6.15: Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data from 2008 Forward

Per-Capita
GDP Growth

Variables
ELF

0.009
(0.012)
0.0000005
(0.0000006)
-0.215*
(0.115)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
0.007**
(0.003)
1.740*
(0.923)
0.0009
(0.002)
-0.032***
(0.011)
-0.043
(0.043)

Initial GDP
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Corruption
Aid
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
194
R-squared
0.14
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The effects of aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.
Similar results are shown in analysis limited to the sample of countries with an initial percapita GDP of $21,100 and growth rates between .15 and -.15:
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Table 6.16: Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data with Countries that had an Initial
GDP of $21,000 or Less from 2008 Forward

Per-Capita
GDP Growth

Variables
ELF

0.008
(0.015)
0.0000001
(0.000001)
-0.21*
(0.126)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
0.007*
(0.004)
1.708*
(1.02)
0.001
(0.002)
-0.034***
(0.013)
-0.051
(0.053)

Initial GDP
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Corruption
Aid
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
168
R-squared
0.109
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The effects of aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.
Examining the Life Quality growth rates, with a truncated Life Quality sample, the
findings are similar and below:
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Table 6.17: Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data from 2008 Forward

Variables

Life Quality
Growth

ELF

0.018***
(0.006)
0.0000004
(0.0000003)
-0.12*
(0.066)
-0.0002**
(0.00008)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.936*
(0.522)
-0.0008
(0.001)
-0.005
(0.008)
0.005
(0.023)

Initial GDP
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Corruption
Aid
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
195
R-squared
0.121
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The effects of aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive. And,
the results of the analysis including data from the truncated and initial GDP under
$21,100 subset do not show much concerning the interested relationships:
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Table 6.18: Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Truncated Data with Countries that had an Initial
GDP of $21,000 or Less from 2008 Forward

Variables

Life Quality
Growth

ELF

0.022***
(0.007)
0.0000005
(0.0000004)
-0.102
(0.066)
-0.0002*
(0.00009)
0.003*
(0.002)
0.786
(0.517)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.009)
0.02
(0.021)

Initial GDP
Aid*Corruption
Human Capital
Corruption
Aid
Population
Oil Country
Constant

Observations
169
R-squared
0.097
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The effects of aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive.
However, the negative and significant coefficient on the human capital variable when
Life Quality growth is the dependent variable is a strange finding, considering the
positive and significant coefficient found during analyses using data from all years
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available. Considering that only four years are being analyzed in these analyses, this
could be caused by a lack of change in the human capital variable from 2008-2011,
resulting in unreliable findings. Or, it could indicate that the percentage of females in
secondary schools in 2008-2011 decreases Life Quality growth. This relationship should
be further examined in future studies.

Conclusions
Using data from 173 countries over an eleven-year period, this study used a
regression analysis to investigate the effect of corruption, foreign aid, and their
interaction on economic growth and growth of the Life Quality. The significant results
follow. Concerning the corruption score, an increase in the score slightly increases the
growth of the Life Quality; this is also found upon truncating the range Life Quality
growth to -.08 and .08, and with the exclusion of countries that had a 1998 per-capita
GDP of $21,100 or higher. The coefficient of the corruption score is significant and
positive with per-capita GDP as the dependent variable in the truncated sample and in all
analyses limited to data from 2008 and forward. While counterintuitive, this finding
could be a result from data availability: some countries experiencing very negative or
levels of Life Quality and economic growth are missing corruption scores. Future work
may find it useful to impute corruption scores that are missing based on available
information.
In the analyses of all data, aid often had a negative and significant relationship
with Life Quality growth. And, in the probit analysis examining positive Life Quality
growth rates, it is indicated that countries receiving aid are not experiencing positive Life
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Quality growth rates. However, in examining the analyses from 2008 forward, the
coefficient on aid receipts becomes positive and is significant in overall analysis with
GDP and Life Quality growth as the dependent variable, the truncated and non-rich
sample of GDP growth, and the truncated sample of Life Quality growth. This change of
directionality is interesting. The negative relationship can be explained through the fact
that countries that receive aid are typically poor countries that may be experiencing
negative Life Quality growth, irrespective of aid receipts. Or, aid receipts could be
causing declines in the Life Quality; however, this analysis would not be able to parse out
the difference. The switch in directionality is puzzling, but could be explained by the fact
that, due to the economic recession, aid receipts have declined and donors are increasing
restricted aid as a percentage of all aid disbursed. This positive relationship could
indicate that restricted aid is, in fact, improving conditions in recipient countries as
measured through economic growth and longevity increases. This relationship could be
examined further by separating the aid variable into restricted and unrestricted aid in
future work.
Additionally, the coefficient on the interaction term was found to be slightly
positive and significant in all samples of the Life Quality growth rates, including the
probit analysis, until limiting examination to 2008 forward. In examining data from 2008
forward, the relationship between the interaction variable and the growth measures
became negative and significant for all samples, except for the sample of truncated Life
Quality growth scores of countries with per-capita GDP under $21,100 in 1998. This
finding is in line with theories that foreign aid receipts in corrupt countries actually
decrease productivity and economic growth through exacerbating present distortions.
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Further work involving the imputation of corruption scores should aid in clarifying this
relationship, also.
Convergence was shown through the prediction of all samples of economic
growth but not in Life Quality growth. This may indicate that either countries had
already experienced significant longevity increases prior to 1998 or that inequalities in
global longevity are not decreasing during the examined time period. Another significant
finding of these analyses is that concerning the human capital measure, which was the
secondary school enrollment of females within a country. This measure was significant
and positive in every regression analysis performed until limiting the data to 2008
forward. In this sample, the coefficient on this variable became negative and very small.
A lack of change in this variable from 2008 forward may be responsible for this change.
Finally, the ELF variable did not demonstrate much of a significant relationship in any
samples. This could be because the measure is dated or, perhaps, fractionalization along
ethnic and linguistic lines has decreased and is not causing as many problems within
countries as in the past. In comparing the two dependent variables, the explanatory
variables of interest generally affected them similarly.
The results of regression analyses controlling for fixed effects are presented in the
appendix. These results similar show, pre-2008, a positive relationship between on the
human capital variable per-capita GDP growth, a negative relationship between the Aid
and Life Quality growth, and a positive relationship between the interaction variable and
Life Quality growth. Post-2007, controlling for fixed effects does not show many
significant findings. The joint test results and the impacts of aid and corruption are
presented in the appendix. These results indicate pre-2008 that aid has a negative impact
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on economic and Life Quality growth, and that post-2007, aid demonstrates a positive
impact on economic and Life Quality growth. The impact of corruption on the dependent
variables is shown to be positive before 2008 and negative after 2007.
In the following chapter, I use theories previously presented to discuss the events
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and happenings within Russia concerning
corruption and foreign aid receipts. Then, analyses similar to that found in this chapter
are performed on the subset of former Soviet Union countries to examine how corruption
and aid affected economic growth and longevity in these countries.
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Chapter Seven: Examining Russia’s Economic Problems Following the Collapse of
the Soviet Union

Introduction
As discussed in Chapter One, foreign aid has been found to both increase and
decrease economic growth, depending on the recipient’s policies. This chapter is a case
study of the problems that corruption caused Russia following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, despite billions of dollars of aid from international organizations and
windfalls from natural resource exportation. Since their formation in the 1940s, the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund have given and loaned billions of dollars in
aid to countries. Currently over 180 countries belong to each institution and benefit from
their broad-based economic and project-specific advice. Throughout their history, they
have been present and actively providing assistance during numerous country- and
region-specific crises. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two institutions
moved to aid Eastern Bloc countries in the transition from a centrally-planned economy
to one based on a market. As this chapter chronicles, the most difficult transition was
found in Russia. Russia proved a difficult case not only because of the size of the
country but also due to the natural resource curse and historical factors like weak
institutions which have proven difficult to remedy. Following the historical discussion
concerning corruption and foreign aid to present, an analysis similar to that found in the
previous chapter is conducted to find if Russia experienced less economic growth and
growth in its Life Quality score than other Former Soviet Union countries.
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A Brief History of the Soviet Union
Though not official until 1922, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
had its beginnings in 1917, with the Russian Revolution ending three hundred years of
dynastic rule. Between 1917 and 1922, Vladimir Lenin led the Red Army to enter nearby
territories of Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Belarus to aid Communists in
seizing power. Through national delimitation 15, the areas of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were created within the USSR.
Following Lenin’s death in 1924, Joseph Stalin came into power and committed the
newly-formed republic to a centrally-planned economy that would focus on
industrialization and collectivism. After the German invasion in 1941, the Soviet Union
fought as an Allied Power during World War II and absorbed Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania into the USSR. Despite sustaining the largest loss of life during the war, the
Soviet Union played a decisive role in the Axis defeat, and built the Eastern Bloc in
Central and Eastern Europe through economic and military pacts, establishing puppet
governments, and enacting reigns of terror on the ruling governments. The countries in
the Eastern Bloc included East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia. These countries were what Churchill referred to as
being “behind the Iron Curtain of Moscow,” and would later officially sign the Warsaw
Pact that promised cooperation and mutual assistance to one another. At the end of the
war, the Soviet Union became one of the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council and emerged as one of the world’s superpowers.

15

National delimitation was the Soviet Union’s attempt to build nations out of the ethnic groups within the
union. This was a result of The Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia that was adopted in 1918
and recognized the sovereignty of all peoples of Russia and their right for self-determination.
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The formation of the Eastern Bloc and post-war plans created a rift between the
Soviet Union and the United States and began the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine
Speech of 1947 indicated that the United States was willing to spend much time and
effort at containing communism. The United States government developed NATO and
began distributing anti-communism propaganda that would fuel the Cold War.
Khrushchev was in power during this time but was ousted and replaced in 1964 by a
collective leadership team. This team set out to stabilize the republic and improve
economic growth through decentralization. After initial success, further reforms were
halted in fear that the ruling party would lose power and economic growth would
stagnate.

Collapsing Economies
By the 1980s, the socialist system was breaking down throughout the Soviet
Union. To the Russian economy that “relied almost entirely on its oil and gas exports to
earn foreign exchange” (Sachs, p. 131), a sharp dip in oil prices and the depletion of oil
fields in the late 1980s was the final straw that would lead the planned economy into ruin.
Following the disbandment of the Soviet Union, the now-sovereign countries began the
journey to a market economy. This journey was wrought with difficult transitions for the
smaller countries, but for Russia, it would prove to be so disastrous that some Russians
believed the transition to be a plot by the West to weaken their country (Woods, 2006).
The dissolution of the Soviet Union left the West with many geopolitical
questions. The pressing issue of the nuclear arsenal that had been accumulated during the
Cold War led the United States to take a vested interest in promoting the stability of the
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new regime. During this time, it was believed by many decision-makers in Washington
that a transition to democracy and capitalism would be an effective method of ensuring
that Russia would become a stable global partner. However, for the U.S. to provide
direct assistance, all funds disbursals would have to be approved by Congress—which
would be politically difficult, so another strategy was developed.

The International Financial Institutions
As discussed in The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their
Borrowers, Woods (2006) discusses an idea that was a less costly (both monetarily and
politically for the U.S.) method of assuring that Russia received aid and transitioned to a
market economy through the international institutions of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Both institutions were created post-World War II,
were conceived at the Bretton Woods meeting of economic officials in 1944, and are
headquartered in Washington, D.C. The original charters of both institutions directed
them to stimulate employment and real income, facilitate balanced growth of
international trade, and develop productive resources of all members. These two
economic powerhouses employ a combined 13,000 people—and are home to the largest
gathering of economic Ph.D.s in the world. However, despite the fact that both their
memberships consist of over 180 countries, most of the economic professionals in these
institutions have been educated in the United States and prescribe to the liberal economic
theories that are so embedded in U.S. thinking. These factors contribute to the fact that
the two institutions are de facto led by US Treasury officials and their decisions and
policies have come to be known as the “Washington consensus,” even though the U.S.
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only holds roughly seventeen percent of the voting rights in each. These are the
institutions that were chosen to be the vehicles to transition Russia to a market economy.

Russian Politics of the Time
During 1989 and 1990, the Russian political system experienced upheaval that
translated to disastrous social and economic outcomes for the people. Following the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the country elected its first Parliament in open elections
since 1917 in 1990. While Mikail Gorbachev was still holding the office of Soviet Union
President, the Russian public was suffering from food shortages and an ever-increasing
crime rate. Desirous of reform, in the summer of 1990, Boris Yeltsin ran against a
Communist party opponent and was elected by sixty percent of the voters into the
Russian presidency.
In 1991, following a speech to the Russian Parliament concerning the economic
state of the country, Boris Yeltsin was granted power from the Russian Parliament to rule
by decree for a year. In this famous speech, Yeltsin pledged cooperation with the IMF,
World Bank, and other international financial organizations, in exchange for their help
and advice in improving the Russian economy. From his decree, Yeltsin eliminated
entire ministries and various bureaucratic positions and put together an entirely new
government that consisted of young reformers with economic training. According to
Sachs (2005), these reformers were to lead Russia through the transition to a market
economy.
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Economic Transition
On October 28, 1991, following Yeltsin’s pledge of cooperation, a plan to create a
market economy through privatization, liberalization, and stabilization was unveiled to
the Russian Congress by the IMF and the World Bank. The IMF was the first of the two
institutions to begin the bargaining. In the months that followed, Russia applied for IMF
membership only to be granted “associate membership” that did not deem the country
eligible for aid. As noted by Woods, the IMF had not only the carrot of full membership
to coerce Russia into making necessary changes to their economy, but also an alreadyapproved (by the G-7) debt relief package desperately needed by the Russian
government. However, this package was contingent on full membership and the
complete conditionality of implementing IMF recommendations.
As discussed in “Russian Economic Reform: Crossing the Threshold of
Structural Change,” (World Bank, 1992), the Russian government began rapidly
implementing macroeconomic changes based on the conditions of admittance to the IMF.
Beginning in January 1992, eighty percent of wholesale and ninety percent of consumer
prices were freed. This price liberalization means that the Russian government began
allowing the supply and demand of goods to determine prices—instead of the
government setting all prices. And, following World Bank advice, wages and social
benefits were increased—as inflation occurs following price liberalization (World Bank,
1994). However, as neither the Bank nor the IMF had ever undertaken a transition
project affecting such a huge economy, specific outcomes were uncertain.
The most recent transition economy at the time, Poland, had experienced levels of
inflation at 250%. However, the inflation facing Russia for 1992 was 1500% (World
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Bank, 1992). Adding to this problem of hyperinflation was the overall disregard for basic
monetary policy by Russia’s Central Bank, which expanded the money supply by roughly
30% of GDP in 1992 and the fact that the other fifteen countries in the Eatern Bloc used
and printed the same currency (the ruble) without a coordinated policy (Sachs, 2005).
This dramatic decrease in real money motivated a group of politically-powerful elite
industrialists to lobby the government in opposition of future economic reforms.
However, another group that would emerge from the reforms much better off was
funneling thirty percent of Russia’s GDP into their personal bank accounts due to a
different recommended program. Privatization programs are implemented with the goal
to turn state-owned enterprises into profit-making entities (that are not dependent on
government subsidies to survive). As discussed in “Creating Private Enterprises and
Efficient Markets” (World Bank, 1994), in contrast to the privatization programs of other
Eastern Bloc countries, the Russian privatization program was implemented uniformly
and strictly across the nation—resulting in rapid privatization and a corrupt program. As
opposed to the hybrids of methods used in other Eastern Bloc countries, Russia only
utilized the transfer and voucher systems of privatization. A transfer simply gives
employees and managers of the enterprise shares that can be sold or kept to collect
money upon the enterprise earning profits. The voucher system distributed free vouchers
that could be exchanged for shares in government-owned enterprises equally to the entire
Russian population. These vouchers could be kept and the voucher-holders could collect
profits, or the vouchers could be sold. Contrary to the very design of the privatization
process, many of the vouchers and shares were not kept to collect profits but sold for
their face value.
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013

119

A group of businessmen bought most of the vouchers and shares of successful
enterprises and became known as Russia’s oligarchs, as they were a relatively-small
group of very wealthy individuals. These oligarchs became politically powerful and
would use that power during future reforms to capture huge amounts of money from the
Russian government and economy. As corruption and rent-seeking within Russia
increased, the national deficit was also growing and conditions of the citizenry were
deteriorating.

Funding to the Rescue?
Upon implementing price liberalization and privatizing these enterprises, Russia
had met the conditions demanded by the IMF for full membership. In August 1992,
under a broad set of new conditions with the aim to decrease inflation, Russia received $1
billion from the IMF and $600 million from the World Bank. These loans were only a
small fraction of what the institutions were prepared to offer to Russia, however, there
were significant political changes taking place within the country that would make
providing more aid difficult.

More Russian Politics
As the economy of Russia was changing, so were post-Soviet politics. The
economic reforms that had devastated Russian citizens through a dramatic decrease in
real wealth were causing support for Yeltsin to decline. The Parliament opposed many of
the reforms and took action to limit Yeltsin’s implementation powers. The President
became limited in the positions he could appoint and in the reforms he could set into
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motion. Without his decree power of appointment, corrupt bureaucrats began bargaining
with lobbies for powerful governmental positions. Additionally, the young reformers that
had developed strong relationships with the staff of the World Bank and IMF were being
ousted from their positions and replaced by former government officials with no interest
in reform.
From the industrial lobbying forces, two men were brought into the government—
with one being appointed as chairman of the Central Bank of Russia. While these
government insiders were increasing the budget deficit through corrupt practices, the
oligarchs continued lobbying for more sales of government enterprises, decreased
taxation for their companies, and decreased regulations. This combination of demands
and overall oligarchical power that was referred to as the new Russian mafia not only
decreased receipts by the Treasury but undermined public support of a new “reformed”
economy by showing that a market economy is also subject to corruption (Sachs, 2005).
As conditions for the people continued to deteriorate, Yeltsin was pulled in two
directions. To the international institutions, he had to demonstrate that his country was
planning on continuing down the road of dramatic economic reforms. However,
domestically, as the Communist party was gaining power in the Parliament and in the
streets, Yeltsin had to pacify the oligarchs to remain in power. This balancing act proved
difficult, and following the new appointments and election of several Communist party
members to Parliament, the Russian government passed a budget with a deficit that was
twenty-five percent of GDP—breaking a specific condition of their agreement with the
IMF and World Bank. The institutions reacted by announcing that Russia’s economic
reforms were not sufficient to warrant the $6 billion loan ready for the country.
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In 1993, it seemed that all was going wrong in Russia. The region of Chechnya
within Russia attempted secession, resulting in civil war within the country, there was
unrest throughout the country, fueled by lack of success from the economic reforms, and
as Yeltsin attempted to retain his power to impose more economic reforms, he was
impeached by a political opponent. This political power struggle resulted in a bloody
showdown in which the army (under orders) attacked Yeltsin’s opponents, and Yeltsin
attempted to disband the Parliament and reinstate his Presidential decree. With Yeltsin’s
actions deemed unconstitutional, the political stability of Russia was unraveling—to the
west, this posed a very real threat of Communist resurgence. During this time of
political turmoil no new economic reforms were put into motion and some previous
conditions were breached, so the country certainly could not expect continued funding
from international institutions—or could they?

American Politics
Throughout the dissolution period of the Soviet Union, President H.W. Bush and
his advisers believed aid to Russia via international institutions would be the best (for his
administration) way to reform the country. However, domestically, this was not the most
relevant subject--as the First Gulf War was coming to a close and elections were
approaching. Additionally, any of the current Republican President’s encouragement for
aid to Russia was politically spun by a Democratically-controlled Congress to put the
President in a negative light. As the election neared, Bush had little to do with the
Russian political or economic situations and concentrated on his own campaign.
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However, as Clinton came into office among a supportive public and Democratic
Congress, he was able to vocalize his (and his advisors’) opinions about aid to Russia.
Despite the oligarchic rent-seeking and the conflict in Chechnya still going on, Clinton
and his advisors developed a slogan of “Russia First,” indicating support for Yeltsin and
his economic reforms (Talbott, 2003). As Clinton and Yeltsin developed a personal
relationship at the beginning of Clinton’s administration, the IMF and World Bank were
pressured by the administration to loosen their demands and increase lending to Russia.
As a result, Russia was approved for a $28 billion aid package (some from the U.S. and
other countries—mostly from the World Bank and IMF) with lightened conditions, an
additional $1.5 billion from the IMF, and a combined $770 million from the World Bank
for varying projects. Following the impeachment of Yeltsin and subsequent turmoil in
Russia previously described, Clinton and other western leaders sought to provide more
aid to Russia with less conditions to assist in the overall stabilization of the country (and
to keep power out of Yeltsin’s Communist opponents’ hands). These western concerns
resulted in another $1.5 billion from the IMF and $1.52 billion from the World Bank.

Problems for the International Financial Institutions
Moving into 1994, the Russian economy deteriorated further as the ruble
collapsed, inflation was still shockingly high, and tax receipts dwindled (as oligarchs
sought additional exemptions for their enterprises and industries). As the World Bank
and IMF moved to halt disbursements due to the lack of macroeconomic stability and
breeched conditionality agreements, a Senate hearing concerning the two institutions
began. This hearing consisted of much criticism for the imposition of conditions that had
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“adversely affected Russia’s economic stability and transition to democracy,” considering
that neither institution had any experience with such a large-scale economic transition
process (Woods, p. 119). Despite the turmoil, rent-seeking, and lack of support for
reforms on the part of the Parliament in Russia, the IMF and World Bank were pressured
to get the ball rolling on their largest loans.

Happenings in Russia
While the World Bank and the IMF were letting go of the restrictions on aid
disbursal, the Russian government was busy with another budget deficit. While the
deficit clearly breached a condition of its loans, Yeltsin and his advisors were trying to
finance the deficit without causing more inflation. As discussed in “Privatization in the
Republics of the Former Soviet Union: Framework and Initial Results” (World Bank,
1993), following the voucher and transfer programs of privatization, the state retained
ownership of various commodity and utility companies throughout the country. Despite
the oligarchical disaster of the first privatization of state assets, another round was set
into motion. In a loans-for-shares process, the government would auction shares of its
remaining enterprises—which, paradoxically, had traditionally been a large source of
revenue for the Russian government. This wave of privatization was poorly publicized,
and, not surprisingly, resulted in share purchases from the oligarchs interested in
increasing their wealth. As described by Sachs, “Russian privatization became a
shameless and criminal activity” (p. 143) in the mid-1990s, a group of businessmen
obtained ownership of formerly state-owned enterprises that included oil, natural gas, and
other commodities. It is estimated that $100 billion worth of rights to resources were
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sold to government insiders and oligarchical power-wielders during this period, while the
Russian Treasury only received $1 billion for the sale. The logic behind selling rights to
such lucrative assets was that Yeltsin would win support from this elite group that would,
in return, finance and support his campaign for reelection in the following year—thus,
paving the way for Yeltsin to implement more economic reforms.
As the election in Russia neared, leaders of western countries remained concerned
that the oligarchic support would not be sufficient for Yeltsin’s victory. Consequently,
following the demands of Congress and the western countries, the IMF disbursed $6.8
billion with new monitoring requirements in 1995 and $10.1 billion in 1996. While this
privatization was under way, the World Bank, which was quite involved in the firstgeneration privatization program, left this program to Russia and set to work on
disbursing previous loans that Russia had been granted but not received due to not
meeting requirements or missing paperwork. Still fearing a Communist win, the western
countries continued to pressure the financial institutions to make Russia’s economy work.
Under this vein, the Paris Club began restructuring proceedings of the $38.7 billion debt
facing Russia. Western pressures to lend were beginning to undermine the principles of
the financial institutions.

Questionable Practices
Following the political turmoil of 1993, the World Bank and the IMF began down
a path of lending that was rife with problems (IMF, 2004). On one hand, continuing
lending would appease western governments and could possibly provide the Russian
government with resources that could finally reform their economy. However, with this
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option, the institutions would have to break their own rules and go against their principles
of institutional independence. Also, this choice poses the risk that an ever-increasing
amount of aid would be wasted (or channeled to oligarchs within Russia) without
providing any benefit to Russia or the global economy. On the other hand, discontinuing
aid would be politically costly (as western countries that dominate the power within the
institutions would not be happy), be viewed as an admittance that this problem was too
much for the institutions, and all aid disbursed so far would be seen as wasted resources.
However, suspending aid may force Russia to face their own problems, and, possibly,
force the country deal with the oligarchical rent-seeking that was robbing their Treasury
and citizens. Additionally, this option would allow the institutions to maintain their
moral standing in the world—as institutions that follow their rules and keep their
agreements.
Fueled by western demands, the institutions became lax on restrictions and
continued lending despite cover-ups and dodgy accounting practices rampant in Russia’s
financial institutions. These practices were known to both institutions and ranged from
improper reporting that would change the time of debits and credits to blatant lies about
Russia’s tax administration (Woods, 2003). As the government was void of the
reformers the institutions staff had formed relationships with, no sympathetic
interlocutors could be counted on to take actual steps toward reform. The previous
interlocutors’ views were comparable to that of Boris Federov, former Russian Minister
of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister, when he said, “The most terrible thing that the
World Bank and IMF could do in Russia would be to remove the conditions on which
their loans are based” (Gurria and Volcker, p. 21).
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Following Yeltsin’s victory in 1996, the Bank released loans of $4.5 billion for
the improvement of social protection and the coal industry. At this point, the Washington
Consensus was that they had worked with Russia for too long and loaned too much
money to stop their assistance now. Over the next two years, the institutions partnered
with the sparse reformers in the government to encourage foreign investment, liberalize
the capital account, and initiate tax collections from the oligarchs. However, all
assistance from the World Bank and the IMF was limited to previously-approved
disbursements of loans and economic advice.

Economic Crisis
While substantial progress was made in the economy, the Asian financial crisis of
the late 1990s proved contagious and infected the Russian economy. The shared
financial instruments of Asia and Russia began the problem, but a rapid accrual of debt
from coupon redemption ($1 billion per week) and plummeting world commodity prices
left Russia with an extremely volatile income source and high debt servicing costs.
These factors led the financial institutions to begin developing a new loan package that
would, hopefully, save the Russian economy. Within months, a plan was developed that
would provide a $17.1 billion loan, followed by $11.2 billion with specific earmarks for
use to stave off the impending economic threats.
At the beginning of this economic debacle, the reformers of the Russian
government had accrued political power following two comparatively-economically
stable years, but Yeltsin began having health problems and was generally unavailable to
offer his support for reformative action. Coupled with his declining power, as the
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Russian economy began to descend into the crisis, the oligarchs again pressured Yeltsin’s
government for more political positions. This new government that resulted from more
appointments and lobbying viewed the Bank and Fund as responsible for the crisis that
was becoming the Russian economy and vocalized their opposition to accepting
additional funds. Surprisingly, there were other global leaders that also opposed the
disbursement of the newly-approved loans (IMF, 2004).
While the Russian economy was approaching financial crisis, western countries
were finally becoming skeptical of the aid given to Russia. As the Russian government
and the officials in Chechnya were having disputes, the region again attempted to secede.
A harsh reaction by the Russian national government followed, and reports of forced
disappearances, political persecution, and civilian violence flooded western news outlets.
Around the same time, information from the previous six years of assistance to Russia
was released. The shock value of the misallocation of billions of dollars by the Russian
government (while the international financial institutions looked the other way), made
disbursement of further aid to the country an unpopular subject both with the western
public and western leaders (IMF, 2004). However, despite the open condemnation of
previous aid disbursals and increasing political pressures from the west to suspend all aid
to Russia, the two institutions worked with the government and implemented tightened
fiscal and monetary policies that would help the country through a simultaneous debt,
currency, and banking crises. While the policies developed aided the economy, another
factor can be identified as responsible for getting the country out of the crisis.
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Black Gold
As the government began following the advice of the IMF and the World Bank,
rising global energy prices contributed greatly to Russia’s quick recovery. The energy
sector accounts for almost seventeen percent of Russia’s total GDP, and other oil
products and natural gas summed are half of Russia’s total exports (IMF, 2002).
Additionally, with the world’s largest gas reserves and seventh-largest oil reserves, even
small price increases translate to substantially increased revenue to Russia. With the
price per barrel increasing almost seven-fold from 2000 to 2008, the Russian government
realized a hefty revenue boost (IMF, 2009).
Following advice from the IMF, Russia increased domestic oil and gas prices—to
move toward the world market price, and began taxing oil and gas production—despite
facing opposition from the oligarchs that still owned substantial portions of both
industries. This influx of money into the Russian government allowed them to pay down
portions of their debt, and it was concluded by all parties that there was no additional
need for aid (IMF, 2009).

Concluding Aid
While the Russian economy was saved by oil and gas price escalation, the
government developed (somewhat) liberal principles to maintain growth and manage the
volatility that comes with such a large part of GDP attributable to natural resources.
Despite the sharp drop of oil prices in 2009 that adversely affected the Russian economy,
governmental officials have staved off additional financial crises by continuing to work
closely with staff from both the World Bank and the IMF. While the institutions have no
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power over the Russian decisions, governmental officials have followed their advice to
maintain tight monetary and fiscal policy, while using resource revenue to build a rainy
day fund.
Since 1999, the aid that Russia has obtained has been, not surprisingly, very wellmonitored in use. It is unknown exactly how the long current global recession will last,
but officials from the IMF believe that, like most of the global economy, “the Russian
economy is expected to experience a sluggish recovery” (IMF, p. 15). During the
recovery phase, the world will find out if the policies of the Russian economy will prove
the country self-sufficient or if the country will find itself needing additional aid.
While this case study spotlights the plight of Russia following the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, other Eastern Bloc countries also experienced some economic
problems. However, I argue that it is expected for Russia to have significantly different
economic outcomes than these territories following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Based on prior discussion concerning the influence institutions have on economic
development, I assert that such differences are due to the political, economic, and societal
institutions built in Russia over centuries of civilization that allowed for such rampant
corruption to become commonplace throughout the USSR. While some policies were
applied to the entire Eastern Bloc while under Soviet control, I do not think the
application is equal to that in Russia, nor should the effects be as strong. Additionally,
these prior independent countries had their own institutions before assimilation into the
republic and such influence would continue to develop despite Soviet efforts, and Russia
received much higher levels of foreign aid (as a percentage of GDP) than the other
Eastern Bloc countries. (Effects of foreign aid on economic growth are discussed in
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previous chapters.) Finally, Russia is the only country from the Soviet Union that is a
top-ten world producer of oil. (Kazakhstan produces about one-tenth of the quantity of
oil as Russia and is on the top-twenty list of global producers.) The resource curse is
discussed at length in Chapter Five, and, I argue, when combined with rampant
corruption and foreign aid, can explain the diverging economic outcomes following
dissolution of the Soviet Union. The following section uses post-Soviet data to explore
the relationship between corruption, foreign aid, and economic growth within the Eastern
Bloc countries.

Comparing Russia to Other Eastern Bloc Countries
There are occasions in which, researchers are provided with opportunities to
observe natural experiments. These experiments have such excessive controls that they
could never have been enacted by a researcher. For example, the dissolution of the
USSR has provided a natural experiment by which scholars can compare the Eastern
Bloc territories to each other and attempt to explain the differences between them. As
chronicled at the beginning of this chapter, as recently as 1945, some of these countries
were independent and not a part of the republic.
As noted by Heybey and Murrell (1999), the initial conditions of the Eastern Bloc
countries are very important in determining growth performance, post-transition. These
initial conditions include things like geographical location and prior institutions. For
example, the location of the Czech Republic provides less costly trade with European
countries than does the location of Turkmenistan. Following these results, I find it useful
to divide the Eastern Bloc territories into several groups based on their initial conditions
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such as geographical location, ethnic makeup, and the conditions of their absorption and
release from the republic. I hypothesize that the countries within each group will have
comparable economic effects following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and that none
of the groups will experience similar outcomes to Russia. With the rationale behind
group division found in the following paragraph, the table showing the divisions is
below:

Table 7.1: Groups of Eastern Bloc Countries

Group 1
Estonia

Group 2
Kazakhstan

Latvia
Kyrgyzstan
Lithuania Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan

Group 3
Armenia

Group 4
Czech
Republic
Azerbaijain Hungary
Georgia
Poland

Group 5 Group 6
Moldova Croatia
Ukraine
Belarus

Romania
Slovak
Republic

Group 7
Russia

Slovenia
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Serbia
Kosovo
Macedonia
Albania

The countries in Group 1 are referred to as the Baltic States due to their location
on the Baltic Sea, and they share common political institutions, cultural practices, and
ethnicities. Additionally, these countries quickly integrated into Western Europe
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and joined NATO and the European Union
in 2004. As discussed earlier, the countries in Group 2 were created within the Soviet
Union because they were home to non-Russian peoples. Each country has a majority
demographic of the ethnicity for which it was named (e.g., the majority ethnic group is
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Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan), a low percentage of the population is Russian, and various
ethnicities round out the remainder of the populace. While each country has its own
dominant ethnic group, all of these groups have a similar Turkish ancestry and are of the
Muslim faith, and I argue these commonalities have resulted in the formation of similar
societal institutions and similar outcomes following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Group 3’s countries are located in the Caucasus region, and all regained their
independence from the Soviet Union around the same time. Within Group 4, I argue
similarities will be found concerning post-Soviet economic conditions, as these countries
are geographically and ethnically similar. Additionally, I expect Group 5’s postdissolution outcomes to be the most similar to Russia due to similar geography and ethnic
background. The final group includes countries of former Yugoslavia, and despite ethnic
differences that led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, I assert that these countries
developed similar institutions over time that will lead to comparable post-Soviet
economic outcomes.

Analysis and Results
Using the same data and methods as in the previous chapter, I now focus on
former Soviet Union countries. In this analysis, I use the same explanatory variables as
in the previous chapter, excepting the human capital indicator. As data concerning the
secondary school enrollment for females is not available for some Eastern Bloc countries,
I will use the average years of schooling. (For a complete discussion concerning the pros
and cons of various human capital measures, see Chapter Three.) Additionally, a simple
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correlation test between the two measures suggests a .7509 correlation, which is fairly
strong. Below are the results of the analyses with only data from Eastern Bloc countries:

Table 7.2: Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the
Dependent Variable

Variables

GDP Growth

Corruption

-0.002
(0.004)
0.021
(0.018)
-0.545*
(0.285)
-0.0000007
(0.000002)
4.973*
(2.455)
0.012
(0.007)
-0.008***
(0.002)
0.003
(0.003)
0.094**
(0.04)

ELF
Aid*Corruption
Initial GDP
Aid
Oil Country
Human Capital
Population
Constant

Observations
217
R-squared
0.117
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

While showing a negative and very small coefficient for the human capital
variable is curious, the negative coefficient of the interaction variable is expected. Also,
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in comparison to the comparable global analysis of the previous chapter, this model has a
better fit. Here, when the level of aid is -.0004, the effect of the interaction term is zero.
Additionally, I tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Aid variable and the
interaction term are both zero and the results are below:

Aid and interaction=0
chi2( 2) =

0.79

Prob > chi2 = 0.674

At the mean corruption level, testing that the coefficients on the Aid variable and
the interaction term are both zero shows:

Aid and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) =

0.02

Prob > chi2 = 0.901

To quantify the impact of aid at the mean level of corruption, I used the same
equation as in Chapter 6:

Impact of Aid = Coefficient of Aid + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean of Corruption),

to find that the impact of aid is -36.17. This means that for a given country, an increase
in one unit of aid is associated with a decrease in per-capita GDP of 36.17. For example,
an increase in aid in Russia in 1999 0.9% of GDP to 100.9% would be associated with
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36.17 decline in per-capita GDP growth from a 6.8% growth rate to a -3616.93% growth
rate.
I then tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Corruption variable
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:

Corruption and interaction=0
chi2( 2) =

1.96

Prob > chi2 = 0.376

And, at the mean level of aid, testing that the coefficients of the Corruption
variable and the interaction term are both zero shows:

Corruption and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) =

1.93

Prob > chi2 = 0.164

Using the equation:

Impact of Corruption = Coefficient of Corruption + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean
of Aid),

I find that the impact of Corruption at the mean level of Aid is -0.11. The application of
this would indicate that, in Russia, in 1999, an increase in the corruption score from 8.6
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to 9.6 would be associated with a decrease in the growth rate of per-capita GDP from
6.8% to -4.5%.

And, with Life Quality growth as the dependent variable, the results are:

Table 7.3: Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the
Dependent Variable

Variables

Life Quality Growth

Corruption

-0.001
(0.002)
0.002
(0.006)
-0.121
(0.152)
-0.000002**
(0.0000009)
0.887
(1.282)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.084**
(0.039)

ELF
Aid*Corruption
Initial GDP
Aid
Oil Country
Human Capital
Population
Constant

Observations
217
R-squared
0.033
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The only significant finding here indicates convergence. Here, when the level of
aid is

-0.004, the effect of the interaction term is zero.
Additionally, I tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Aid variable

and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:

Aid and interaction=0
F( 2, 666) = 5.07
Prob > F =

0.007

At the mean corruption level, testing that the coefficients on the Aid variable and
the interaction term are both zero shows:

Aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 666) = 10.06
Prob > F =

0.002

To quantify the impact of aid at the mean level of corruption, I used the same
equation as in Chapter 6:

Impact of Aid = Coefficient of Aid + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean of Corruption),

to find that the impact of aid is -0.027. This means that for a given country, an increase
in one unit of aid is associated with a decrease in per-capita GDP of .027. For example,
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an increase in aid in Russia in 1999 0.9% of GDP to 100.9% would be associated with a
decline in per-capita GDP growth from a 6.8% growth rate to a 4.1% growth rate.
I then tested the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the Corruption variable
and the interaction term are both zero and the results are below:

Corruption and interaction=0
F( 2, 666) =

1.40

Prob > F = 0.247

And, at the mean level of aid, testing that the coefficients of the Corruption
variable and the interaction term are both zero shows:

Corruption and interaction = 0
F( 1, 666) = 0.44
Prob > F = 0.506

Using the equation:

Impact of Corruption = Coefficient of Corruption + (Interaction Coefficient*Mean
of Aid),

I find that the impact of Corruption at the mean level of Aid is -0.004. The application of
this would indicate that, in Russia, in 1999, an increase in the corruption score from 8.6
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to 9.6 would be associated with an increase in the growth rate of Life Quality from
-7% to -7.4%.

In the previous chapter, a subset of data was created to only include post-2006
observations due to data availability of the corruption score. However, in the Eastern
Bloc subset, a more appropriate cutoff is 2002. Following 2002 and excepting Kosovo
and Macedonia, there is only one missing observation of the corruption score. Below are
the results of analyses from 2002 forward:
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Table 7.4: Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2003 Forward

Per-Capita
GDP Growth

Variables
Corruption

-0.002
(0.005)
0.024
(0.02)
-0.736**
(0.275)
0.000001
(0.000002)
6.861***
(2.267)
0.008
(0.007)
-0.008**
(0.003)
0.008**
(0.003)
0.011
(0.048)

ELF
Aid*Corruption
Initial GDP
Aid
Oil Country
Human Capital
Population
Constant

Observations
151
R-squared
0.125
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Though the fit of the model has improved slightly, the findings are very similar to
the Eastern Bloc analysis with data from all years. Here, when the level of aid is -0.0003,
the effect of the interaction term is zero. And, with Life Quality growth as the dependent
variable:
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Table 7.5: Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2003 Forward

Variables

Life Quality Growth

Corruption

0.00009
(0.003)
0.022**
(0.008)
-0.361***
(0.123)
0.0000006
(0.0000009)
3.291***
(1.027)
0.008
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.002)
-0.029
(0.029)

ELF
Aid*Corruption
Initial GDP
Aid
Oil Country
Human Capital
Population
Constant

Observations
151
R-squared
0.075
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The fit of this model improves upon the model that includes data from Eastern
Bloc countries for all years, and several variables become significant, including a
negative coefficient on the interaction term. The effects of aid and corruption on the
interaction term here are positive.
Following these general analyses of Eastern Bloc countries, I drill down to the
groups that were presented earlier. With Russia as the control group, I use dummy
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groups to represent the other groups. The results from adding these group variables when
per-capita GDP is the dependent variable are below:

Table 7.6: Results of Regression Analysis with Per-Capita GDP Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2003 Forward with Russia as the Control
Per-Capita
GDP Growth

Variables
Corruption

0.0009
(0.003)
-0.012
(0.018)
-0.638**
(0.239)
0.000004*
(0.000002)
5.814**
(2.05)
-0.008***
(0.003)
0.006
(0.005)
0.011
(0.016)
0.017
(0.016)
0.012
(0.018)
-0.015
(0.009)
-0.004
(0.011)
-0.020
(0.018)
0.03
(0.075)

ELF
Aid*Corruption
Initial GDP
Aid
Human Capital
Population
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Group 5
Group 6
Constant

Observations
217
R-squared
0.142
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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No significant findings concerning the dummy variables are found. The effects of
aid and corruption on the interaction term here are positive. With Life Quality growth as
the dependent variable and Russia again as the control variable, the findings are below:
Table 7.7: Results of Regression Analysis with Life Quality Growth as the
Dependent Variable and Using Data from 2003 Forward with Russia as the Control

Variables

Life Quality Growth

Corruption

-0.002
(0.002)
-0.00004
(0.01)
-0.152
(0.136)
-0.000002**
(0.000001)
1.1
(1.128)
-0.002
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.003)
-0.009
(0.01)
0.001
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.007)
-0.005
(0.006)
-0.009**
(0.004)
-0.006
(0.009)
0.112
(0.07)

ELF
Aid*Corruption
Initial GDP
Aid
Human Capital
Population
Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4
Group 5
Group 6
Constant

Observations
217
R-squared
0.04
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The only significant finding concerning the groups of countries indicates a
negative relationship between Group 5 (the countries of Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus)
and the growth of the Life Quality. Here, when the level of aid is -0.002, the effect of the
interaction term is zero.

Conclusions
The analyses in this chapter examined the relationship between corruption,
foreign aid, economic growth, and longevity within the Eastern Bloc countries. In every
analysis with per-capita GDP growth as the dependent variable, the significant findings
included a small and negative coefficient on the human capital measure, a positive
coefficient on the aid variable, and a negative coefficient on the interaction term. The
finding concerning human capital could be a result of data problems discussed in Chapter
Three or could indicate that attending school in Eastern Bloc countries does not educate
students but rather keeps them from participating within the economy. This relationship
warrants further investigation. While no significant findings concerning the Corruption
variable were discovered, the negative coefficient on the interaction term is in line with
theory and my hypothesis that providing aid to corrupt countries decreases economic
growth. Further, when Life Quality growth was the dependent variable, convergence was
found and similar findings concerning the interaction term were discovered, supporting
the hypothesis that the citizenry within a corrupt country that receives aid does not
experience gains through longevity and economic growth.
Results from the regression analyses controlling for fixed effects, joint tests,
additional computed impacts of aid and corruption are found in the appendix. Adding
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fixed effects to the model estimation shows a negative relationship between the
interaction term and moderate Life Quality growth and a negative relationship between
corruption and moderate GDP growth. The impact of aid becomes positive after 2002,
while the impact of corruption is negative throughout time that data is available for.
While significant differences in per-capita GDP and Life Quality growth were not
found across Eastern Bloc groups (excepting Group 5), future studies may be able to
expand the dataset to include more years of available data and further investigate these
relationships. The absence of the predicted significant difference between Russia and the
other countries could indicate that since 1998, all of the Eastern Bloc countries have
continued to undertake steps to improve their institutional quality and reached
comparable levels. Further analyses examining these countries is warranted, and if
reliable data concerning corruption statistics from the period immediately following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union can be found, analyses of that time period may paint a
more accurate picture of the differences of institutional quality between these countries.
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Chapter Eight: Policy Implications and Future Research Avenues

Discussion
The increased number of studies concerning corruption, foreign aid, and
economic growth has not only provided new conclusions but adept recommendations for
policy-makers. The data utilized in this literature includes panel datasets encompassing
both decades and continents. Many of these datasets are publicly-available and provide a
solid foundation for future research to develop recommendations that will increase the
effectiveness of foreign aid. The relationship between types of foreign aid and
institutional quality changes promises to be an interesting area of future study. With the
current global recession, donor countries have less money to provide for aid and are
demanding effectiveness of that provided. Developing a better understanding of how to
entice recipient countries to improve their institutions and decrease corruption will lead to
a more efficient aid environment. While this area of study has historically been thin,
increased interest from policy-makers and the public will ensure continued exploration
within the field.
The findings from this study should be useful to policymakers of all levels in
many different regions of the world. International officials will be able to use the results
to direct foreign aid where it can be best utilized, while, at domestic levels, bureaucrats
and politicians can use these findings to shift their country’s policies toward those that
foster economic growth. Additionally, as the emerging donors: China, India, and Brazil,
increase their levels of aid provision to countries with varying levels of corruption
(Manning, 2006); their policymakers can also learn from this study. Using a historical
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eye, the research from Russia’s foreign aid experience may parallel with the lack of
restricted aid these emerging donors provide and show how this aid may influence the
economic growth of the current recipients. Further, with the somewhat difficult SinoAmerican relationship, policy-makers can learn strategies concerning trading aid for
influence from looking back at the aid game during the Cold War.
The results of the empirical analysis in this dissertation suggest that aid does
increase growth of per-capita GDP and the Life Quality score, however the results
concerning the interaction of the corruption score and foreign aid show that the
relationship between the dependent variables and interaction term is a negative one. As
the combination of aid levels and corruption levels increases, gains in economic growth
and Life Quality growth decrease. Policy-makers at IFIs and at domestic levels should
heed these findings to realize that providing aid to corrupt countries can actually create
new issues (e.g., the creation of the class of oligarchs in Russia following privatization)
or exacerbate existing ones (e.g., ethnic fighting in highly fractionalized countries over
which group will receive benefits from aid). As previous studies have found, providing
project-specific aid and on-the-ground oversight is one method of limiting the negative
effects of providing foreign aid within a corrupt country.
A clear recommendation from this study could be to not provide aid to corrupt
countries. Additional work showing the impacts of aid and corruption indicate that, after
2007, the impact of aid on a country’s economic and Life Quality growth is positive and
the impact of corruption on a country’s economic and Life Quality growth is negative.
This finding suggests that corruption is the problem when searching for economic and
Life Quality growth—not aid receipts. Corrupt countries could be deemed unable to
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receive aid until these scores are improved. International organizations or nongovernmental organizations may provide assistance and advice to these countries
concerning how to improve their policies to decrease corruption levels. However, as
discussed in previous chapters, the institutions that allow this corruption to continue are
entrenched and have been developed over long periods of time, so changing these
institutions will be a very difficult task for any country and will require substantial
resolve from the public and officials.
Further, additional work could stratify the globe and examine specific effects of
corruption and aid within a region of similar countries, similar to the examination of
Eastern Bloc countries in this dissertation. Such findings could provide more specific
information concerning the relationship between corruption and aid in a region than a
global analysis has afforded and increase the likelihood that polices enacted would be
effective in improving economic growth and longevity increases. Policy-makers from
traditional and emerging donors alike have a responsibility to use results from such
studies to address their motivations of providing aid and to make sure that the institutions
in the recipient countries do not use aid to pervert these motivations or decrease the wellbeing of their citizenry.
Also, following the results found from the global analysis including all years, the
human capital measure of the percentage of females attending secondary school indicated
a significant and positive relationship with both economic and longevity growth. While
the endogeneity between human capital development and economic development has
been discussed, and the two have been found to continue along a virtuous or vicious
cycle, this cycle does continue to present. As, increasing female attendance in schools,
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particularly secondary schools, has been shown to have a such significant and positive
associations with economic growth and growth of the Life Quality Indicator, policymakers around the world should use these findings to implement policies that encourage
females to attend secondary school. As discussed in “World Development Report 2012:
Gender and Equality Development” (2012), there are many impediments for females
attending secondary school and some specific examples include being an ethnic minority
in one’s country, increased levels of mortality of females in comparison to males, or
increased household responsibility for women. Whatever the problem, the report details
that changing the specific impairment for a locale is difficult because these issues are
often entrenched in a culture due to social norms (e.g., average age of marriage) or more
formally through institutions (e.g., segregation laws). The report suggests many avenues
to increase the level of schooling of females such as improving the level of relative
mortality, improving educational opportunities to severely disadvantaged groups (e.g.,
ethnic minorities within a country), creation of policies that subsidize childcare,
implementing affirmative action, and removing discriminatory laws. The global
development community can increase the likelihood of progression on these avenues by
providing funding and technical assistance.
Globalization has resulted in countries becoming more interconnected than at any
other time in human history. As the number of interactions across countries and cultures
has increased in the past few decades, those in the developed world have realized how
markedly different life in developing countries is from our own. The decade of poverty
eradication that began in 1996 (United Nations, 1996) has extended but still has not
achieved its goal. With experience and data gathered from the past, it is my hope that
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those responsible for future aid provision will take into account the findings of this
dissertation and that its results and recommendations will aid in the global war on
poverty.
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Appendix
List of Countries
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Andorra
Angola
Antigua and Barbuda
Arab World
Argentina
Armenia
Aruba
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas, The
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bermuda
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Brunei Darussalam
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Cayman Islands
Central African Republic
Chad
Channel Islands
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Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt, Arab Rep.
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Faeroe Islands
Fiji
Finland
France
French Polynesia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Greenland
Grenada
Guam
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
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Hong Kong SAR, China
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic Rep.
Iraq
Ireland
Isle of Man
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kiribati
Korea, Dem. Rep.
Korea, Rep.
Kosovo
Kuwait
Kyrgyz Republic
Lao PDR
Latvia
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao SAR, China
Macedonia, FYR
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mayotte
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Mexico
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.
Moldova
Monaco
Mongolia
Montenegro
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Palau
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Rwanda
Samoa
San Marino
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovak Republic
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Slovenia
Solomon Islands
Somalia
South Africa
South Asia
South Sudan
Spain
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela, RB
Vietnam
Virgin Islands (U.S.)
West Bank and Gaza
World
Yemen, Rep.
Zambia
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Zimbabwe

Description of Variables for Global Analysis
Variables
Description
Per-capita GDP growth
The growth rate of Per-Capita GDP in a country from year t to
year t+1
Life Quality Growth
The growth rate for the Life Quality Indicator in a country from
year t to t+1
Corruption
The Corruption score given by Transparency International
Aid
The ODA received by a country as a percentage of that country’s
GDP
ELF
The most recent ethnolingustic fractionalization score
Initial GDP
The per-capita GDP in 1998
Interaction
Aid * Corruption
Human Capital
On a scale of 100, the secondary schooling rates of females
Oil Country
A dummy variable indicating the top-ten world oil producers.
Population
The natural log of the population of a country
Description of Variables for Eastern Bloc Analysis
Variables
Description
Per-capita GDP growth
The growth rate of Per-Capita GDP in a country from year t to
year t+1
Life Quality Growth
The growth rate for the Life Quality Indicator in a country from
year t to t+1
Corruption
The Corruption score given by Transparency International
Aid
The ODA received by a country as a percentage of that country’s
GDP
ELF
The most recent ethnolingustic fractionalization score
Initial GDP
The per-capita GDP in 1998
Interaction
Aid * Corruption
Human Capital
The average years of schooling the population over fifteen has
completed
Oil Country
A dummy variable indicating the top-ten world oil producers.
Population
The natural log of the population of a country

Summary Statistics:
Summary Statistics for all data
Variable
Obs
Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

country

0

year

12240

1985

14.7202

1960

2010

Corruption Score

1726

6.754867

2.246625

1

10.6

ELF

11235

0.336262

0.310503

0

0.984

Initial GDP

2912

6932.73

10728.11

105.9102

70151.55
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y_GDP_pc

9274

6417.663

10211.33

57.78493

108111.2

yHDI_grow

931

0.008222

0.008456

-0.03564

0.07047

yLQI_grow

8345

0.015527

0.032589

-1

0.388713

Interaction

3028

0.146616

0.470282

-0.05301

8.858281

yaid_ELF

11083

0.012723

0.036741

-0.00425

0.923939

Human Capital

7074

7.724856

3.313182

0

16.911

Aid

9308

0.038298

0.081295

-0.0292

2.416823

ypop_total

12125

1.42E+08

5.46E+08

6104

6.89E+09

Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

1570

65.81366

26.89682

0.929397

100

12240

0.441667

1.383264

0

7

Oil Country

12240

0.041667

0.199835

0

1

country_no

12240

120.5

69.28426

1

240

y_GDP_pc_g~w

9044

0.020671

0.056653

-0.5029

0.92586

Human Capital

12125

15.49056

2.765948

8.7167

22.654

_IEastern Bloc_1

12240

0.0125

0.111107

0

1

_IEastern Bloc_2

12240

0.020833

0.142832

0

1

_IEastern Bloc_3

12240

0.0125

0.111107

0

1

_IEastern Bloc_4

12240

0.020833

0.142832

0

1

_IEastern Bloc_5

12240

0.0125

0.111107

0

1

_IEastern Bloc_6

12240

0.029167

0.16828

0

1

_IEastern Bloc_7

12240

0.004167

0.064418

0

1

GDP_pos

12240

0.809314

0.392858

0

1

LQI_pos

12240

0.852941

0.354179

0

1

resid_GDP

1705

-0.02918

0.053128

-0.49863

0.355081

resid_LQI

1685

-0.00246

0.029778

-0.19247

0.113789

Summary Statistics for Data Truncated by GDP Growth
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min

Max

country

0

year

8855

1988.576

13.87945

1961

2010

Corruption

1673

6.708667

2.244425

1

10.6

ELF

8265

0.348258

0.312488

0

0.984

Initial GDP

2817

6849.961

10694.48

105.9102

70151.55

y_GDP_pc

8855

6551.539

10327.74

57.78493

108111.2

yHDI_grow

897

0.008129

0.008151

-0.03564

0.07047

yLQI_grow

7756

0.015503

0.026543

-0.2385

0.286078
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Interaction

2801

0.148962

0.46442

-0.05301

8.858281

yaid_ELF

8322

0.014936

0.038775

-0.00425

0.923939

Human Capital

5648

8.007476

3.304589

0

16.911

Aid

8520

0.036901

0.079945

-0.0292

2.416823

ypop_total

8853

1.86E+08

6.29E+08

6242

6.89E+09

Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

1506

66.15645

26.85708

0.929397

100

8855

0.264483

1.071563

0

7

Oil Country

8855

0.048447

0.214721

0

1

country_no

8855

119.3556

68.66403

2

240

y_GDP_pc_g~w

8855

0.020189

0.04252

-0.14908

0.149426

Human Capital

8853

15.9825

2.704442

8.739056

22.654

GDP_pos

8855

0.745342

0.435694

0

1

LQI_pos

8855

0.813213

0.389763

0

1

resid_GDP

1688

-0.0296

0.047856

-0.2166

0.098088

resid_LQI

1668

-0.00248

0.029646

-0.19247

0.113789

Min

Max

Summary statistics Data Truncated by LQI Growth
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
country

0

year

8174

1989.039

13.84515

1961

2010

Corruption

1661

6.704515

2.252497

1

10.6

ELF

7770

0.38267

0.310439

0

0.984

Initial GDP

2663

6160.636

9017.899

105.9102

47902.77

y_GDP_pc

7797

5908.88

8688.506

57.78493

67554.23

yHDI_grow

896

0.008215

0.008392

-0.03564

0.07047

yLQI_grow

8174

0.015434

0.023569

-0.0796

0.079525

Interaction

2690

0.154754

0.478081

-0.05301

8.858281

yaid_ELF

7760

0.016885

0.041536

-0.00425

0.923939

Human Capital

5666

7.937992

3.326647

0

16.911

Aid

7989

0.035871

0.06681

-0.0292

1.030033

ypop_total

8172

1.51E+08

5.89E+08

9901

6.89E+09
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Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

1467

65.72033

27.0462

0.929397

100

8174

0.258013

1.061826

0

7

Oil Country

8174

0.052728

0.223504

0

1

country_no

8174

120.2929

69.5604

1

240

y_GDP_pc_g~w

7778

0.019422

0.050835

-0.42809

0.568298

Human Capital

8172

15.97032

2.363157

9.200391

22.654

GDP_pos

8174

0.750673

0.43265

0

1

LQI_pos

8174

0.787497

0.409104

0

1

resid_GDP

1667

-0.02846

0.050636

-0.41022

0.234914

resid_LQI

1669

-0.00247

0.028062

-0.10214

0.098546

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Summary Statistics for Data After 2007
Variable
Obs
Mean
country

0

year

720

2009

0.817064

2008

2010

Corruption

523

6.990631

2.105878

1.6

10

ELF

678

0.334327

0.310867

0

0.984

Initial GDP

672

6932.73

10734.25

105.9102

70151.55

y_GDP_pc

648

8170.423

12997.54

99.42976

108111.2

yHDI_grow

557

0.00654

0.007794

-0.03564

0.045946

yLQI_grow

631

0.01243

0.048974

-1

0.08599

Interaction

705

0.246056

0.682312

-0.01848

8.858281

yaid_ELF

678

0.016589

0.05963

-0.00156

0.923939

Human Capital

414

10.29622

3.067797

1.755

16.911

Aid

660

0.040858

0.094229

-0.00246

1.030033

ypop_total

717

1.96E+08

7.38E+08

9786

6.89E+09

Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

274

71.59953

23.82935

7.78577

99.59715

720

0.441667

1.384169

0

7

Oil Country

720

0.041667

0.199965

0

1

country_no

720

120.5

69.32959

1

240
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y_GDP_pc_g~w

648

0.012408

0.043601

-0.17545

0.233896

Human Capital

717

15.89027

2.741505

9.188708

22.654

GDP_pos

720

0.701389

0.457967

0

1

LQI_pos

720

0.741667

0.438023

0

1

resid_GDP

392

-0.03917

0.044655

-0.23972

0.18353

resid_LQI

389

-0.00335

0.028787

-0.09373

0.098546

Summary Statistics for Data after 2007 and Truncated by GDP Growth
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
country

0

year

645

2008.977

0.813942

2008

2010

Corruption

495

6.957172

2.093982

1.6

9.7

ELF

609

0.348708

0.307645

0

0.984

Initial GDP

635

6425.37

10276.62

105.9102

70151.55

y_GDP_pc

645

8147.655

12983.84

99.42976

108111.2

yHDI_grow

533

0.006559

0.007446

-0.03564

0.04298

yLQI_grow

616

0.014079

0.027544

-0.0796

0.08599

Interaction

641

0.246181

0.671412

-0.01848

8.858281

yaid_ELF

615

0.017014

0.06038

-0.00156

0.923939

Human Capital

401

10.34203

3.072301

1.755

16.911

Aid

642

0.039333

0.092354

-0.00246

1.030033

ypop_total

645

2.18E+08

7.76E+08

9786

6.89E+09

Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

260

71.45719

24.11664

7.78577

99.59715

645

0.491473

1.453846

0

7

Oil Country

645

0.044961

0.20738

0

1

country_no

645

120.9829

69.00735

2

240

y_GDP_pc_g~w

645

0.012646

0.041527

-0.14421

0.133112

Human Capital

645

16.17535

2.640021

9.188708

22.654

GDP_pos

645

0.669767

0.470662

0

1

LQI_pos

645

0.71938

0.449651

0

1

resid_GDP

389

-0.03879

0.041264

-0.17883

0.093141
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resid_LQI

384

-0.00315

0.028612

-0.09373

0.098546

Summary Statistics for Data After 2007 and Truncated by LQI Growth
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
country

0

year

626

2008.982

0.814672

2008

2010

Corruption

495

6.947273

2.100517

1.6

9.7

ELF

594

0.359849

0.308176

0

0.984

Initial GDP

609

6159.964

9260.672

105.9102

47902.77

y_GDP_pc

615

7706.859

11248.52

99.42976

67554.23

yHDI_grow

533

0.006592

0.007754

-0.03564

0.045946

yLQI_grow

626

0.013601

0.027294

-0.0796

0.078377

Interaction

623

0.259377

0.694555

-0.01848

8.858281

yaid_ELF

596

0.018033

0.062717

-0.00156

0.923939

Human Capital

402

10.32496

3.089823

1.755

16.911

Aid

625

0.036082

0.085483

-0.00246

1.030033

ypop_total

626

2.24E+08

7.86E+08

31198

6.89E+09

Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

254

71.29909

24.32139

7.78577

99.59715

626

0.5

1.468877

0

7

Oil Country

626

0.046326

0.210358

0

1

country_no

626

120.4297

69.11351

1

240

y_GDP_pc_g~w

615

0.012963

0.043037

-0.17545

0.233896

Human Capital

626

16.36727

2.452007

10.34811

22.654

GDP_pos

626

0.686901

0.464125

0

1

LQI_pos

626

0.704473

0.456644

0

1

resid_GDP

385

-0.03894

0.044669

-0.23972

0.18353

resid_LQI

387

-0.0037

0.028448

-0.09373

0.098546
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Summary Statistics for EASTERN BLOC Countries
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

country

0

year

1377

1985

14.72495

1960

2010

Corruption

282

7.552482

1.3195

3

9.5

ELF

1348

0.364021

0.216933

0

0.701

Initial GDP

338

2105.333

2073.994

122.3984

8849.863

y_GDP_pc

693

2534.632

2286.699

122.0949

13836.19

yHDI_grow

123

0.005666

0.005343

-0.01235

0.020319

yLQI_grow

573

0.015693

0.035628

-0.13122

0.134676

Interaction

350

0.095292

0.155936

0

1.008321

yaid_ELF

1140

0.004035

0.016091

-7.1E-05

0.33237

Human Capital

965

10.20611

2.433879

1.191

16.749

Aid

550

2.12E-02

4.45E-02

-0.00545

5.42E-01

ypop_total

1348

1.51E+07

4.23E+07

55408

1.18E+09

Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

180

83.9955

10.58936

14.57391

95.67303

1377

3.925926

1.824901

1

7

Oil Country

1377

0.037037

0.188921

0

1

country_no

1377

120.963

72.43179

2

231

y_GDP_pc_g~w

666

0.020996

0.091909

-0.45325

0.904682

Human Capital

1348

15.62023

1.164675

10.92248

20.8871

GDP_pos

1377

0.872186

0.334004

0

1

LQI_pos

1377

0.875817

0.32991

0

1

resid_GDP

247

-0.00085

0.049412

-0.20985

0.098088

resid_LQI

244

0.000419

0.031414

-0.10064

0.102143

Summary Statistics for EASTERN BLOC Countries Data Truncated by GDP Growth
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
Obs
country

0
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year

626

1996.84

9.886073

1966

2010

Corruption

276

7.533333

1.321037

3

9.5

ELF

626

0.365383

0.217409

0

0.701

Initial GDP

329

2142.995

2086.159

122.3984

8849.863

y_GDP_pc

626

2636.731

2328.746

122.3984

13836.19

yHDI_grow

122

0.005764

0.005254

-0.01235

0.020319

yLQI_grow

529

0.018192

0.031639

-0.13122

0.134676

Interaction

337

0.098367

0.158047

0

1.008321

yaid_ELF

587

0.00602

0.013145

-7.1E-05

0.140507

Human Capital

469

11.4563

1.910173

5.509

16.749

Aid

498

0.019593

0.036742

-0.00545

0.541714

ypop_total

626

1.42E+07

2.69E+07

1340000

1.49E+08

Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

177

8.41E+01

1.07E+01

14.57391

9.57E+01

626

3.741214

1.79959

1

7

Oil Country

626

0.033546

0.180202

0

1

country_no

626

120.6869

69.20028

2

231

y_GDP_pc_g~w

626

0.027206

0.060036

-0.14878

0.146829

Human Capital

626

15.71377

1.069846

14.10818

18.81737

GDP_pos

626

0.761981

0.426212

0

1

LQI_pos

626

0.77476

0.418074

0

1

resid_GDP

246

-1.10E-10

0.047671

-0.17883

0.098088

resid_LQI

243

0.000693

0.031186

-0.10064

0.102143

Summary Statistics For EASTERN BLOC Countries Data Truncated by LQI Growth
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
country

0

year

554

1999.233

7.526321

1969

2010

Corruption

277

7.527798

1.318068

3

9.5

ELF

554

0.356385

0.215755

0

0.701

Initial GDP

329

2145.049

2087.882

122.3984

8849.863

y_GDP_pc

549

2721.786

2442.503

122.0949

13836.19
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yHDI_grow

122

0.005651

0.005362

-0.01235

0.020319

yLQI_grow

554

0.015426

0.030925

-0.07854

0.079083

Interaction

338

0.098126

0.157876

0

1.008321

yaid_ELF

530

0.007279

0.014957

-7.1E-05

0.140885

Human Capital

415

11.79645

1.72763

7.967

16.749

Aid

514

0.018116

0.027246

-0.00545

0.200977

ypop_total

554

1.56E+07

2.84E+07

1340000

1.49E+08

Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

178

8.41E+01

1.06E+01

14.57391

9.57E+01

554

3.806859

1.768896

1

7

Oil Country

554

0.037906

0.191142

0

1

country_no

554

123.2798

71.27883

2

231

y_GDP_pc_g~w

547

0.020085

0.080229

-0.31178

0.31996

Human Capital

554

15.79216

1.102242

14.10818

18.81737

GDP_pos

554

0.732852

0.44287

0

1

LQI_pos

554

0.703971

0.456916

0

1

resid_GDP

243

-3.96E-05

0.0488

-0.20985

0.098088

resid_LQI

243

-4.22E-11

0.03079

-0.10064

0.054019

Summary Statistics for EASTERN BLOC Countries after 2002
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

country

0

year

216

2006.5

2.29661

2003

2010

Corruption

202

7.556436

1.361987

3

9.4

ELF

216

0.363482

0.217648

0

0.701

Initial GDP

208

2105.333

2075.92

122.3984

8849.863

y_GDP_pc

216

3235.908

2896.294

179.9283

13836.19

yHDI_grow

123

0.005666

0.005343

-0.01235

0.020319

yLQI_grow

216

0.031736

0.029791

-0.07128

0.099531

Interaction

216

0.104992

0.149374

0

0.625952

yaid_ELF

208

0.006141

0.009958

0

0.04246
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Human Capital

152

12.42442

1.788512

8.567

16.749

Aid

216

1.49E-02

2.07E-02

0

1.37E-01

ypop_total

216

1.46E+07

2.75E+07

1340000

1.45E+08

Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

121

84.25285

11.41504

14.57391

95.67303

216

3.925926

1.828476

1

7

Oil Country

216

0.037037

0.189291

0

1

country_no

216

120.963

72.57367

2

231

y_GDP_pc_g~w

216

0.052507

0.059064

-0.17545

0.330305

Human Capital

216

15.72638

1.090822

14.10818

18.78948

GDP_pos

216

0.893519

0.309169

0

1

LQI_pos

216

8.43E-01

0.36503

0

1

resid_GDP

152

-5.29E-05

0.054514

-0.20985

0.098088

resid_LQI

152

0.007098

0.030217

-0.09373

0.054019

Summary Statistics for EASTERN BLOC Countries after 2002 and Data Truncated by GDP
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

country

0

year

210

2006.524

2.300802

2003

2010

Corruption

196

7.529592

1.365375

3

9.4

ELF

210

0.362124

0.219777

0

0.701

Initial GDP

202

2142.158

2090.381

122.3984

8849.863

y_GDP_pc

210

3271.698

2920.323

179.9283

13836.19

yHDI_grow

122

0.005764

0.005254

-0.01235

0.020319

yLQI_grow

210

0.031065

0.028666

-0.07128

0.08599

Interaction

210

0.107027

0.150946

0

0.625952

yaid_ELF

202

0.006284

0.010069

0

0.04246

Human Capital

151

12.41268

1.788579

8.567

16.749

Aid

210

1.52E-02

2.09E-02

0

1.37E-01

ypop_total

210

1.49E+07

2.79E+07

1340000

1.45E+08

Human Capital-Female

118

84.34858

11.52607

14.57391

95.67303
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Eastern Bloc

210

3.971429

1.82988

1

7

Oil Country

210

0.038095

0.191884

0

1

country_no

210

121.5524

71.78283

2

231

y_GDP_pc_g~w

210

0.04943

0.050014

-0.14421

0.140599

Human Capital

210

15.73188

1.102818

14.10818

18.78948

GDP_pos

210

0.895238

0.306978

0

1

LQI_pos

210

8.43E-01

0.364805

0

1

resid_GDP

151

1.34E-03

0.051925

-0.17883

0.098088

resid_LQI

151

0.007584

0.029717

-0.09373

0.054019

Summary Statistics for EASTERN BLOC Countries after 2002 and with Data Truncated by LQI Growth
Variable
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev. Min
Max
country

0

year

211

2006.493

2.316339

2003

2010

Corruption

197

7.521827

1.361077

3

9.4

ELF

211

0.364024

0.219992

0

0.701

Initial GDP

203

2144.85

2085.861

122.3984

8849.863

y_GDP_pc

211

3271.651

2920.667

179.9283

13836.19

yHDI_grow

122

0.005651

0.005362

-0.01235

0.020319

yLQI_grow

211

0.030329

0.028662

-0.07128

0.079083

Interaction

211

0.1066

0.150716

0

0.625952

yaid_ELF

203

0.006259

0.01005

0

0.04246

Human Capital

152

12.42442

1.788512

8.567

16.749

Aid

211

0.015178

0.020872

0

0.137009

ypop_total

211

1.48E+07

2.78E+07

1340000

1.45E+08

Human Capital-Female
Eastern Bloc

119

8.44E+01

1.15E+01

14.57391

9.57E+01

211

3.952607

1.840712

1

7

Oil Country

211

0.037915

0.191444

0

1

country_no

211

122.5308

71.54887

2

231

y_GDP_pc_g~w

211

0.048842

0.052969

-0.17545

0.159808

Human Capital

211

15.72342

1.103028

14.10818

18.78948

GDP_pos

211

0.890995

0.312386

0

1
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LQI_pos

211

0.838863

0.368532

0

1

resid_GDP

152

0.054514

-0.20985

0.098088

resid_LQI

152

-5.29E05
7.10E-03

0.030217

-0.09373

0.054019

Fixed Effects Results
Moderate GDP Growth
(1)
y_GDP_pc_grow

VARIABLES
Corruption

-0.000661
(0.00293)
-0.0315
(0.519)
0.00700
(0.0644)
0.000316*
(0.000161)
0.167***
(0.0392)
0.000213
(0.00832)
0.0173**
(0.00831)
-0.00155
(0.00839)
7.84e-05
(0.00832)
0.00523
(0.00826)
0.0158*
(0.00833)
0.00827
(0.00840)
0.0102
(0.00858)
0.00675
(0.00873)
-0.0144
(0.00896)
-0.0666***
(0.00914)
-0.00432

Aid
Interaction
Human Capital--Female
Human Capital
_Iyear_1999
_Iyear_2000
_Iyear_2001
_Iyear_2002
_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
_Iyear_2010
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(0.0103)
-2.695***
(0.627)

Constant

Observations
813
Number of country_no
134
R-squared
0.343
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
F( 2, 662) = 0.03
Prob > F = 0.9749
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
F( 1, 662) = 0.02
Prob > F = 0.8883
Aid and interaction=0
F( 2, 662) = 0.03
Prob > F = 0.9662
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 662) = 0.01
Prob > F = 0.9027
GDP Growth
(1)
y_GDP_pc_grow

VARIABLES
Corruption

0.00172
(0.00186)
ELF
-0.0106
(0.00979)
Initial GDP
-9.76e-07**
(3.84e-07)
Aid
-0.267
(0.403)
Interaction
0.0380
(0.0510)
Human Capital--Female
0.000372***
(0.000113)
Human Capital
0.000851
(0.00154)
Oil Country
-0.0121
(0.00735)
_Iyear_1998
-0.0126
(0.0112)
_Iyear_1999
-0.0103
(0.00814)
_Iyear_2000
0.00861
(0.00678)
_Iyear_2001
-0.00902
(0.00746)
_Iyear_2002
-0.00543
(0.00699)
_Iyear_2003
0.000866
(0.00708)
_Iyear_2004
0.0185**
(0.00836)
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_Iyear_2005

0.00889
(0.00771)
0.0152*
(0.00788)
0.00877
(0.00683)
-0.00739
(0.00670)
-0.0609***
(0.00840)
-0.00710
(0.0251)

_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
Constant

Observations
818
Number of country_no
134
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 1.96
Prob > chi2 = 0.3758
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 1.93
Prob > chi2 = 0.1643
Aid and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 0.79
Prob > chi2 = 0.6739
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 0.02
Prob > chi2 = 0.9005
Life Quality Growth:
(1)
yLIFE
QUALITY_grow

VARIABLES

Corruption

-0.00148
(0.00198)
Aid
-0.759**
(0.351)
Interaction
0.0729*
(0.0435)
Human Capital--Female
5.96e-05
(0.000109)
Human Capital
0.0519**
(0.0264)
_Iyear_1999
0.0112**
(0.00562)
_Iyear_2000
0.0162***
(0.00562)
_Iyear_2001
0.0198***
(0.00567)
_Iyear_2002
0.0273***
(0.00562)
_Iyear_2003
0.0420***
(0.00560)
_Iyear_2004
0.0454***
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(0.00563)
0.0351***
(0.00567)
0.0358***
(0.00579)
0.0424***
(0.00590)
0.0378***
(0.00605)
-0.00654
(0.00617)
0.0314***
(0.00695)
-0.842**
(0.424)

_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
_Iyear_2010
Constant

Observations
814
Number of country_no
131
R-squared
0.418
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
F( 2, 666) = 1.40
Prob > F = 0.2465
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
F( 1, 666) = 0.44
Prob > F = 0.5063
Aid and interaction=0
F( 2, 666) = 5.07
Prob > F = 0.0065
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 666) = 10.06
Prob > F = 0.0016
Moderate Life Quality growth
(1)
yLIFE
QUALITY_grow

VARIABLES

Corruption

-0.00147
(0.00180)
Aid
-0.161
(0.331)
Interaction
0.00497
(0.0411)
Human Capital--Female
-3.70e-05
(0.000100)
Human Capital
0.0582**
(0.0244)
_Iyear_1999
0.00429
(0.00524)
_Iyear_2000
0.0119**
(0.00523)
_Iyear_2001
0.0136**
(0.00526)
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_Iyear_2002

0.0199***
(0.00523)
0.0358***
(0.00520)
0.0392***
(0.00521)
0.0275***
(0.00527)
0.0281***
(0.00538)
0.0355***
(0.00547)
0.0316***
(0.00561)
-0.0124**
(0.00571)
0.0226***
(0.00652)
-0.931**
(0.391)

_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
_Iyear_2010
Constant

Observations
805
Number of country_no
131
R-squared
0.440
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 1.96
Prob > chi2 = 0.3758
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 1.95
Prob > chi2 = 0.1628
Aid and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 0.79
Prob > chi2 = 0.6739
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 0.02
Prob > chi2 = 0.8858
After 2007 moderate GDP Growth
(1)
y_GDP_pc_grow

VARIABLES
Corruption

0.0165
(0.0132)
Aid
-7.893**
(3.541)
Interaction
0.747*
(0.388)
Human Capital--Female
-6.71e-05
(0.000300)
Human Capital
1.734***
(0.487)
_Iyear_2008
0.0183
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(0.0137)
-0.0475***
(0.0106)
-27.96***
(7.860)

_Iyear_2009
Constant

Observations
194
Number of country_no
106
R-squared
0.586
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

CORRUPTION and interaction=0
F( 2, 81) = 3.35
Prob > F = 0.0401
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
F( 1, 81) = 6.58
Prob > F = 0.0122
Aid and interaction=0
F( 2, 81) = 2.73
Prob > F = 0.0710
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 81) = 4.72
Prob > F = 0.0327

GDP Growth after 2007
(1)
y_GDP_pc_grow

VARIABLES
Corruption

0.00562
(0.00347)
ELF
-0.00415
(0.0151)
Initial GDP
1.04e-07
(6.12e-07)
Aid
0.939
(0.778)
Interaction
-0.116
(0.0974)
Human Capital--Female
-0.000216
(0.000150)
Human Capital
0.00287
(0.00217)
Oil Country
-0.0315***
(0.0102)
_Iyear_1998
0
(0)
_Iyear_1999
0
(0)
_Iyear_2000
0
(0)
_Iyear_2001
0
(0)
_Iyear_2002
0
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(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
-0.00685
(0.00662)
-0.0586***
(0.00778)
-0.0328
(0.0418)

_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
Constant

Observations
195
Number of country_no
106
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 3.01
Prob > chi2 = 0.2220
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 0.04
Prob > chi2 = 0.8353
Aid and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 1.46
Prob > chi2 = 0.4818
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 1.08
Prob > chi2 = 0.2982
After 2007, moderate Life Quality growth
(1)
yLife
Quality_grow

VARIABLES

Corruption

-0.00174
(0.00724)
Aid
-1.141
(2.019)
Interaction
-0.0317
(0.221)
Human Capital--Female
-0.000262
(0.000171)
Human Capital
0.712**
(0.277)
_Iyear_2008
0.0200**
(0.00783)
_Iyear_2009
-0.0301***
(0.00607)
Constant
-11.39**
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(4.479)
Observations
195
Number of country_no
106
R-squared
0.719
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
F( 2, 82) = 0.05
Prob > F = 0.9522
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
F( 1, 82) = 0.09
Prob > F = 0.7666A
id and interaction=0
F( 2, 82) = 2.90
Prob > F = 0.0607
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 82) = 3.70
Prob > F = 0.0579
After 2007, Life Quality growth
(1)
yLIFE
QUALITY_grow

VARIABLES

Corruption

0.00268*
(0.00162)
Aid
0.380
(0.494)
ELF
0.0110*
(0.00643)
Initial GDP
1.45e-07
(3.06e-07)
Interaction
-0.0496
(0.0625)
Human Capital--Female
-0.000158**
(7.47e-05)
Human Capital
9.75e-05
(0.00117)
Oil Country
-0.00477
(0.00793)
_Iyear_1998
0
(0)
_Iyear_1999
0
(0)
_Iyear_2000
0
(0)
_Iyear_2001
0
(0)
_Iyear_2002
0
(0)
_Iyear_2003
0
(0)
_Iyear_2004
0
(0)
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_Iyear_2005

0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0.0100***
(0.00375)
-0.0328***
(0.00434)
0.00867
(0.0212)

_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
Constant

Observations
195
Number of country_no
106
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

CORRUPTION and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 2.82
Prob > chi2 = 0.2437
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 0.07
Prob > chi2 = 0.7975
Aid and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 0.68
Prob > chi2 = 0.7122
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 0.23
Prob > chi2 = 0.6338
Eastern Bloc, moderate GDP growth:
(1)
y_GDP_pc_grow

VARIABLES
Corruption

-0.00840*
(0.00496)
Aid
1.421
(2.034)
Interaction
-0.140
(0.229)
Human Capital
-0.00246
(0.0126)
_Iyear_1998
-0.0378
(0.0357)
_Iyear_1999
-0.0245
(0.0467)
_Iyear_2001
0.00678
(0.0180)
_Iyear_2002
0.00440
(0.0278)
_Iyear_2003
0.0153
(0.0394)
_Iyear_2004
0.0256
(0.0518)
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_Iyear_2005

0.00747
(0.0131)
0.0160
(0.0206)
0.0144
(0.0319)
-0.0127
(0.0436)
-0.105*
(0.0555)
-0.0316**
(0.0141)
0.134
(0.154)
-1.987
(2.489)

_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
_Iyear_2010
Human Capital
Constant

Observations
216
Number of country_no
19
R-squared
0.583
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
F( 2, 180) = 3.06
Prob > F = 0.0493
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
F( 1, 180) = 3.35
Prob > F = 0.0688
Aid and interaction=0
F( 2, 180) = 0.38
Prob > F = 0.6837
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 180) = 0.76
Prob > F = 0.3841
Eastern Bloc GDP Growth:
(1)
y_GDP_pc_grow

VARIABLES
Corruption

-0.00394
(0.00414)
ELF
0.0130
(0.0147)
Oil Country
0.00651
(0.00873)
Initial GDP
-4.97e-06**
(2.20e-06)
Aid
2.179
(1.692)
Interaction
-0.247
(0.188)
Human Capital
0.000444
(0.00293)
_Iyear_1998
-0.00985
(0.0186)
Copyright © Amanda Deerfield 2013

177

_Iyear_1999

-0.000183
(0.0144)
0.0341***
(0.0106)
0.0365***
(0.0106)
0.0312***
(0.00782)
0.0401***
(0.00865)
0.0462***
(0.0121)
0.0394***
(0.00787)
0.0456***
(0.00806)
0.0417***
(0.00837)
0.0109
(0.00929)
-0.0906***
(0.0177)
0.000296
(0.00349)
0.0514
(0.0652)

_Iyear_2000
_Iyear_2001
_Iyear_2002
_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
Human Capital
Constant

Observations
217
Number of country_no
19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 9.87
Prob > chi2 = 0.0072
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 9.74
Prob > chi2 = 0.0018
Aid and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 1.74
Prob > chi2 = 0.4196
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 0.66
Prob > chi2 = 0.4183
Eastern Bloc moderate Life Quality growth:
(1)
yLIFE
QUALITY_grow

VARIABLES

Corruption

0.000824
(0.00175)
ELF
0.0132**
(0.00561)
Oil Country
0.00719**
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(0.00365)
-2.01e-06**
(9.51e-07)
1.071*
(0.554)
-0.140*
(0.0716)
0.000953
(0.000845)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0.0344***
(0.00596)
0.0348***
(0.00455)
0.0221***
(0.00352)
0.0251***
(0.00329)
0.0408***
(0.00486)
0.0317***
(0.00453)
-0.0454***
(0.00717)
0.000540
(0.00154)
-0.0121
(0.0219)

Initial GDP
Aid
Interaction
Human Capital
_Iyear_1998
_Iyear_1999
_Iyear_2000
_Iyear_2001
_Iyear_2002
_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
Human Capital
Constant

Observations
151
Number of country_no
19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

CORRUPTION and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 4.83
Prob > chi2 = 0.0894
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 2.32
Prob > chi2 = 0.1276
Aid and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 3.83
Prob > chi2 = 0.1475
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 0.01
Prob > chi2 = 0.9033
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Eastern Bloc Life Quality Growth:
(1)
yLIFE
QUALITY_gro
w

VARIABLES

Corruption

0.00174
(0.00274)
1.786
(1.125)
-0.193
(0.127)
0.00464
(0.00695)
-0.0170
(0.0197)
-0.0378
(0.0258)
0.0150
(0.00993)
0.0137
(0.0153)
0.0274
(0.0218)
0.0251
(0.0286)
0.0274***
(0.00724)
0.0271**
(0.0114)
0.0397**
(0.0176)
0.0276
(0.0240)
-0.0542*
(0.0307)
0.00507
(0.00780)
0.0992
(0.0850)
-1.634
(1.370)

Aid
Interaction
Human Capital
_Iyear_1998
_Iyear_1999
_Iyear_2001
_Iyear_2002
_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
_Iyear_2010
Human Capital
Constant

Observations
217
Number of country_no
19
R-squared
0.700
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

CORRUPTION and interaction=0
F( 2, 181) = 1.19
Prob > F = 0.3079
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
F( 1, 181) = 0.51
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Prob > F = 0.4749
Aid and interaction=0
F( 2, 181) = 1.30
Prob > F = 0.2739
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 181) = 2.03
Prob > F = 0.1559
Eastern Bloc, moderate GDP growth after 2002
(1)
y_GDP_pc_grow

VARIABLES
Corruption

-0.00796
(0.00581)
0.727
(2.400)
-0.165
(0.276)
0.0295
(0.0196)
-0.0716
(0.0539)
-0.0972
(0.0735)
-0.0250
(0.0226)
-0.0617
(0.0415)
-0.121**
(0.0605)
-0.247***
(0.0800)
-0.0506***
(0.0118)
0.556**
(0.237)
-8.980**
(3.848)

Aid
Interaction
Human Capital
_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
_Iyear_2010
Human Capital
Constant

Observations
150
Number of country_no
19
R-squared
0.668
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
F( 2, 119) = 2.52
Prob > F = 0.0848
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
F( 1, 119) = 4.97
Prob > F = 0.0277
Aid and interaction=0
F( 2, 119) = 0.94
Prob > F = 0.3930
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 119) = 0.74
Prob > F = 0.3918
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Eastern Bloc GDP Growth after 2002
(1)
y_GDP_pc_grow

VARIABLES
Corruption

-0.00676
(0.00604)
1.023
(2.499)
-0.197
(0.288)
0.0282
(0.0204)
0.180***
(0.0307)
0.156***
(0.0142)
0.248***
(0.0834)
0.225***
(0.0630)
0.190***
(0.0426)
0.132***
(0.0237)
0.198**
(0.0791)
0.631**
(0.246)
-10.41**
(4.031)

Aid
Interaction
Human Capital
_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2010
Human Capital
Constant

Observations
151
Number of country_no
19
R-squared
0.678
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
F( 2, 120) = 2.06
Prob > F = 0.1319
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
F( 1, 120) = 3.95
Prob > F = 0.0490
Aid and interaction=0
F( 2, 120) = 0.88
Prob > F = 0.4177
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 120) = 0.56
Prob > F = 0.4572
Eastern Bloc moderate Life Quality growth after 2002
(1)
yLIFE
QUALITY_gro
w

VARIABLES
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Corruption

0.000300
(0.00239)
0.610
(0.986)
-0.110
(0.114)
0.00422
(0.00807)
0.0876***
(0.0121)
0.0841***
(0.00562)
0.0824**
(0.0329)
0.0817***
(0.0249)
0.0933***
(0.0168)
0.0813***
(0.00934)
0.0580*
(0.0312)
0.157
(0.0971)
-2.574
(1.591)

Aid
Interaction
Human Capital
_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2010
Human Capital
Constant

Observations
151
Number of country_no
19
R-squared
0.826
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
F( 2, 120) = 0.63
Prob > F = 0.5340
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
F( 1, 120) = 0.49
Prob > F = 0.4849
Aid and interaction=0
F( 2, 120) = 1.51
Prob > F = 0.2258
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
F( 1, 120) = 0.77
Prob > F = 0.3807
Eastern Bloc Life Quality growth after 2002
(1)
yLIFE
QUALITY_grow

VARIABLES

Corruption

0.000824
(0.00175)
ELF
0.0132**
(0.00561)
Oil Country
0.00719**
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(0.00365)
-2.01e-06**
(9.51e-07)
1.071*
(0.554)
-0.140*
(0.0716)
0.000953
(0.000845)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0
(0)
0.0344***
(0.00596)
0.0348***
(0.00455)
0.0221***
(0.00352)
0.0251***
(0.00329)
0.0408***
(0.00486)
0.0317***
(0.00453)
-0.0454***
(0.00717)
0.000540
(0.00154)
-0.0121
(0.0219)

Initial GDP
Aid
Interaction
Human Capital
_Iyear_1998
_Iyear_1999
_Iyear_2000
_Iyear_2001
_Iyear_2002
_Iyear_2003
_Iyear_2004
_Iyear_2005
_Iyear_2006
_Iyear_2007
_Iyear_2008
_Iyear_2009
Human Capital
Constant

Observations
151
Number of country_no
19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
CORRUPTION and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 4.83
Prob > chi2 = 0.0894
At mean aid level, CORRUPTION and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 0.89
Prob > chi2 = 0.3445
Aid and interaction=0
chi2( 2) = 3.83
Prob > chi2 = 0.1475
At mean corruption level, aid and interaction = 0
chi2( 1) = 0.01
Prob > chi2 = 0.9089
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Impacts
Corruption
Mean

Aid
Mean

impact
aid

impact
corruption

all data

6.75

0.038

gdp

6.75

0.038

-0.06008

0.006128

lqi

6.75

0.038

-7.395

0.00604

moderate gdp

6.708

0.037

-0.01614

0.003416

moderate lqi

6.704

0.0359

-0.05874

0.002783

>2007 gdp

6.99

0.0409

0.27623

-0.00159

>2007 lqi

6.99

0.0409

0.0972

-0.00118

>2007 and moderate gdp

6.95

0.036

0.24575

-0.00038

>2007 and moderate lqi

6.957

0.03933

0.10116

-0.00099

FSU gdp

7.55

0.0212

-36.1745

-0.11821

fsu lqi

7.55

0.0212

-0.02655

-0.00371

fsu lqi after 2002

7.556

0.015

0.563284

-0.00532

fsu gdp after 2002

7.556

0.015

6.126

-0.0129
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